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To avoid environmental breakdown, high-income countries need to transition to 
a post-growth economy that can deliver wellbeing within planetary boundaries, 
independent of GDP growth. The post-growth literature recognises that such a 
transition will require structural change in the sectoral composition of economic 
output and demand. But the literature is lacking a systematic analysis of the 
structural change that is desired and how we can achieve it. In my thesis I 
address the gap by answering the question how structural change can contribute 
to the transition to a post-growth economy, focusing on the contribution it can 
make to reducing final energy demand and to reducing labour productivity 
growth.  
I answer the question by combining two research streams. The first stream uses 
novel estimates of embodied energy and labour productivity of sectors in the UK 
and Germany to identify labour-intensive service sectors and test the assumption 
that they can reduce energy use and labour productivity growth. Building on the 
results I develop a systematic framework for identifying structural change goals 
for a post-growth economy. The framework splits the economy into 4 sector 
groups with similar characteristics and structural change goals. The second 
stream adds new insights to the literature on structural change drivers with a 
novel decomposition analysis of final energy demand in the UK. I demonstrate 
that structural change has only made a relatively small contribution to energy 
demand reductions and has largely been driven by offshoring.  
Combining the two streams I assess historical structural change against the goals 
for a post-growth economy. I find that it has partially been in the right direction. 
But, to move to a post-growth economy, more attention needs to be paid to the 
drivers and consequences of structural change, as the historical drivers are 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction and literature review 
1.1 Introduction  
Human activities are now breaching several planetary boundaries, for example 
with regard to climate change, biodiversity loss and the alteration of the nitrogen 
cycle (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015; O’Neill et al., 2018). These 
planetary boundaries define a “safe operating space” for humanity (Rockström et 
al., 2009). Breaching one or more of them leads to changes in the earth system 
that will likely make conditions on the planet much less hospitable for human 
life, with potentially catastrophic effects on human livelihoods (Steffen et al., 
2015).  
Moving the impacts of human activities back within planetary boundaries will 
require a fundamental transformation of the economic system, as greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, energy use and other environmental impacts are intrinsically 
linked to the way we produce goods and services (Steinberger et al., 2013). At the 
same time significant parts of the global population live in poverty (OPHI and 
UNDP, 2019), almost a billion people do not have access to electricity (IEA, 2019) 
and inequality is increasing both within and between nations (Alvaredo et al., 
2018).  
The big challenge for the 21st century is to reduce our environmental impacts at 
the speed and scale necessary to return to within planetary boundaries while 
simultaneously transforming our economic system to provide for the needs of 
everyone to flourish under these circumstances. Historically the growth in 
economic production, as measured by the gross domestic product (GDP), has 
been closely coupled with the growth in environmental impacts, such as GHG 
emissions or material use (Hickel and Kallis, 2019). It is therefore likely that 
effective policy actions to reduce such impacts to levels within planetary 
boundaries will lead to reductions in GDP, at least in high-income countries. In 
our current system, such reductions in GDP, or even just in its growth rate, 
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exacerbate many social challenges, such as unemployment, poverty, bankruptcies 
and inequality (Kallis et al., 2018).  
The economic transformation will therefore need to be one towards a post-
growth economy, an economy that provides the needs for human flourishing 
within planetary boundaries, independent of whether GDP is growing or not. 
With the research presented in my thesis I hope to contribute a small piece to the 
puzzle of achieving such a transformation.  
In my research I will specifically focus on investigating what structural change in 
the sectoral composition of the economy, in terms of output, demand and labour, 
is needed for the transition to a post-growth economy. It is widely acknowledged 
in the literature that the transition to a post-growth economy will be a qualitative 
transformation, which will have different implications for different sectors. While 
some activities will need to decline, others will need to grow and others will have 
to be qualitatively transformed (Kallis, 2011). However, there has been no 
systematic treatment of structural change in the post-growth literature that 
identifies the change needed in the sectoral composition and potential ways to 
achieve it. Such a systematic treatment of structural change, drawing on the 
insights of the wider economic literature, would be a useful addition to the post-
growth literature. It would allow the identification of sector-specific strategies 
and it would make the post-growth vision more concrete and easier to 
communicate to policy makers, businesses and the general public, who are often 
used to discussing the economy in terms of different sectors.  
With my thesis I contribute to addressing this gap in the post-growth literature 
by answering the following research question:  
How can structural change contribute to the creation of a post-growth 
economy?  
I particularly focus on the contribution that structural change can make to 
reductions in final energy demand and to ensuring employment through 
reductions in labour productivity growth, because the post-growth literature 
suggests that these are two key objectives that can be potentially and partially 
achieved through structural change (Jackson, 2017, pp.219–220). I also focus on 
investigating structural change in high-income countries, because such countries 
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have been the focus of most of the post-growth literature and face a challenge 
that is distinct from those in low-income countries. However, given the 
importance of international trade for structural change, I pay particular attention 
to the insights that can be gained from a supply chain perspective, which 
considers the interlinkages between production and demand in high-income 
countries and the global economic system.  
I address my overarching research question using a two-streamed approach 
(Figure 1-1). In the first stream I review the treatment of structural change in the 
post-growth literature and present new evidence for identifying structural change 
goals for a post-growth economy. In the second stream I review the literature on 
structural change in the wider economics literature and present new evidence on  
 
 
Figure 1-1: Outline of the thesis content 
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the drivers of structural change and its relationship to energy use. Bringing these 
two streams together allows me to discuss in how far historical structural change 
has moved us towards a post-growth economy and what further efforts will be 
necessary to achieve the structural change desired for a post-growth economy.  
In the remainder of this chapter I will review both the literature on post-growth 
economics and the literature on structural change to discuss, firstly, how 
structural change has been treated in the post-growth literature, and, secondly, 
what we can learn about the historical trends and drivers of structural change 
from the wider economics literature. Based on the review I identify three specific 
gaps that are important for answering my overarching research question, two 
related to Stream 1 and one related to Stream 2. From these gaps I derive three 
specific research objectives for my thesis that are addressed in three academic 
articles that make up Chapters 2, 3 and 4 (Figure 1-1).  
Firstly, there is limited evidence on how the historical relationship between 
structural change and energy use in high-income countries has been mediated by 
developments in international trade and the offshoring of specific sectors. A 
better understanding of this issue is important to determine how far the energy 
savings achieved from structural change have been desirable from the perspective 
of a post-growth economy and could provide a plausible route for further energy 
demand reductions in the future. Therefore the first objective of my research is:  
A. To provide evidence on the role of international trade in shaping 
structural change and energy use in high-income countries. 
Secondly, one element of structural change that has been identified explicitly in 
the post-growth literature is the need to shift the economy towards labour-
intensive services. However, there is very little empirical research on the question 
which sectors in the economy show the desired characteristics of labour-
intensive services. The evidence is especially limited when it comes to sector 
characteristics from an embodied perspective. The second objective of my 
research is:  
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B. To provide empirical evidence on sectoral characteristics for the 
identification of labour-intensive services, focusing on an embodied 
perspective.   
Thirdly, the post-growth literature does not feature a systematic approach for 
identifying the structural change desired for a post-growth economy. There are 
some partial ideas, such as the need for more labour-intensive services, but there 
is no assessment for the whole economy. The third objective of my research is:  
C. To develop a systematic approach for determining desirable structural 
change and sector-specific strategies for a post-growth economy.  
Finally, there is also very little discussion in the post-growth literature on how 
structural change happens in the economy and what strategies could be 
employed to shape it towards the desired outcomes. Therefore the discussion of 
potential strategies for achieving structural change for a post-growth economy 
will be a cross-cutting theme of this thesis that will be discussed in conjunction 
with all of the three research objectives outlined above. 
I outline my approach for achieving the research objectives in Section 1.4. 
1.2 Structural change for a post-growth economy  
1.2.1 Post-growth economics 
The past decades have seen a growing academic literature and advocacy 
movement arguing that the only realistic and sensible way to avoid catastrophic 
environmental changes is to adopt new economic approaches that prioritise the 
delivery of prosperity within planetary boundaries over GDP growth. Such 
approaches have been called steady-state economics (Daly, 1977; Dietz and 
O’Neill, 2013), degrowth (Schneider et al., 2010; Kallis, 2018), post-growth 
economics (Jackson, 2017) or doughnut economics (Raworth, 2017). 
Around the approaches described above, a diverse academic literature has 
developed, which is seeking to develop theories, models and strategies for a 
sustainable economy not reliant on GDP growth. Despite the use of different 
terminology and labels, the different approaches are well interconnected, they 
share many goals and assumptions and there exists a lot of cross-fertilisation. For 
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the purpose of my thesis, the commonalities of these approaches are more 
important than their differences and I will therefore discuss them as one 
literature under the label of “post-growth” economics. I choose the term “post-
growth” because I consider it the widest and most general term of the ones used.  
The arguments in the post-growth literature are particularly founded on two 
bodies of evidence. The first body of evidence describes the close historical 
coupling of GDP with energy use, GHG emissions, material use and biodiversity 
loss (Hickel and Kallis, 2019; Parrique et al., 2019; Haberl et al., 2020; Otero et 
al., 2020; Vadén et al., 2020). While these environmental impacts have generally 
been growing more slowly than GDP, the evidence suggests that it is very 
unlikely that we can decouple GDP growth from its environmental impacts fast 
enough to avoid catastrophic environmental breakdown.  
The second body of evidence relates to the relationship between wellbeing and 
GDP, which suggests that GDP in itself is not a good indicator of progress 
(Stiglitz et al., 2010; Costanza et al., 2014). Above a relatively low threshold, 
measures of life satisfaction, life expectancy or educational attainment are not 
increasing consistently with GDP (Deaton, 2008; Inglehart et al., 2008; Easterlin 
et al., 2010; Jackson, 2017, pp.74–76).  
Together these two bodies of evidence suggest that continued increases in GDP, 
especially in high-income countries, are neither compatible with avoiding 
environmental breakdown, nor necessary for achieving prosperity. Nevertheless, 
there is also a shared recognition across the post-growth literature that GDP 
growth is systemically embedded in our current economies. Even though GDP is 
not a good measure of progress, a stagnating or shrinking GDP is accompanied by 
undesirable social consequences, such as increasing unemployment, poverty and 
inequality. Jackson (2017, p.66) refers to this challenge explicitly as the “dilemma 
of growth”, but it is also acknowledged in the wider post-growth literature (Daly, 
2008; Schneider et al., 2010; Kallis, 2011; Raworth, 2017). The dilemma of growth 
demands that the transformation to a post-growth economy needs to be an all-
encompassing systemic change, because the treatment of individual problems 
will always run up against the dilemma. Achieving such a transformation in a 
socially acceptable way, however, provides a huge challenge. 
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In contrast to many other economic schools of thought, post-growth economics 
is not united around specific theories or methods, but instead around a shared 
framing of the challenge and shared goals for economic transformation. The 
shared goals become very clear when comparing the descriptions of different 
post-growth approaches in the literature  (Table 1-1). For the purpose of my thesis 
I define a post-growth economy based on three characteristics derived from the 
shared goals:  
1. In a post-growth economy the environmental impacts of human activities 
are reduced to levels within planetary boundaries.  
2. A post-growth economy provides for human needs and enables flourishing 
for everyone and the benefits of economic activities are equitably 
distributed.  
3. Continued GDP growth is not seen as a desirable goal in a post-growth 
economy and it is recognised that the transformation required to achieve 
the first two characteristics will likely lead to reductions in GDP in high-
income countries.  
The first two characteristics are explicitly shared in all the three definitions given 
in Table 1-1. They are also graphically captured in Raworth’s “doughnut”, which 
describes a “safe and just space” between the “ecological ceiling” on the outside, 
defined by the planetary boundaries, and the “social foundations” on the inside, 
defined by basic human needs (Raworth, 2017). Similarly to the other definitions, 
she advocates that living within this “doughnut”, rather than continued GDP 
growth, should be the overarching goal for society.  
Table 1-1: Definitions of different post-growth approaches 
Steady-state Economics Degrowth Post-growth economics 
“If an economy manages to 
achieve relatively constant stocks 
and flows over the analysis period 
(…). If the economy also manages 
to maintain material flows within 
ecological limits, then it is 
referred to as a steady-state 
economy. If, in addition (…), the 
country manages to achieve a 
high quality of life for its citizens, 
then it is referred to as a socially 
sustainable steady-state 
economy.” (O’Neill, 2015, p.1215) 
“We define degrowth as a 
voluntary transition towards a 
just, participatory, and 
ecologically sustainable society. 
(…) The objectives of degrowth are 
to meet basic human needs and 
ensure a high quality of life, while 
reducing the ecological impact of 
the global economy to a 
sustainable level, equitably 
distributed between nations.” 
(Research & Degrowth, 2010, 
p.524) 
A post-growth society is “one in 
which neither economic stability 
nor decent employment rely 
inherently on relentless 
consumption growth. One in 
which economic activity remains 
within ecological scale. One in 
which our ability to flourish 
within ecological limits becomes 
both a guiding principle for design 
and a key criterion for success.” 
(Jackson, 2017, p.160) 
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The third characteristic is only implicit in the definitions given in Table 1-1. 
However, it is an important feature in the post-growth literature, because it is the 
de-prioritisation of GDP growth that sets the post-growth literature apart from 
other approaches to sustainable economics, such as green growth. While the 
necessity of the first two characteristics would probably be widely accepted 
among economists and policy makers of different backgrounds, the expectation 
that these two characteristics can, and might have to be, achieved without 
further GDP growth is much more controversial.  
Most of the post-growth literature has focused on achieving the goals of a post-
growth economy within high-income countries, which are also the focus of my 
thesis. The reason is that the consumption in high-income countries is associated 
with much higher environmental impacts per capita (Simas et al., 2015; O’Neill et 
al., 2018) and it is in high-income countries where continued GDP growth 
contributes the least to wellbeing (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013, pp.26–27). While low-
income countries fundamentally share the same goals, namely the achievement 
of flourishing within planetary boundaries, they face a different set of challenges 
for achieving them.  
In addition to the shared overarching vision in the post-growth literature, there is 
also considerable overlap and agreement on the practical policies proposed for 
the transition to a post-growth economy. Such proposals are rooted in a shared 
understanding that the economic and social changes envisioned in the post-
growth literature cannot be achieved without strong government action (Kallis, 
2011; Jackson, 2017, pp.185–209). A full discussion of post-growth policy 
proposals is beyond the scope of this chapter, but Table 1-2 provides an overview 
of the most common policy goals and policy instruments proposed across the 
post-growth literature.  
Despite the commonalities with regard to the overarching vision and policy 
proposals, there remain considerable differences and debates within the post-
growth economics literature. Key differences relate to the question of how deep 
the changes in our economic institutions, norms and lifestyles will have to be to 
achieve a high quality of life within planetary boundaries.  
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Table 1-2: Common policy goals and instruments in the post-growth literature 
Policy goal Policy instruments 
Limit resource use and 
emissions 
 Cap and trade systems 
 Environmental taxes 
 Mandatory warranties and repair services  
Provide universal social 
security 
 Universal basic income 
 Universal basic services 
 Job guarantee 
Reduce inequality  Minimum and maximum income limits 
 Progressive taxation, including wealth taxes 
 Wider distribution of asset ownership  
Maintain employment  Reduced working hours 
 Support for labour-intensive service sectors  
Reform the financial system  Credit guidance 
 Public investment banks 
 Sovereign money  
Change policy priorities  Alternative indicators of progress to replace GDP 
Foster local production  Restrictions on international trade and capital flows 
 Local currencies  




 Support not-for-profit and social enterprises 
 Creation of common spaces ( e.g. libraries, community 
centres) 
 Common government of shared resources and spaces 
Sources: (Daly, 2008; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013; Cosme et al., 2017; Jackson, 2017; Hardt and O’Neill, 2017; 
Kallis, 2018) 
Many degrowth proponents are very sceptical whether the fundamental 
dynamics and institutions of our current capitalist economy, such as wage labour, 
profit, private property, corporations and private credit, are compatible with the 
achievement of a high quality of life within planetary boundaries (Johanisova et 
al., 2013; Kallis et al., 2015; Hinton, 2020). They argue that the implementation of 
the necessary policies will only work if there is a much deeper shift in social 
values, norms and institutions towards “‘sharing’, ‘simplicity’, ‘conviviality’, ’care’ 
and the ‘commons’” (Kallis et al., 2015). Achieving such a shift requires a 
deconstruction of some of the foundational conceptualisations of the consumer 
society, including “progress, science and technology” (Latouche, 2010, p.520). 
Changes proposed in the degrowth literature therefore go considerably beyond 
what is commonly considered to be part of economics and include, for example, 
the strengthening and reformation of democracy (Fournier, 2008; Demaria et al., 
2013; Kallis et al.,2018), a different governance of technology and innovation 
focused on simplicity and conviviality (Kerschner et al., 2018) and the 
establishment of alternatives forms of living (Cattaneo, 2015). A large part of the 
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degrowth literature and movement is not only about transforming economic 
thinking but also about challenging our societies’ focus on economic reasoning 
and the framing of problems in economic terms as such (Kallis, 2018, p.8). 
Despite such radical thinking, many of the practical policy proposals in the 
degrowth literature, such as carbon taxes, are still framed in terms of 
conventional economic thinking.   
Other streams in the post-growth literature are somewhat less radical in their 
approach to economic transformation, even though they still constitute 
considerable departures from mainstream thinking. They are more selective in 
the parts of the economic system that are criticised and see a continued role for 
existing institutions. For example, Daly’s seminal work (1991; 2008), focuses on 
radical reforms of the economic system, mostly through top-down policies 
focused on restrictions on resource use, inequality, trade and a redefinition of 
measures of progress. But compared to the degrowth literature he is less 
concerned with changes in lifestyles, the meaning and organisation of work and 
the existence of profit and private property. Similarly, Jackson (2017, p.185) 
mainly attacks the current system, norms and institutions of “consumer 
capitalism”, which is the part of the system that locks us into a destructive cycle 
of novelty production and consumption, which entices us to seek meaning 
through unnecessary material consumption and which exploits and exacerbates 
our individualistic and self-centred values. He is less critical of markets as an 
institution per se and considers wage labour as important source of meaning. As 
a solution he proposes that our economic institutions, specifically work, 
enterprise, investment and money creation, need to be redesigned around new 
values, emphasising collective responsibility, long-term commitment, 
participation and the common good.   
Debates on the depth of change required for a post-growth economy are closely 
intertwined with debates about effective strategies for achieving the desired 
change. Especially the degrowth proposals and the use of the term “degrowth” 
have been criticised for being too radical, based on the argument that such 
language cannot reach beyond a core of people already convinced into other 
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important areas of civil society, governments and businesses (Van den Bergh, 
2011).  
In response, degrowth proponents argue that, given the power and influence of 
vested interests benefiting from the current system, necessary policies to achieve 
a post-growth economy will not be implemented by governments unless radical 
social movements are effective in shifting the power balance in society (Kallis, 
2011). From the beginning the degrowth community has therefore understood 
itself as a movement for radical social change, based on a combination of 
grassroots action and academic research (Demaria et al., 2013; Weiss and 
Cattaneo, 2017).  
1.2.2 Structural change for a post-growth economy  
1.2.2.1 The case for structural change analysis 
The analysis of structural change has a long history in economics. Silva and 
Teixeira (2008, p.275) broadly define structural change analysis as any approach 
that divides “the economic system into a limited number of subsystems, in order 
to analyse the dynamic properties of the economy as a whole”. Although the 
division of economic output into different sectors is one of the most common 
approaches to structural change analysis, structural change can also be analysed 
along other dimensions. Ciarli and Savona (2019) identify six aspects of structural 
change that are especially relevant for climate change mitigation, namely sectors, 
industrial organisation, technical change, employment, demand and institutions. 
While the transformation to a post-growth economy will require structural 
change in all of these aspects, I focus specifically on structural change in the 
sectoral composition of the economy, in terms of output, demand and 
employment. For the remainder of this thesis I will therefore use the term 
structural change to refer to such changes in the sectoral composition of the 
economy.  
There is a general recognition in the post-growth literature that the transition to 
a post-growth economy is a qualitative change that will require changes in the 
composition of goods and services that are produced and consumed (Daly, 2008; 
Schneider et al., 2010). While it is expected that serious efforts to reduce 
12 
 
environmental impacts to sustainable levels will reduce the size of GDP, such 
reductions in GDP are not expected to be equally distributed across the economy. 
Kallis (2011, p.875), citing Latouche, briefly introduces the idea of “selective 
degrowth”, arguing that there is a need for public debate about which economic 
activities will have to expand and which will have to be reduced. He argues that 
such a selection cannot be left to market forces. Similarly, both Cosme et al. 
(2017) and Hardt and O’Neill (2017) identify shifts in consumption and 
production between different products as an important theme in the post-growth 
literature.  
Despite this general recognition, however, there is little analysis in the post-
growth literature that systematically investigates how the sectoral composition of 
the economy will have to change, how such change can be achieved and what it 
implies for differences in sector-specific strategies. Discussions around “selective 
degrowth” are not continued further in the degrowth literature and the term does 
not feature in two recent reviews by Weiss and Cattaneo (2017) and Kallis et al. 
(2018). Similarly, the term “structural change” is virtually absent from the post-
growth literature, with very little engagement with the structural change 
literature in the wider field of economics. The only exception is the discussion of 
Baumol’s cost disease by Jackson (2017, pp.170–174). Structural change has been 
investigated as part of transition pathways to a sustainable economy, but these 
usually assume the context of a growing economy (Campiglio, 2014; Ciarli and 
Savona, 2019).  
The absence of a systematic analysis of the structural change needed for a post-
growth economy presents an important omission in the post-growth literature. 
Developing such a structural change analysis can therefore further the transition 
to a post-growth economy in three important ways.   
Firstly, as already outlined above, structural change will be an important part of 
the transition to a post-growth economy, either as a consequence of other post-
growth policies or as the outcome of strategic actions to achieve structural 
change. It is therefore important to develop an analysis that systematically 
considers what structural change is necessary and/or desired for a post-growth 
economy and how these can be achieved. In addition, such an analysis of 
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structural change can form the foundation for the development of sector-specific 
policies that fill the gap between policies aimed at the whole economy and 
policies aimed at individual organisations.  
Secondly, analysing the structural change desired for a post-growth economy 
helps to translate the often abstract vision of a post-growth economy into more 
concrete proposals. By sub-dividing the whole economy into a set of economic 
sectors, structural change analysis is able to refer to specific areas of economic 
activity while still offering a comprehensive view of the whole economy. Having a  
clear picture of the structural change associated with the post-growth 
transformation helps to determine the social and geographic distribution of 
changes in income and employment and how these can be managed. It helps to 
identify sectors and businesses in the economy that are likely to gain from the 
post-growth transformation, but also those sectors and businesses that are likely 
to lose out. Such information is vital for the development of effective political 
strategies to achieve the implementation of a post-growth economy.  
Thirdly, the development of a structural change analysis for a post-growth 
economy is an important tool for communicating the vision for a post-growth 
economy. Many policy makers, businesses and union leaders are already  familiar 
with a sectoral approach to economic policy-making. For example the UK 
government has published sector roadmaps for energy efficiency in the past (e.g. 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015), and has proposed explicit “sector 
deals” in its recent industrial strategy (HM Government, 2017). Similarly, the 
German Council of Economic Experts (2019, p.3) suggests that in specific 
circumstances “there could be justification for a vertical policy intervention that 
is tailored to individual sectors or technologies”. Framing the post-growth 
transition in sectoral terms therefore makes it easier to communicate the changes 
that the transition would bring.  
I have chosen to focus my thesis on the question of how structural change can 
contribute to a post-growth transition in order to contribute to the development 





1.2.2.2 Structural change in the post-growth literature  
Even though there is no systematic analysis of structural change in the post-
growth literature, we can obtain some ideas of how and why the sectoral 
composition has to change. These ideas serve as a useful starting point for 
developing a more systematic analysis.  
There are some scattered references to specific sectors that are considered a 
hindrance to the pursuit of a post-growth economy, including resource 
extraction, marketing and speculative finance (Daly, 2008; Dietz and O’Neill, 
2013; Sekulova et al., 2013).  
In terms of sectors that are desired, there is an overarching theme that relational 
services are seen as more valuable than material products (Research & Degrowth, 
2010; Kallis, 2011). The most strongly developed vision of such a structural 
change can be found in the work by Jackson and co-authors who promote a shift 
towards labour-intensive services, activities with high social value and potential 
for creating meaningful work (Jackson and Victor, 2011; Jackson et al., 2014; 
Jackson, 2017). Jackson (2017) describes such desirable activities as the following:  
 “Community-centred enterprise engaged in delivering local services, 
such as nutrition, education, care, maintenance and repair, recreation, 
craft, creativity, culture: these activities contribute to flourishing and 
are embedded in the community. They have potential for low-carbon 
footprints and they provide meaningful work.” (pp.219-220) 
Although most extensively discussed by Jackson and co-authors the desirability 
of such shifts towards labour-intensive services has been expressed throughout 
the post-growth literature (e.g. Kallis et al., 2012; Nørgård, 2013).    
Overall it is proposed that there are two important post-growth goals to which 
structural change can contribute.  
The first goal is the reduction of the overall environmental impacts of economic 
activity. It is proposed that labour-intensive services feature lower environmental 
impacts and therefore a shift in consumption and production towards such 
sectors can make a contribution towards moving our economy back to within 
planetary boundaries. Cosme et al. (2017, p.328)  associate the degrowth proposal 
to “promote changes in consumption patterns” with the goal of reducing the 
environmental impact of human activities. However, there is also a recognition 
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that there are limits as to how much structural change can contribute to such a 
goal, for example with regard to GHG emissions (Victor, 2012; Horen Greenford 
et al., 2020).  
For the purpose of my thesis I focus specifically on the final energy use in 
different sectors as one aspect of environmental impact. Final energy use refers to 
the use of final energy carriers, such as electricity or petrol, by end users. I choose 
to focus on final energy use for two reasons.  
Firstly, reductions in final energy use in high-income countries will be crucial for 
achieving the goals of the Paris agreement (Rogelj et al., 2018). Reductions will 
need to be achieved in both the final energy use within high-income countries as 
well as the global footprints of final energy use associated with lifestyles in high-
income countries. Such reductions will give some room to low-income countries 
to increase their final energy use and they will make the transition to renewable 
energy sources more easily achievable (Steckel et al., 2013; Grubler et al., 2018).  
Secondly, final energy use is very closely coupled with the process of economic 
production in general (Haberl et al., 2020) and it is also likely linked to labour 
productivity growth (Sorman and Giampietro, 2013; Witt and Gross, 2019; 
Elkomy et al., 2020). As reducing environmental impacts and labour productivity 
growth are both key objectives for structural change in a post-growth economy, 
the relationship between the two makes final energy use a very relevant metric of 
environmental impact for addressing my research question.  
The second goal of structural change for a post-growth economy is the creation 
of meaningful work. One of the key concerns related to the post-growth economy 
is the loss of employment and income, especially if aggregate labour productivity 
continues to increase without continued economic growth. A shift towards 
labour-intensive services has been proposed as one important solution to provide 
employment in such a situation (Jackson and Victor, 2011), in addition to 
reductions in working time (Kallis et al., 2013; Antal, 2018).  
Jackson (2017, pp.146–149) proposes that sectors such as care, education or art or 
other personal services, are able to create employment because they have a 
higher labour intensity than other sectors, meaning that they are associated with 
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more employment per unit of final demand. In addition he also suggests that it is 
difficult and undesirable to increase labour productivity in such services, because 
the value of the service delivered is directly related to the time invested. 
Increasing the share of such sectors in output and demand would therefore not 
only provide employment but also slow down the aggregate rate of labour 
productivity growth, which would prevent further unemployment in a non-
growing economy.  
Increasing the provision of labour-intensive services is not only suggested to 
maintain employment and income, but also because such work can be an 
important way to participate in society and to seek fulfilment and well-being 
(Jackson, 2015). However, in order to increase worker well-being, the post-
growth literature stresses that the work created has to be meaningful. Druckman 
and Mair (2019) provide a review of the factors that can make work meaningful. 
They identify a number of aspects related to two overarching criteria. The first 
criterion relates to good working conditions,  including aspects such as wages, 
hours and autonomy. The second criterion relates to the output of the work, 
which needs to be of high quality and to contribute to the common good.  
Considering such criteria, several authors suggest that most of the work available 
in the current system is not meaningful. For example Klitgaard (2013, p.280) 
argues that meaningful work is “limited to a small number of professional 
workers, for example skilled craftworkers, health professionals and college 
professors”. Proponents of the concept of “contributive justice” suggest that the 
uneven distribution of meaningful work is an important aspect of inequality that 
needs to be addressed through a fairer distribution of opportunities for 
meaningful work (Timmermann, 2018; Bottazzi, 2019). 
The implicit assumption in the post-growth literature is that a shift towards 
labour-intensive sectors, such as care and education, can provide meaningful 
work, because it fulfils the second criterion, namely the contribution to the 
common good. However, as Druckman and Mair (2019) discuss for the health 
care sector, contributing to the common good is not a sufficient condition for 
meaningful work. It is therefore important that work created through structural 
17 
 
change towards labour-intensive services is accompanied by improvements in 
working conditions.   
1.2.2.3 Literature gaps 
While the post-growth literature therefore shows the beginnings of a vision and 
discussion of structural change, it is lacking a comprehensive analysis identifying 
the kind of structural change necessary for the post-growth transition and how to 
achieve it. In particular, three specific gaps in the literature stand out.  
Firstly, while the shift towards labour-intensive services is widely discussed in the 
literature, there is no detailed empirical investigation into which sectors of the 
economy actually show the characteristics of labour-intensive services and how a 
shift in economic output and demand towards such sectors could be achieved. So 
far the only evidence provided is a brief comparison of sectoral embodied labour 
and GHG emissions presented in Jackson et al. (2014). This lack of empirical 
investigation of labour-intensive services has informed my research objective B 
and is addressed in Chapter 3. 
Secondly, the promotion of labour-intensive service sectors only refers to a 
specific section of the economy. In order to develop a coherent strategy for 
structural change towards a post-growth economy, it is important to develop a 
systematic framework that covers the whole economy and locates the shift to 
labour-intensive services within the wider structural change needed for a post-
growth economy. Such a framework would then provide an important starting 
point for developing sector-specific strategies, for example which sectors would 
have to grow or reduce output and demand or labour productivity. This gap has 
informed my research objective C. In Chapter 4 I address this gap in the literature 
by developing such a framework derived from the two structural change goals 
identified in Section 1.2.2.2.  
Thirdly, the development of successful structural change strategies for the 
transition to a post-growth economy needs to engage with the existing 
knowledge on structural change in the economics literature, in order to 
understand the drivers of structural change in our current system and the 
potential barriers to desired change. So far the engagement with the structural 
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change literature in post-growth economics is limited. I address this gap in 
Stream 2 of my thesis, which includes a review of the literature on structural 
change in Section 1.3 of this chapter and some novel evidence on the drivers of 
structural change and energy use presented in Chapter 2.  
1.2.3 Defining economic sectors  
At the heart of any analysis of structural change lies the definition of economic 
sectors. For the purpose of my thesis I rely on the sector classification system and 
data from the system of national accounts. I use these definitions of economic 
sectors to examine the sectoral composition of the economy along a number of 
different dimensions, including economic output, gross value added (GVA), 
demand, employment and final energy use. As discussed in Section 1.2.2, these 
are the aspects of economic composition that are most relevant for the goals that 
post-growth economists aim to achieve from structural change.  
Using the common system of national accounts for the classification of economic 
sectors has many advantages. It allows me to use the economic data that are 
widely available in the national accounts and in multi-regional input-output 
databases. It also allows an easy comparison to other economic studies and it 
makes it easier to communicate the results, as the system of sectoral classification 
is widely known and accepted.  
However, using the common system of sectoral classification also has some 
limitations, especially for research in post-growth economics. Firstly, measures of 
real output in the national accounts, such as GVA, can be difficult to measure in 
some sectors, especially in many of the sectors that are relevant for the post-
growth economy, such as education, care and other service sectors (Eurostat, 
2016, pp.34–38). Secondly, the sectoral classification in the national accounts 
excludes many activities that are important for the transition to a post-growth 
economy, such as unpaid care work or voluntary work. Shifts in the balance 
between formal, paid work and informal, unpaid work will likely play a part in 
the transition to a post-growth economy (Nørgård, 2013; Kallis et al., 2018). 
However, these are not captured by my analysis looking at structural change 
between sectors in the formal economy.  
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Nevertheless, keeping these limitations in mind, I consider that an analysis of 
structural change for a post-growth economy, conducted within the framework 
of national accounts, constitutes a valuable addition to the literature for the 
reasons outlined in Section 1.2.2.1.  
Using the national accounts, economic sectors can still be conceptualised in two 
different ways, both of which are important for analysing structural change for a 
post-growth economy. Firstly, in conventional reporting, sectors classify 
economic production by the type of product that is produced. For example the 
sector “vehicles”, would include all the firms that assemble vehicles from 
intermediate inputs. When the energy use of the sector is considered from this 
perspective, it includes all the energy that is directly used by the firms producing 
vehicles, but not the energy used in producing the intermediate inputs, such as 
steel or plastic. I refer to this approach as the “direct” perspective and to sectors 
conceptualised in this way as “direct sectors”. Such a direct perspective for sector 
classification has the advantage that it is relatively easy to link sectors to real 
firms and that the type of production activities are relatively homogeneous 
throughout a sector. However, the perspective is less suited to assess the complex 
interlinkages between sectors.  
The second way of conceptualising sectors starts with the type of product that is 
consumed and then defines the sector to include all production activities that are 
part of the supply chain and therefore embodied in the product and services 
delivered to final demand. Sectors defined in this way have been referred to as 
“vertically-integrated” and, conceptually, they are completely self-sufficient and 
are not directly connected to any other sector (Pasinetti, 1981). Defining sectors 
in this way has the advantage that it takes into account the interconnectedness 
within the economic system. For example such a perspective allows estimation of 
the impacts that any changes in demand have throughout the whole economy. In 
ecological economics such a perspective has a long history for the estimation of 
the energy and material requirements, as well as the emissions, that are 
embodied in the supply chains of different end products (e.g. Cleveland et al., 
1984). Since the development of multi-regional input-output (MRIO) models, 
which cover the global economy, another prominent research topic has been the 
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comparison of carbon emissions or energy use within specific countries with the 
carbon emissions or energy use that are associated with the global supply chains 
that serve the final demand in specific countries (Minx et al., 2009; Inomata and 
Owen, 2014). When this approach has been used to investigate the global energy 
use and emissions of whole countries, it has been referred to as consumption-
based accounts (Barrett et al., 2013; Owen et al., 2017) or as footprints (Lan et al., 
2016; Akizu-Gardoki et al., 2018). The energy use or emissions associated with 
the supply chain of a specific demand sector or product are often referred to as 
“embodied” energy use or emissions (e.g. Hammond, 2007; Skelton et al., 2011; 
Simas et al., 2015). I therefore refer to this perspective as an “embodied” 
perspective, which describes the embodied inputs associated with different 
“demand sectors”. 
The disadvantage of the embodied perspective is that it is in many ways an 
abstract concept that is difficult to link to real companies and parts of the 
production system. In reality, most companies will be part of the supply chains of 
a number of different demand sectors. Nevertheless, it is very important to 
include the embodied perspective when studying structural change for a post-
growth economy, because the challenges that the transition to a post-growth 
economy aims to address are inherently global in nature. Structural change and 
its impact on energy use and employment therefore has to be evaluated in the 
global context and not only in individual countries.  
Sectors classified from the two perspectives are inherently linked through the 
accounting structure of the national accounts and input-output tables. In my 
thesis, the set of direct sectors and demand sectors is the always the same. That 
means for each direct sector there is a corresponding demand sector which 
describes the final demand for the output from the direct sector. The embodied 
perspective then provides the inputs needed to produce that demand along the 
supply chain. These embodied inputs associated with the demand sectors are 
made up of bits of direct output or GVA, direct energy use or direct labour use 
from different direct sectors. On a global level, the total direct energy use and 
total direct labour use are the same as the total embodied energy use and total 
embodied labour use. The characteristics of the direct inputs into direct sectors 
21 
 
and the embodied inputs associated with the corresponding demand sectors are 
often related, because in most cases a large part of the supply chain inputs into a 
specific demand sector is made up of output from the corresponding direct sector 
(Schettkat and Yocarini, 2006). For example, the supply chain inputs in the 
production of the “vehicles” demand sector contain a large proportion of output 
from the “vehicles” direct sector, even though they also include output from 
other direct sectors, such as “iron and steel”.  
Given the close connection between the direct sector and the corresponding 
demand sector, I often discuss the two perspectives together, for example in the 
sector classification in Chapter 4. I therefore use the term “sector” in my thesis 
when I refer to the corresponding direct and demand sectors together. I use the 
term “direct sector” and associated “direct” inputs of energy and labour when I 
refer specifically to a sector from a direct perspective. I use the term “demand 
sector” when I refer specifically to a sector from the embodied perspective, with 
its associated “embodied” inputs of energy and labour.  
Both sectors and demand sectors can be represented at different levels of 
aggregation. For example the literature on structural change often describes the 
stylised development path of countries using three highly aggregated sectors, 
such as agriculture, manufacturing and services. In my thesis I will use different 
levels of sector aggregation, which are dependent on the requirements of the 
analysis and are described in detail in each chapter.  
In the context of input-output analysis, sectors are often referred to as 
“industries” (e.g. Stadler et al., 2018). However, in my thesis I do not adopt this 
language and continue to refer to them as “sectors” in order to avoid confusion 
with the term industry as used in the structural change literature (and in 
common language), which distinguishes industrial sectors from other types of 
sectors, such as services.  
It is worth noting that my thesis is only concerned with the energy use of sectors 
that are featured in the national accounts. I do not investigate the energy use for 
non-commercial purposes, such as residential or private transport. Any country 
totals of embodied energy reported in my thesis therefore do not constitute the 
total energy footprint or the total consumption-based energy use of the country 
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as commonly defined in the literature, because such measures would include 
energy use for residential purposes and private transport within the country (e.g. 
Lan et al.,2016; Owen et al., 2017).  
1.3 Evidence on structural change   
In order to investigate how structural change can contribute to the transition to a 
post-growth economy, it is useful to examine the patterns and drivers of 
structural change in the past and how they are related to energy use.  
1.3.1 Historical patterns of structural change  
Long-term structural change in growing economies is often described as a 
stylised fact using a model of three highly aggregated sectors (Kuznets, 1966; 
Kuznets, 1973; Krüger, 2008). In the first stage economies are dominated by a 
large agricultural (or primary) sector. In the second stage the share of the 
industry (or secondary) sector in the economy rises rapidly while the agricultural 
sector share declines. In the final stage the share of the industry sector declines 
again at the expense of an expanding services (or tertiary) sector, while the share 
of the agricultural sector remains at a low level.  
For the purpose of this thesis I focus on the last stage of this stylised pattern, the 
rise of the service sectors that has been observed in industrialised countries 
during the 20th century (Kongsamut et al., 1997). As this process of structural 
change has been most important in the more recent past and is still unfolding in 
many high-income countries I consider it as most relevant for understanding 
structural change towards a post-growth economy in high-income countries. I do 
not consider here the contributions to the understanding of structural change 
that have been developed in the literature on development economics, which has 
largely focused on the transition from agricultural to industrial economies (e.g. 
Storm, 2015).  
Structural change between the three highly aggregate sectors has been described 
in terms of shares in direct employment, nominal GVA or real GVA.  
When considering the sectoral composition of direct employment, the structural 
change observed over the last decades has shown a remarkable regularity across 
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high-income countries. Two important trends have been discussed. Firstly, for all 
of the 20th century, increasing GDP has been closely coupled with an increasing 
share of direct employment in the service sectors (Fuchs, 1980; Kongsamut et al., 
1997; Schettkat and Yocarini, 2006). Secondly, after the share of direct industry 
employment rose with increasing GDP for the first two thirds of the century, 
there has been a consistent fall in the direct employment share of industry since 
the 1970s (Saeger, 1997; Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004; Kollmeyer, 2009; Tregenna, 
2009; van Neuss, 2019). The trend of falling direct employment shares in 
industry, and especially manufacturing, has been discussed under the term of 
deindustrialisation. This trend constitutes a relative effect; in some countries 
declining direct employment shares in industry have been associated with 
increases in absolute direct employment in industry (Rowthorn and Coutts, 
2004; Tregenna, 2009; Sarra et al., 2019). The process of deindustrialisation over 
the past decades is not restricted to high-income countries, but can also be 
observed in many low-income countries (Rodrik, 2016; van Neuss, 2019).  
The stylised pattern of structural change observed in employment shares has 
largely been mirrored when the sectoral composition of the economy is 
considered in terms of nominal valued added (van Neuss, 2019). However, when 
the sectoral composition of value added is considered in real terms, corrected 
using sector-specific price indices, the observed patterns of structural change are 
less consistent with the stylised pattern of direct employment shares. While there 
is still an increase in the service sector share and a decline in the industry sector 
share over the last decades, this change is much smaller than the one observed 
for direct employment shares and nominal output (Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004; 
Tregenna, 2009; Henriques and Kander, 2010). In addition, the  pattern is much 
less consistent across countries, with some showing increasing industry shares in 
real output (Tregenna, 2009; Henriques and Kander, 2010). It is also worth 
highlighting that in many countries where the share of the industry sector in real 
value added has been falling, the real output of the industry sector has still been 
growing in absolute terms (Tregenna, 2009).   
The process of deindustrialisation has received considerable attention in the 
academic literature and in policy circles (Sarra et al., 2019). The attention is 
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driven by concerns about the rise of unemployment caused by 
deindustrialisation, which has not been large in absolute terms but has been 
concentrated heavily in specific regions (Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004). In 
addition there are concerns about the impact of deindustrialisation on economic 
growth, as some economic theories suggest that the industry sector, particularly 
the manufacturing sector, is an important driver of economic growth, because it 
is disproportionally responsible for innovation, exports and is related to a strong 
demand for services (Tregenna, 2009; Sarra et al., 2019).  
1.3.2 Drivers of structural change  
Structural change represents a complex phenomenon that can be measured in 
different ways and is influenced by a wide range of factors. A sizeable literature 
discusses the drivers that have produced the stylised patterns of structural 
change observed in high-income countries over the past decades. The literature 
generally identifies four different types of drivers. These include, firstly, the 
outsourcing of service sector tasks from industry firms to specialised service 
sector firms, secondly, the differential rates of labour productivity growth in 
different sectors, thirdly, changes in the structure of demand and fourthly, 
increasing international trade and international division of labour (Schettkat and 
Yocarini, 2006; Kollmeyer, 2009; van Neuss, 2019). While there is some 
consensus that all these drivers play a role in driving structural change, their 
relative importance is debated.  
1.3.2.1 Inter-sector outsourcing 
The first mechanism that has been considered for explaining the shifts in 
employment structure from industry to services has been the increasing 
specialisation of the economy. It has been argued that many service-type 
functions that were previously performed within industry sector companies are 
now being outsourced to specialised service sector companies, leading to an 
increase in the direct employment share in the service sector (van Neuss, 2019). 
In some ways, any observed structural change produced by this process 
represents a statistical artefact, as it is not related to real change in the types of 
goods and services that are produced and consumed in the economy (Schettkat 
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and Yocarini, 2006). Nevertheless, Peneder et al. (2003) suggest that this effect 
does highlight some important changes in the real economy, namely an 
increasing demand and market size for specific services that allows for increasing 
returns on specialisation.  
Overall, there is some evidence that this effect is happening and partially 
responsible for the increase in direct service sector employment, especially in 
those direct service sectors that produce intermediate inputs, such as business 
and professional services (van Neuss, 2019). However, the importance of this 
effect for explaining observed structural change is likely to be small (Rowthorn 
and Coutts, 2004; Schettkat and Yocarini, 2006; Sarra et al., 2019). For the 
remainder of my thesis I therefore concentrate on the remaining three drivers 
discussed below. Nevertheless, the discussions around inter-sector outsourcing 
highlight the inherent challenges to adequately classify business activities in the 
national accounts, especially in an environment where the distinction between 
industry and service sectors is becoming increasingly blurred (Christensen, 2013).    
1.3.2.2 Differential rates of labour productivity growth  
A second important driver of structural change are differential rates of 
productivity increases, especially of labour productivity.  An important 
contribution to this literature has been the theories of William Baumol and his 
co-authors (Baumol and Bowen, 1965; Baumol, 1967; Baumol et al., 1985; Baumol, 
2012). They observe that some sectors in the economy have faster labour 
productivity growth (progressive sectors) than others (stagnant sectors). 
Assuming that wages across sectors cannot diverge to strongly, they propose that 
labour costs in the stagnant sectors rise in comparison to the progressive sectors, 
which leads to similar trends in relative prices. The fate of the stagnant sectors is 
then determined by the price-elasticity of demand for their products and 
services. Those of the stagnant sectors for which demand is price elastic shrink, 
while those of the stagnant sectors for which demand is inelastic take up 
increasing shares in employment and nominal output (but not in real output). 
Finally, assuming that the majority of demand in the stagnant sectors is not price 
elastic, for example in health care and education, they hypothesise that the share 
of these sectors in public expenditure as well as in overall employment and 
26 
 
nominal output continually rises. The increasing share of the stagnant sectors in 
demand, employment and output might then lower the aggregate growth in 
labour productivity and GDP in the economy, a phenomenon that has been 
termed “Baumol’s Cost Disease”. However, Baumol (2012, pp.69–76) identifies 
the potential environmental and social impacts of continuously cheapening 
manufactured goods and weapons as the most important drawbacks of the cost 
disease.  
In Baumol’s theory, the increase of the service sector share in employment and 
nominal output and nominal demand represents a pure price effect. It is assumed 
that the shares of the stagnant and progressive sectors in real output and real 
demand stay the same. The change is caused solely by the progressive products 
becoming less labour intensive and therefore cheaper.  
In a similar fashion, differential rates of labour productivity growth are a key 
component of Pasinetti’s theoretical treatment of structural change (Pasinetti, 
1981; Pasinetti, 1993). Pasinetti (1993) presents an accounting framework of a pure 
labour economy with vertically integrated sectors with a constant wage rate 
across the economy. In his stylised framework the differential rates of change in 
sectoral embodied labour productivity determine relative prices and relative 
shares of demand sectors in embodied employment. However, in contrast to 
Baumol’s theory, the sector shares in real demand are not constant but instead 
change with rising income as the demand for some demand sectors becomes 
saturated. He uses this framework to argue that the independent changes in 
sectoral embodied labour productivity and sectoral demand shares continuously 
create new situations of unemployment that require an active management of the 
system as the market alone cannot ensure full employment.  
Both Baumol’s and Pasinetti’s theories are highly stylised to provide clarity on 
their key messages. These key messages are, firstly, that differential rates of 
labour productivity growth are an integral part of economic growth and, 
secondly, that they are important for influencing the relative prices of products 
and the distribution of employment in the economy.  
Despite being highly stylised, Baumol’s and Pasinetti’s theories are supported by 
empirical observations that structural change towards the direct service sector 
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has been much stronger and more consistent when measured in terms of direct 
employment or nominal output, than in real output (Henriques and Kander, 
2010; Tregenna, 2011). In addition, there is considerable evidence from the 
literature that Baumol’s cost disease plays a role in shaping the economy in the 
US (Nordhaus, 2006; Duernecker et al., 2017), the EU (Hartwig, 2011; Fernandez 
and Palazuelos, 2012), South Korea (Oh and Kim, 2015) and across the OECD 
(Maroto and Rubalcaba, 2008; Hartwig, 2012; Hartwig, 2015). However, the 
strength of the effect varies in line with different contexts. For example Oh and 
Kim (2015) find that the effect of Baumol’s cost disease in South Korea is only 
small, due to a large reliance on exports. Hartwig (2012) only finds evidence for 
Baumol’s cost disease across the OECD when Japan is excluded from the analysis.   
Similarly, the deindustrialisation literature recognises that relatively higher rates 
of direct labour productivity growth in the industry sectors are a key driver of 
reduced direct employment shares in industry (Kollmeyer, 2009; van Neuss, 
2019). However, there is no agreement how important this effect is in comparison 
to other drivers, especially the effect of changes in the composition of demand 
(see Section 1.3.2.3). Tregenna (2011) and Święcki (2017) suggest that relative 
direct labour productivity increases in the manufacturing sectors have been more 
important than shifts in demand for reducing the share of direct manufacturing 
employment in many high-income countries. In contrast, Kollmeyer (2009) 
argues that rising affluence and associated shifts in demand have been more 
important than differential rates of productivity growth in explaining the 
declining direct employment share of manufacturing across OECD countries.  
While the literature highlights the importance of differential rates of productivity 
growth, there is very little discussion about the sources of productivity growth 
and why it differs between different sectors. There are different bodies of 
literature that have been investigating the drivers of labour productivity growth 
in the economy.  
Economists in the Kaldorian tradition have emphasised the special role of 
manufacturing as a driver of economic growth. It is argued that the 
manufacturing sector has a higher potential for labour productivity growth 
compared to other sectors, because of increasing returns to scale, and that 
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growth of manufacturing output therefore induces higher productivity growth in 
the sector (Thirlwall, 1983; Tregenna, 2009; Marconi et al., 2016). As a result 
growth in the manufacturing sector is considered a key driver of growth in the 
economy as a whole.   
The literature on evolutionary economics is explicitly concerned with the 
processes through which innovation and technological change occur, diffuse and 
shape the structure and development of the economy. In their seminal 
contribution, Nelson and Winter (1982) propose a dynamic model in which firms 
search for innovations and process improvements. Market forces, especially 
differences in unit costs, lead to a selection of some technologies and firms over 
others. Firms and sectors that can exploit new innovations get ahead while those 
firms that cannot fall behind. While market forces and profitability influence the 
choice of technologies they do not necessarily lead to the optimal choice as the 
selection process is characterised by uncertainty, path-dependency, institutional 
contexts and chance. These theories have been translated into a range of models 
that try to capture the relationship between technological innovation and 
structural change (e.g. Andersen, 2001; Montobbio, 2002; Saviotti and Pyka, 
2004; Ciarli et al., 2010). Important technological innovations, such as the steam 
engine, can lead to an all-encompassing transformation of the economy, but the 
transformation takes time as it requires institutional adaptation and 
reorganisation until the full benefits of the technology are reaped (Perez, 2013).  
Ecological economists have proposed that a key driver of increasing labour 
productivity has been the replacement of energy for labour. This relationship is 
discussed specifically in Section 1.3.3.2.  
1.3.2.3 Changes in the structure of demand  
A third important driver of structural change is the change in the composition of 
real demand. The conceptualisation of this change is based on an extension of 
Engel’s law, considering that the demand for products is somewhat hierarchical 
(Schettkat and Yocarini, 2006). As a result the structure of demand changes with 
rising income as demand for essential products saturates and the demand for 
luxury products rises. It is generally considered that the demand share of services 
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rises with rising income, while the demand share for agricultural products and, 
ultimately, manufactured goods decreases, leading to structural change in 
demand away from the industry and manufacturing sectors and towards the 
service sectors. Implicit in this theory is the assumption that demand sectors and 
direct sectors are closely connected, so that a shift in demand between demand 
sectors leads to similar shifts in value added or output from a direct perspective.  
The importance of this effect is debated. Baumol’s theory, as outlined above, does 
not feature any changes in demand composition as it assumes constant shares of 
the progressive and stagnant sectors in real demand. Pasinetti’s theory, in 
contrast, features a version of different income elasticities for different demand 
sectors, which are the main driver shaping the structure of the economy.  
Similarly, evolutionary models of structural change feature a sorting process 
relying on different income elasticities for different demand sectors (Montobbio, 
2002).  
Baumol et al. (1985) present some empirical evidence that service sector shares in 
output are constant across countries with different levels of per-capita GDP. 
However, Schettkat and Yocarini (2006) argue that this constancy is only evident 
if national prices are adjusted by purchasing power parities. They argue that 
longitudinal studies in individual countries provide better evidence and suggest 
that the share of service sectors in real final demand has increased in many high-
income countries between 1972 and 1990. The shift to services is even stronger 
and more consistent when only the private consumption component of final 
demand is considered. They also review evidence of studies investigating 
household expenditures, which come to a similar conclusion. Kollmeyer (2009) 
and Comin et al. (2015) similarly conclude that shifts in demand towards service 
sectors have been an important driver of structural change even after relative 
price effects are accounted for.  
Of course, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of differential rates of 
productivity growth and changes in demand. As differential rates of productivity 
growth change relative prices, they might also influence the structure of demand, 
not only in nominal but also in real terms (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1999). 
Baumol (2012, pp.71–73) acknowledges this connection implicitly when he argues 
30 
 
that falling relative prices of manufactured goods might contribute to the 
environmental crisis, because they might increase demand for such goods.  
Despite the recognition of the importance of the demand side, the literature 
dealing explicitly with structural change features relatively little discussion of 
what drives the structure of demand beyond the existence of different income 
elasticities for different products (Silva and Teixeira, 2008). In reality, the 
structure of demand is not only influenced by changes in overall income or GDP, 
but also by many other factors. For example, such factors include changing 
preferences, changes in the income distribution, changes in age structure or the 
level of public intervention (van Neuss, 2019).  
Another important aspect on the demand side is the development of new 
products and sectors. In Pasinetti’s framework, high rates of unemployment can 
only be avoided if new products and sectors are added regularly to the economy. 
Similarly, Montobbio (2002, p.405) explicitly states that his evolutionary model 
describes a transitory process which would lead to strong centralisation of firms 
and that in the “long run the evolutionary process of structural change is 
nurtured by the emergence of new sectors and firms.” However, neither of the 
two authors discuss how the emergence of new sectors and firms comes about.  
A good understanding of what is driving the structure of demand is crucial for 
the advancement of a post-growth economy, given that the consumerist logic and 
institutions are one of the main drivers of environmental destruction (Jackson, 
2017, pp.103–117).  Beyond the structural change literature there does exist a 
range of research investigating the drivers, patterns and motivations of 
consumption that can provide insights into this question. A comprehensive 
review of this literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is worth 
highlighting that the literature in evolutionary economics has made some 
progress in the direction of investigating the drivers of consumption and demand 
structures and incorporating them into wider theories of economic development 
and structural change (Safarzyńska, 2013). For example Witt (2001; 2011) explores 
how consumption patterns are influenced by innate needs and acquired wants. 
Ciarli et al. (2010) present a model of evolutionary economic change to explore 
how microeconomic behaviours can produce different patterns of structural 
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change at the macro level, depending on the interplay between technical change, 
firm structure, income distribution and consumption.  
Other authors have developed theoretical, evolutionary models that represent the 
endogenous emergence of new products and sectors. Andersen (2001) develops a 
theoretical evolutionary model of a simple economy in which consumption and 
labour coefficients as well as the emergence of new sectors is endogenised. These 
changes happen as a result of different search activities that are performed by 
economic agents depending on their situation. Saviotti and Pyka (2004; 2013; 
2017) also develop an evolutionary, endogenous growth model in which the 
creation of new sectors is endogenous and interacts with the supply side of the 
economy. Demand saturation stimulates the development of new sectors which is 
a key driver of continued economic growth.  
1.3.2.4 International trade  
The last important driver of structural change is the rise of international trade 
over the last decades. Especially in the literature on deindustrialisation, the topic 
has received considerable attention. As the deindustrialisation in high-income 
countries over the past five decades has coincided with increasing trade and 
imports of manufactured goods from low-income countries, the latter has often 
been used as an explanation for the former in policy discourse (Saeger, 1997).  
It has been suggested that the production of low-skilled, labour-intensive 
manufactured goods, which were previously produced domestically in high-
income countries, has been moved to low-income countries which feature lower 
labour costs (Kollmeyer, 2009). In high-income countries, the increasing imports 
from those low-income countries have been partially off-set by increases in 
exports of more high-skilled manufactured goods. However, the latter is generally 
less labour intensive, so that even if trade remains balanced, there is a loss of 
employment in the high-income countries (Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004). In 
addition to this direct effect, increasing trade can also influence structural change 
indirectly by increasing the other effects. For example international trade can 
raise overall income leading to changes in the structure of demand, international 
competition stimulates productivity improvements and changes relative prices, 
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while more integrated markets offer more opportunities for inter-sector 
outsourcing (Peneder and Streicher, 2018).  
Despite the importance attached to trade and comparative advantage as a driver 
of deindustrialisation, there is an emerging consensus in the literature that 
international trade does play a role in structural change but that it is not as 
important as is often claimed in political discourse.  
Econometric studies indicate that international trade has reduced the direct 
employment share of manufacturing in high-income countries, but is less 
important than the internal effects discussed in the previous sections (Saeger, 
1997; Alderson, 1999; Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004; Kollmeyer, 2009). Similar 
results have been obtained using general equilibrium models (Święcki, 2017) and 
decomposition analyses (Tregenna, 2011). Using a MRIO model, Peneder and 
Streicher (2018) also find that the main driver of deindustrialisation with regard 
to value added has been the global decline in relative prices of manufactured 
products. They highlight the paradoxical effect of industrial policies which 
increase productivity and international competitiveness at the national level but 
contribute to the overall effect of deindustrialisation at the global level. They also 
highlight, however, that the employment share of manufacturing has been 
reduced as a result of international trade in many high-income countries.  
While international trade might not have been the most important driver of 
structural change in direct employment and value added from industry to service 
sectors, it did lead to some losses of employment in high-income countries. As a 
result, most high-income countries now show a considerable discrepancy 
between the total labour embodied in their final demand and the direct labour 
employed within the country, with the former exceeding the latter, especially 
within industry sectors (Simas et al., 2015; Sakai et al., 2017).  
1.3.3 Structural change and energy use  
In order to explore how structural change can contribute to the transition 
towards a post-growth economy it is important to understand how the patterns 
and drivers of structural change discussed in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 are linked to 
energy use. There are two relevant questions. The first is concerned with the 
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relationship between the overarching patterns of structural change in 
employment and output and its relation to energy use. The second refers to the 
specific relationship between energy use and labour productivity.  
1.3.3.1 The relationship between structural change and energy use 
Since the 1950s most high-income countries have shown considerable reductions 
in the direct energy intensity of GDP that have led to relative decoupling but not 
absolute reductions in energy use (Csereklyei et al., 2016). There are propositions 
in the literature on environmental Kuznets curves that structural change in 
economic output and value added from direct industry to service sectors is one of 
the drivers of the observed reductions in direct energy intensity (Dinda, 2004; 
Stern, 2004).  
However, the literature does not provide evidence for a strong effect of structural 
change in economic output or value added reducing the energy intensity across 
high-income countries. Even though structural change often contributes to direct 
energy intensity reductions, these contributions are usually small compared to 
the effect of energy intensity reductions within direct sectors and are not evident 
across all countries.  
Structural change towards service sectors has been much stronger and more 
consistent when measured in terms of direct employment or nominal output and 
value added. But Henriques and Kander (2010) and Kander (2005) argue that it is 
structural change in real output that is relevant for direct energy use. They 
calculate sector shares in real output for a number of high-income countries 
using sector-specific price indices and find that the increase in direct service 
sector share is either absent or considerably smaller than in nominal output. 
While structural change still contributed to reductions in direct energy intensity 
in most countries, it also increased direct energy intensity in some. In those 
countries where structural change has contributed to reductions in aggregate 
direct energy intensity, these contributions are small, falling in the range of 2% to 
9% between 1971 and 2005 (Henriques and Kander, 2010). This compares to 
contributions of 13% to 37% reductions from direct energy intensity reductions 
within individual sectors.  
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Their findings are also supported by a large literature conducting decomposition 
analyses of energy use across a range of different countries. These analyses 
conventionally allocate the change in a country’s direct final or primary energy 
use to three effects, namely changes in direct sectoral energy intensities, changes 
in the structure (sectoral composition) of economic output or GVA and changes 
in overall output or GVA. These studies find that the contribution of structural 
change to energy intensity reductions varies widely across countries and time 
periods.  
Some high-income countries, like the US, the UK and Germany show relatively 
consistent patterns where structural change has reduced the direct energy 
intensity of the economy, but has generally been less important than reductions 
in direct sectoral energy intensities (Henriques and Kander, 2010; Mulder and de 
Groot, 2013; Marrero and Ramos-Real, 2013; Fernández González et al., 2013). For 
other countries, such as Italy, Spain or Sweden, the evidence is much more mixed 
with structural change reportedly contributing to increases or reductions in 
direct energy intensity depending on the time period and method of analysis 
(Henriques and Kander, 2010; Mendiluce et al., 2010; Andreoni and Galmarini, 
2012; Fernández González et al., 2013; Cruz and Dias, 2016). Torrie, Stone and 
Layzell (2016) report a rare case in which structural change contributed more to 
reductions in overall direct energy intensity than direct sectoral energy intensity 
reductions in Canada between 1995 and 2010.  
The wide variety in results highlight that decomposition analyses are sensitive to 
the decomposition index used, the time period studied and the sectoral 
resolution of underlying data (Ang and Wang, 2015). Especially the sectoral 
resolution can have a strong impact on the reported effects of structural change, 
with a more detailed sectoral resolution leading to stronger structural change 
effects in the decomposition (Weber, 2009). Most of the studies cited above rely 
on a very coarse resolution of sectors. While the evidence therefore seems robust 
that high-level structural change from industry to services had a small but non-
negligible impact on the energy intensity in many high-income countries, it is 
less clear in how far structural change within these sectors has contributed to 
energy intensity reductions.  
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The studies discussed above all estimate the impact of structural change on direct 
energy use within countries and focus on the sectoral composition of the 
economy from a direct perspective. However, for the transition to a post-growth 
economy it is important to consider the relationship between structural change 
and energy use in a global context, as the objective to stay within planetary 
boundaries can only be evaluated at the planetary level. The important question 
is in how far the contributions from structural change to direct energy intensity 
reductions in high-income countries have been driven by international trade and 
the off-shoring of energy-intensive production to other countries.  
The literature gives some indications that offshoring has been an important 
factor, mainly based on MRIO analysis. Most high-income countries are now net 
importers of energy use, meaning that the energy use embodied in their final 
demand exceeds the direct energy use within the country (Chen and Chen, 2011; 
Simas et al., 2015). The UK has shown increases in net imports of embodied 
energy use until the financial crisis, but decreases thereafter (Owen et al., 2017). 
Assuming that high-income countries have not always been net-importers of 
embodied energy use, the existence of such net-imports indicate that structural 
change in the past has led to a shift of energy-intensive production away from 
high-income countries towards the rest of the world. Jiborn et al. (2018) suggest 
that this shift has been driven by trade specialisation rather than overall increases 
in the trade deficit of high-income countries, meaning that energy-intensive 
imports have largely been replaced by less energy-intensive exports. This effect is 
similar to the one that has been described for the decreasing share of direct 
manufacturing employment driven by international trade (Section 1.3.2.4). Such a 
combination is especially evident in the case of Germany, which features large 
net-exports in monetary terms but net-imports of energy and labour (Simas et al., 
2015).  
Lan et al. (2016) provide a structural decomposition analysis of energy footprints 
for countries around the world using a global MRIO model. They estimate that 
between 1990 and 2010 changes in the structure of the production system and 
the structure of final demand have only played a minor role in influencing the 
development of energy footprints around the world. These results provide 
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another indication that energy demand reductions from structural change within 
high-income countries is likely a reflection of off-shoring.  
Gaining a better understanding of how structural change and energy use within 
high-income countries is driven by global trade presents an important piece of 
the puzzle for developing viable strategies for structural change for a post-growth 
economy. This gap in the literature has informed my research objective A and I 
address this gap in the article presented in Chapter 2.  
1.3.3.2 The relationship between energy use and labour productivity  
In addition to the direct effects of structural change on energy use, there is also a 
potentially important connection between the two via their respective linkages to 
labour productivity. As discussed in Section 1.3.2.2, differential rates of labour 
productivity growth in different sectors are an important driver of structural 
change, at least in terms of employment, nominal output and nominal demand. 
Ecological economists argue that high rates of labour productivity growth in the 
past were only possible through increases in the amount of energy that was made 
available to workers. As a result reductions in the availability of high quality fossil 
fuels might reduce the potential for labour productivity growth (Tverberg, 2012; 
Kaufmann, 2014; Jackson, 2019). Some even argue that future energy constraints 
will not only reduce the rate of labour productivity growth but also the level, 
suggesting that unemployment in a post-growth economy will not be as much of 
a problem as is often claimed (Sorman and Giampietro, 2013). Degrowth scholars 
have responded by arguing that degrowth does not aim to maintain the same 
level of production and instead aims to systematically change lifestyles, 
production and consumption systems, which would reduce the level of 
production and allow for lighter workloads, even in an energy-constrained future 
(Kallis, 2013; Sekulova et al., 2013). 
Elkomy et al. (2020) provide an extensive review of the literature on the 
relationship between energy and productivity. They conclude that there is 
evidence for a long-term link between energy use and productivity, but that there 
is very little clarity on how this link operates. Kander et al. (2013) argue that it 
was the overall availability of energy per worker, linked to the capital deepening 
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of the economy, that has been an important enabler of increasing labour 
productivity since the beginning of the industrial revolution. Focusing on more 
recent times,  Semieniuk (2016) decomposes the growth rate of fossil energy 
productivity into the growth rate of direct labour productivity and the growth 
rate of the direct energy-labour ratio. He then compares the growth rates of the 
two components for a large number of countries and for each decade from 1950 
to 2012. He finds that, with the exception of the 1980s, there is a close 
relationship between the growth rates in the two ratios for most decades, with 
the direct energy-labour ratio growing at very similar rates to direct labour 
productivity. In addition, there is also evidence that it is not only the quantity but 
also the quality of energy inputs into production that is important for labour 
productivity. Especially the increasing share of electricity in the energy mix is 
considered to have played an important role in productivity growth, both in the 
manufacturing sector and the aggregate economy (Jorgenson, 1984; Beaudreau, 
1995; Murillo-Zamorano, 2005).  
The reliance of labour productivity growth on increases in the energy-labour ratio 
does not necessarily mean that there is a trade-off between the growth in energy 
and labour productivity, as overall energy intensity often declines at the same 
time as labour productivity rises. Jorgensen (1984) argues that this reflects the 
situation where increases in energy use stimulate growth in labour productivity 
above and beyond their own rate so that energy use increases while energy 
intensity falls or stagnates. This positive relationship between increasing energy 
efficiency and increasing labour productivity has more recently been used to 
strengthen the political case for energy efficiency improvements (Boyd and Pang, 
2000; Worell, 2011; Baptist and Hepburn, 2013).  
The discussions in the literature have mostly remained at the level of direct 
aggregate energy and labour productivity, sometimes also looking at the direct 
manufacturing sector on its own. However, in order to gain insights into the 
relationship between structural change and energy use it is important to know 
how the relationship between direct and embodied energy use and labour 
productivity differs between different economic sectors.  
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Mulder and de Groot (2004; 2007) provide one of the few systematic 
comparisons of direct labour productivity and direct energy productivity growth 
across four sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, services and transport) and 
across several OECD countries, covering the time period from 1970 to 1997. They 
find a positive relationship between growth rates in direct energy productivity 
and direct labour productivity in the manufacturing sector, and to a lesser extent, 
in the transport sector. In almost all of the countries and in both sectors, the 
growth rate of direct labour productivity exceeds the growth rate of direct energy 
productivity, indicating an increasing direct energy-labour ratio. However, in the 
services and agriculture sectors, the relationship between the growth rates of 
direct energy and labour productivity is less consistent.  
Witt and Gross (2019) explicitly link the relationship between energy and 
productivity to structural change. They hypothesise that it is possible to raise 
direct labour productivity by substituting cheap energy for labour in the industry 
and transport sectors but not in the service sectors. They test their hypothesis 
using a co-integration model of US sectoral data between 1970 and 2005. They 
find that direct labour productivity is co-integrated with the direct energy-labour 
ratio only in the industry and transport sectors, but not in the services sector.  
The two studies indicate that one of the drivers of differential rates of direct 
labour productivity growth could be the better ability of some direct sectors, 
especially the industry and transport sectors, to harness energy to replace labour. 
While the two studies show consistent results, it is difficult to assess whether 
such sector-specific relationships between direct energy use and labour 
productivity will hold in the future. It is generally expected that many labour 
productivity increases in the future will come from automation and information 
processing technologies (Frey and Osborne, 2017; Spencer, 2018). Such 
technologies could change the sector-specific patterns of the relationship 
between labour-productivity growth and energy use observed in the past, 
although there is currently not enough evidence to assess such impacts (Lange et 
al., 2020).  
If some sectors, like the manufacturing and transport sectors, have indeed a 
higher potential for direct or embodied labour productivity growth based on a 
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better ability to exploit energy sources, it would have implications for structural 
change in the transition to a post-growth economy. Firstly, any constraints on 
energy use might diminish the ability of the industry and transport sectors to 
increase labour productivity compared to other sectors, reducing one of the key 
drivers of structural change, in particular Baumol’s cost disease. Secondly, the 
relationship between labour productivity growth and the energy-labour ratio 
might determine whether it is desirable to increase labour productivity in a 
sector or not.  
However, so far there is not sufficient evidence on the relationship between 
energy use and labour productivity at the sectoral level in order to gauge the 
implications for structural change in the transition to a post-growth economy. To 
get a comprehensive picture it would be especially useful to compare direct and 
embodied measures of energy use and labour productivity, to gain additional 
insights into the drivers that have been responsible for shaping the relationship. 
For example, reductions in the direct energy-labour ratio in industry might be 
caused by improvements in technology or by the off-shoring of industrial sectors 
with a low energy-labour ratio.  
The lack of evidence on the relationship between labour productivity and energy 
use at a sectoral level presents an important gap in the literature on post-growth 
economics and structural change. In Chapter 4, I present some new evidence on 
the direct and embodied energy-labour ratio of different sectors and their 
relationship to labour productivity as a part of a wider framework for identifying 
structural change goals for a post-growth economy.  
1.4 Research approach  
1.4.1 Overall approach  
In the previous sections I have set out the overall research question I am 
addressing in my thesis, namely:  
How can structural change contribute to the creation of a post-growth 
economy? 
In order to do so I have identified three research objectives that address specific 
gaps in the literature:  
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A. To provide evidence on the role of international trade in shaping 
structural change and energy use in high-income countries. 
B. To provide empirical evidence on sectoral characteristics for the 
identification of labour-intensive services, focusing on an embodied 
perspective. 
C. To develop a systematic approach for determining desirable structural 
change and sector-specific strategies for a post-growth economy. 
My research is grounded in the perspective of post-growth economics and 
ecological macroeconomics. These approaches to economic analysis are highly 
sceptical of mainstream approaches based on marginalist substitution of 
production factors and consumer products and the analysis of markets as 
optimising systems (Rezai et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 2014; Rezai and Stagl, 2016; 
Hardt and O’Neill, 2017). Instead post-growth and ecological macroeconomic 
thinking has been drawing on ecological economics, which highlights the 
embeddedness of the economy in biophysical processes, and heterodox 
approaches to economic analysis, such as post-Keynesian, evolutionary and 
Marxian thinking, which are concerned with disequilibrium dynamics, non-
optimisation models, path-dependency, uncertainty and power relations 
(Kronenberg, 2010; Foxon, 2011; Hardt and O’Neill, 2017; Pirgmaier and 
Steinberger, 2019; Jackson and Victor, 2020; Stratford, 2020). 
Given the lack of structural change analysis in the post-growth literature, my 
research objectives aim to establish an empirical and theoretical foundation for a 
structural change analysis for the post-growth transition. As a result, the 
empirical analysis presented throughout my thesis is focused on structural 
change developments and sectoral characteristics derived from historical data, 
rather than dynamic modelling of future scenarios.   
The most important method I employ in order to achieve my research objectives 
is MRIO analysis, which forms an integral component in the analysis performed 
for each of the three research objectives. MRIO models are particularly well 
placed for analysing structural change in the economy and for achieving my 
research objectives. Firstly, the MRIO framework is specifically built around a 
representation of the economy as a set of interconnected economic sectors 
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(Leontief, 1974; Miller and Blair, 2009). It therefore allows for the analysis of 
structural change while maintaining a comprehensive view of the aggregate 
economy. Secondly, MRIO models explicitly describe trade flows between sectors 
and can link them to the final demand for goods and services on one end, and the 
environmental impacts and labour inputs associated with economic production 
on the other end. MRIO models can therefore provide the link between the direct 
and embodied perspectives of sectoral structure (Owen et al., 2017). As outlined 
in Section 1.2.3, the consideration of both of these perspectives is an important 
requirement for analysing structural change for a post-growth economy. Lastly, 
MRIO models cover the whole global economy in a consistent manner that 
satisfies accounting balances. MRIO models therefore allow for an explicit 
assessment of how global trade has been related to structural change in 
individual countries (Minx et al., 2009; Peters et al., 2011; Timmer et al., 2013). 
Given the important role of international trade in shaping structural change, any 
analysis of structural change for a post-growth economy is incomplete without 
the consideration of international trade. 
I address each of my three research objectives in an academic journal article, 
which make up Chapters 2-4 of my thesis.  
1.4.2 Untangling the drivers of energy reduction in the UK economic sectors: 
Efficiency or offshoring?   
The article in Chapter 2 addresses research objective A. It is part of Stream 2, 
which is concerned with the historical relationship between structural change 
and energy use. The objective is specifically concerned with obtaining new 
evidence on the link between structural change impacts on energy use in high-
income countries and the development of international trade.  
In order to address this research objective I perform an index decomposition 
analysis of direct final energy use in the UK between 1997 and 2013. The index 
decomposition builds on the approaches used in the literature on energy 
decomposition analysis, as discussed in Section 1.3.3.1. However, I add a novel 
element that utilises MRIO data to determine whether structural change in the 
UK is related to the off-shoring of industries to other countries. In this way the 
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decomposition analysis specifically addresses the gap in the literature, which, so 
far, does not link structural change within countries to international trade.  
In addition I also provide some novel insights on the drivers of another important 
decomposition factor, namely the direct energy intensity within sectors. Using 
data on the useful exergy consumption in the UK, I investigate the role that 
increases in the thermodynamic conversion efficiency from final energy to useful 
exergy have played in driving changes in the direct energy intensity of output in 
different sectors. Useful exergy measures the amount of useful work (in 
thermodynamic terms) that is delivered by energy carriers to the economy, such 
as the movement of a car or the light emitted by a light bulb (Brockway et al., 
2014; Sousa et al., 2017). It is useful to investigate the role of useful exergy 
conversion, because there is some evidence that the amount of useful exergy used 
is even more strongly coupled with GDP than primary and final energy use (Warr 
et al., 2010; Serrenho et al., 2014; Guevara et al., 2016).  
I focus on the UK as a relevant case study for the research objective because it is 
one of the few countries that has achieved absolute reductions in direct final 
energy use in combination with increasing GDP since the early 2000s (Csereklyei 
et al., 2016; Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2018). Given 
the importance of reducing final energy use for the transition to a post-growth 
economy, it is useful to examine the case of the UK in order to gain better 
insights into how the reductions in direct final energy use were achieved.  
1.4.3 Structural change for a post-growth economy: Investigating the 
relationship between embodied energy intensity and labour 
productivity  
The article in Chapter 3 addresses research objective B. It is part of Stream 1, 
which is focused on the transition to a post-growth economy. Objective B is 
specifically concerned with the shift towards labour-intensive services that is 
advocated in the post-growth literature. It addresses the gap in the literature that 
is the lack of an empirical analysis identifying labour-intensive services and the 
lack of a discussion of the challenges of achieving such a shift.  
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I identify two characteristics of labour-intensive services, namely a low energy 
intensity and a low rate of labour productivity growth. The lack of empirical 
evidence on such sector characteristics is especially prevalent for data from an 
embodied perspective, as data on direct energy intensity and direct labour 
productivity growth are widely available. Although the latter have not been used 
specifically for the identification of labour-intensive services from a post-growth 
perspective.  
Given the international nature of our global economy and supply chains, the 
estimation of embodied energy intensity and labour productivity requires an 
MRIO model. To address my research objective I therefore use the EXIOBASE 
MRIO model (Stadler et al., 2018) to estimate novel results for the embodied final 
energy intensity and embodied labour productivity associated with demand 
sectors in the UK and Germany between 1995 and 2011. In order to do so, I 
develop a new extension to the EXIOBASE MRIO model describing direct final 
energy inputs in economic sectors across the world. The new empirical evidence I 
provide allows me to identify a subset of demand sectors that show the 
characteristics of labour-intensive services.  
In order to gain more insights into the potential challenges surrounding the 
promotion of such labour-intensive services, specifically from Baumol’s cost 
disease, I also link the analysis of embodied energy intensity and labour 
productivity to the changes in prices in different sectors.  
While the MRIO model takes into account final energy use and labour inputs 
along the global supply chain, I focus on the final demand in the UK and 
Germany. Focussing on these two case studies allows me to strike a balance 
between providing the necessary detail on final energy use, especially in the 
service sectors, while also allowing for some international comparison.  
I have chosen the UK and Germany as case study countries, because they are 
both high-income countries with similar income levels but important differences 
in sectoral structure, both in terms value added and demand, and economic 
dynamics. Since the 1990s, the UK has experienced considerable reductions in 
the share of direct output, labour and energy use in the industrial sectors, with an 
increasing share in the service sectors (Department for Business Energy & 
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Industrial Strategy, 2018; Office for National Statistics, 2019). In contrast, 
Germany has experienced deindustrialisation to a lesser degree and has retained 
a greater share of the industry sectors in direct employment and output 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019; AG Energiebilanzen, 2020). The two countries 
therefore provide a useful contrast for the investigation of structural change.   
1.4.4 What structural change is needed for a post-growth economy: A 
framework of analysis and empirical evidence  
The article in Chapter 4 addresses research objective C. It is also part of Stream 1 
and is concerned with the development of a systematic approach for identifying 
structural change goals and sector-specific strategies for a post-growth economy, 
an important gap in the post-growth literature (see Section 1.2.2.3).  
In order to address this gap I develop a novel framework that allows for 
identification of structural change goals for different sectors based on sector 
characteristics in three dimensions, namely the sectoral energy intensity, the 
potential for labour productivity growth, and the relationship between labour 
productivity and the energy-labour ratio. The structural change goals for 
individual sectors are derived by combining the sector characteristics in these 
three dimensions with the two overarching structural change goals for the whole 
economy identified in Section 1.2.2.2.  Overall this framework allows me to 
identify a number of sector groups that share the same combination of 
characteristics and therefore the same structural change goals.   
I apply the framework by estimating values for the sector characteristics for 
economic sectors in the UK and Germany. As outlined before, it is important that 
sector characteristics are considered both from a direct and embodied 
perspective. The empirical analysis I conduct for this purpose builds on the one 
conducted for objective B using the EXIOBASE MRIO model and my own 
extension describing direct final energy use. However, it expands the analysis by 
adding new results with regard to the relationship between the energy-labour 
ratio and labour productivity and by comparing direct and embodied values for 
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Chapter 2  
Untangling the drivers of energy reduction in the UK economic sectors: 
Efficiency or offshoring?  
 
Lukas Hardt , Anne Owen, Paul Brockway, Matthew K. Heun, John Barrett, Peter 
G. Taylor, Timothy J. Foxon   
Abstract: 
The UK has been one of the few countries that has successfully decoupled final 
energy consumption from economic growth over the past 15 years. This study 
investigates the drivers of direct final energy consumption in the UK economic 
sectors between 1997 and 2013 using a decomposition analysis that incorporates 
two novel features. Firstly, it investigates to what extent changes in the 
thermodynamic conversion efficiency from final energy to useful exergy have 
contributed to overall changes in direct sectoral energy intensities. Secondly, it 
analyses how much of the structural change in the UK economy is driven by the 
offshoring of energy-intensive production overseas. The results show that direct 
energy intensity reductions are the strongest factor reducing energy 
consumption. However, only a third of the energy savings from energy intensity 
reductions can be attributed to increases in the final-to-useful conversion 
efficiency, with reductions in the useful exergy intensity of monetary output 
making up the reminder. In addition the majority of energy savings from 
structural change are a result of offshoring, which constitutes the second biggest 
factor reducing energy consumption. In recent years the contributions of all 
decomposition factors have been declining with very little change in energy 
consumption after 2009. This suggests that a return to the strong reductions in 
direct energy consumption observed between 2001 and 2009 in the UK economic 
sectors should not be taken for granted. Given that further reductions in UK final 
energy consumption are needed to achieve global targets for climate change 
mitigation, additional policy interventions are needed. Such policies should 
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adopt a holistic approach, taking into account all direct sectors in the UK 
economy as well as the relationship between the structural change in the UK and 
in the global supply chains delivering the goods and service for demand in the 
UK.   
Keywords: Energy consumption; Decomposition; UK; Exergy; Multiregional 
input-output databases; Offshoring 
2.1 Introduction 
Most of the IPCC scenarios aiming to limit global warming to 2°C result in a 
stabilisation of energy consumption at the global level (Clarke et al., 2014). This 
requirement for stabilisation should be considered as an optimistic requirement 
as most of the scenarios also rely on large quantities of unproven negative 
emission technologies (Anderson and Peters, 2016; Peters et al., 2017). If such 
technologies do not materialise at sufficient scale, stabilisation of global energy 
consumption might not be sufficient and absolute reductions might be needed to 
avoid dangerous climate change. At the same time global population is predicted 
to increase over the period to 2050 by about 30% compared to current levels in 
the UN’s medium variant (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, 2017) and many less-developed countries will need to increase their 
energy consumption to reduce poverty and social hardships, especially given that 
16% of the global population currently do not have access to energy 
(International Energy Agency, 2017). Increasing energy consumption in 
developing countries combined with a need to stabilise (let alone reduce) global 
energy use therefore implies the need for absolute reductions in direct energy 
consumption in developed countries, potentially exceeding 50% for per capita 
energy-use.  
However, only very few developed countries have so far achieved an absolute 
decoupling of direct final energy consumption and economic growth over 
extended periods of time (Csereklyei et al., 2016). One of the few examples where 
this has happened is the UK. Despite a 19% growth in real GDP, direct final 
energy consumption (excluding non-energy use) declined by 11% between 2001 




Figure 2-1: UK GDP and final energy consumption (excluding non-energy use) 
between 1990 and 2015. Values are indexed with 1990 = 100. Economic sectors 
include the industry and non-industrial sectors but excludes energy consumption 
for domestic and transport purposes. GDP and energy data were obtained from 
the UK Office for National Statistics (Office for National Statistics, 2017) and the 
Energy Consumption in the UK data collection (Department for Business Energy 
& Industrial Strategy, 2016b) respectively. 
consumption will most probably need to be reduced even further. To assess the 
need for further policy interventions and to see whether lessons from the UK can 
be applied in other countries, it is important to understand what has been driving 
the reduction in direct energy consumption in the UK and whether the trends are 
likely to continue into the future.  
This study will contribute to this understanding by providing an analysis of the 
direct final energy consumption in the UK economic sectors between 1997 and 
2013. We refer to economic sectors as those direct sectors that use final energy 
carriers for commercial purposes and record economic output in the national 
accounts, including industrial and non-industrial sectors, but excluding the 
direct final energy used in the commercial transport sector for reasons discussed 
in Section 2.2. By focusing on economic sectors we exclude final energy used for 
non-commercial domestic (i.e. residential) and transport use. This study is also 
exclusively concerned with the direct energy intensity of different direct sectors 
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in the UK. It does not investigate the embodied energy intensity associated with 
different demand sectors, although it assesses the global output of different 
sectors that is embodied in the total final demand in the UK. The term “sector” 
therefore exclusively refers to direct sectors in this chapter.   
While non-transport, final energy consumption in the economic sectors only 
accounted for 31% of all direct final energy consumption in the UK in 2013 
(Figure 2-2), the reductions in direct final energy consumption in these sectors 
account for about two thirds of the overall reductions in direct UK final energy 
consumption since 2001. To investigate the drivers of energy consumption in the 
economic sectors this study employs an index decomposition analysis with two 
novel features. Firstly, it draws on energy conversion chain (ECC) analysis that 
allows the estimation of the conversion efficiencies from final energy to useful 
exergy (Heun et al., 2017). In this way direct energy intensity reductions can be 
broken down into a component representing the conversion efficiency from final 
energy to useful exergy (hereafter final-to-useful efficiency) and a component 
 
Figure 2-2: Final energy consumption in the UK by purpose. This article only 
investigates energy use in the economic sectors which include the industry and 
non-industrial sectors shown here. Energy data were obtained from the Energy 
Consumption in the UK data collection (Department for Business Energy & 
Industrial Strategy, 2016b). 
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 representing the changing monetary output per unit of useful exergy.  Secondly, 
it employs data from a multi-regional input-output (MRIO) model to investigate 
how much of the direct energy savings resulting from structural change can be 
attributed to offshoring. The results of this decomposition analysis are also 
compared to the results of a conventional approach featuring only direct energy 
intensity and structural change factors. 
Index decomposition analysis is a widely-used tool to identify the drivers of 
change in direct energy use and carbon emissions (Liu and Ang, 2003; Ang, 
2004). It has been applied to study aggregate direct energy consumption in 
countries (Fernández González et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2014), as well as energy 
consumption for particular purposes, such as domestic (i.e. residential) energy 
use (Nie and Kemp, 2014; Xu and Ang, 2014) and transport energy use (Sorrell et 
al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2011). Index decomposition analysis of energy use in 
economic sectors commonly decomposes energy use according to three factors, 
namely direct energy intensity, structural change and output (Liu and Ang, 
2007). In such an approach direct energy intensity describes the energy used per 
unit of monetary output in each sector, structural change describes the sectoral 
composition of economic output and output describes the change in the 
aggregate output of the economy. Such decomposition analyses for the UK 
generally conclude that direct energy intensity reductions have been the major 
driver of reductions in direct UK final energy consumption over the last two 
decades, even though structural change has also been important (Liu and Ang, 
2007; Hammond and Norman, 2012; Fernández González et al., 2013; Mulder 
and de Groot, 2013; Marrero and Ramos-Real, 2013; Gynther et al., 2015; Obadi 
and Korček, 2015; Cruz and Dias, 2016). However, most of these studies only pay 
brief attention to the UK as part of a multi-country study and there has not been 
a comprehensive analysis of the drivers of direct final energy consumption in the 
UK economic sectors in the past two decades. Hammond & Norman (2012) 
decompose trends in direct energy use and CO2 emissions in the UK, but focus 
exclusively on the manufacturing sectors between 1990 and 2006. Reports from 
the ODYSEE-MURE project present detailed analyses of the ODEX efficiency 
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indicator, but pay less attention to structural change (Ricardo Energy & 
Environment et al., 2015).  
The conventional decomposition approach focusing on direct energy intensity, 
structure and output provides important insights, but it leaves important 
questions unanswered about the underlying drivers of changes in direct energy 
intensity and economic structure. Firstly, the measure of direct energy intensity 
does not answer the question of whether changes have been driven by an 
increasing final-to-useful efficiency of energy conversion or by other effects 
influencing monetary output. Secondly, looking at structural change within a 
country does not indicate whether this structural change is a reflection of 
offshoring, (i.e. a shift of energy-intensive production to other countries) or 
whether it is due to changed economic demands and the production structure 
that satisfies them. Whether structural change is due to offshoring is important, 
because it determines in how far direct energy savings from structural change 
have contributed to global climate change mitigation efforts. There are studies 
that have used input-output models to investigate changes in the energy-
footprint of countries, including the UK (Lan et al., 2016; Owen et al., 2017). 
However, these studies do not link the changes in the footprint to the changes in 
domestic structure of economic output to assess in how far domestic structural 
change has been a result of offshoring. Other studies specifically study the 
economic impacts of environmental improvements along the whole supply chain 
of products, focussing on specific companies or sectors (Savino et al., 2015; 
Savino et al., 2017). The two novel features employed in this study provide new 
insights into the underlying drivers of direct energy intensity reductions and 
structural change across the whole of the UK economic sectors. 
2.2 Data and methods 
2.2.1 The decomposition factors  
This study investigates the drivers of the change in direct final energy 
consumption (excluding non-energy use) in the UK economic sectors between 
1997 and 2013. Direct final energy excludes energy consumed by those economic 
sectors that produce primary energy carriers (e.g. the extraction of oil & gas) or 
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transform primary energy into final energy carriers for sale (e.g. oil refineries). 
For brevity the word energy always refers to final energy in this article. The 
economic sectors include only those direct sectors that use final energy 
consumption for commercial purposes and record economic output in the 
national accounts. The energy used for personal transport and domestic uses is 
not investigated. The commercial transport sector is also not analysed in this 
study, because it is difficult to disentangle the energy consumption for private 
and commercial transport and transport energy use is a complex issue that would 
not be well served by the approach applied here to the other sectors (for a good 
analysis of UK road freight energy use see (Sorrell et al., 2009). The economic 
sectors analysed are subdivided into fifteen direct sectors including twelve 
industrial and three non-industrial sectors (Table 2-1). This is the most 
disaggregated level of energy data available from 1997. These sectors cover all 
sectors in the national accounts excluding the transport and energy producing 
sectors. For ease of presentation many of the results will be aggregated as  
Table 2-1: Sector split used in the conventional and extended decomposition 
analysis, based on the classification used in the Digest of the United Kingdom 
energy statistics (Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2016a). 
Sector name SIC 2007 code 
Industrial Sectors 
 
Iron & Steel 24.1 – 24.3 
Non-ferrous Metals 24.4 – 24.5 
Mineral Products 08, 23 
Chemicals 20 - 21 
Mechanical Engineering and Metal Products 25, 28 
Electrical and Instrument Engineering 26 - 27 
Vehicles 29 - 30 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 10 - 12 
Textiles, Clothing, Leather & Footwear 13 - 15 
Paper, Printing and Publishing 17 - 18 




Public Administration 84 - 88 




“industrial” and “non-industrial” sectors, in which the latter contains the direct 
public and commercials services and agriculture sectors. 
To analyse the change in direct final energy consumption in the UK economic 
sectors two decomposition analyses are presented. The first decomposition 
analysis follows the conventional approach to estimate the role that changes in 
the direct energy intensity and structure of the economy have contributed to the 
observed change in direct final energy consumption in the UK economic sectors.  
The main purpose of this conventional decomposition is to serve as a comparison 
to the new and extended approach. Specifically, this comparison was used to 
verify that the treatment of structural change in the newly developed extended 
approach is comparable to the conventional approach, because the extended 
approach uses slightly different decomposition factors to describe structural 
change. For the purpose of the conventional decomposition analysis, direct final 
energy consumption in the economic sectors (E) is expressed as the combination 
of  an intensity effect (I), a structural change effect (S), an output effect (O) and a 
population effect (P) (Table 2-2): 
 















where Ei is the direct sectoral energy consumption in the UK, Xi is sector output 
in the UK, X is total output of the UK and P is UK population. The subscript i 
denotes the economic sectors studied, which are presented in Table 2-1.  
The extended analysis introduces two novel features that further investigate the 
intensity and structural change effects. While the direct final energy use (E) is the 
same as in the conventional approach, the extended approach includes more 
factors in the identity used to decompose direct final energy consumption. These 
six factors are a final-to-useful efficiency effect (FUE), a useful exergy intensity 
effect (UEI) an offshoring effect (OS), an embodied output effect (EO), a final 
demand effect (DM) and a population effect (P) (Table 2-2):  
 
𝐸 = ∑ 𝐹𝑈𝐸𝑖
𝑖














 (2-2)  
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Table 2-2: Summary of the decomposition factors used in the conventional and 
extended decomposition analysis. More detailed descriptions are provided in 




 Description  Units 
Conventional decomposition   
Intensity  Ii Final energy used in each UK sector (Ei) divided by the 





Si Monetary output of each UK sector (Xi) divided by the total 
output of the UK economy (X) 
million £/ 
million £ 




Population  P UK population (P) person 
Extended decomposition  
Final-to-useful 
efficiency  
FUCEi Final energy used in each UK sector (Ei) divided by the 




UEIi Useful exergy used in each UK sector (UEi) divided by the 
monetary output of the sector (Xi) 
ktoe/ 
million £ 
Offshoring  OSi Monetary output of each UK sector (Xi) divided by the 







Global sector output embodied in UK final demand (XGi) 
divided by the total amount of UK final demand (Y) 
million £/ 
million £ 




Population  P UK population (P) person 
where Ei is direct sectoral energy consumption in the UK, UEi is the useful exergy 
consumed in each direct sector, Xi is sector output in the UK, XGi is the global 
output of the sector embodied in UK final demand, Y is UK final demand and P is 
UK population. 
The first two factors subdivide the energy intensity effect in the conventional 
decomposition into two separate effects, namely the final-to-useful efficiency 
effect and the useful exergy intensity effect. These two factors sum exactly to the 
energy intensity effect in the conventional decomposition. The final-to-useful 
efficiency effect describes the efficiency with which direct final energy is 
transformed into direct useful exergy in each sector as obtained from ECC 
analysis (Heun et al., 2017). Useful exergy describes the work that is delivered at 
the last stage of the energy conversion chain that can still be measured in energy 
units, for example useful heat, mechanical drive, or light. Useful exergy can 
therefore be considered to be most closely related to the energy services delivered 
(Sousa et al., 2017). The final-to-useful efficiency effect is calculated as direct final 
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energy per unit of direct useful exergy used in each sector. This factor presents a 
purely thermodynamic measure of energy efficiency, because it is a ratio of two 
energy measures.  
In contrast, the useful exergy intensity effect is a mixed measure as the ratio 
includes monetary and energy measures. The effect captures the changes in the 
monetary output that is produced for each unit of direct useful exergy. These can 
include changes in the physical efficiency of the production process that are not 
captured by the final-to-useful efficiency effect, but also changes in the monetary 
value of production, imperfect deflation and structural change within sectors. For 
example the conventional approach applied to the steel sector would describe the 
energy intensity of the sector as the direct final energy used in the sector divided 
by the output of steel (in monetary terms). The extended version splits this ratio 
into a ratio describing the direct final energy used per unit of direct useful exergy 
used (i.e. the mechanical drive, heat and light used) and a ratio describing the 
direct useful exergy used divided by the output of steel (in monetary terms). This 
can provide new insights into whether reductions in direct energy intensity have 
come from increases in in final-to-useful conversion efficiencies or changes in the 
monetary value of the output produced. 
The offshoring and embodied output effects allow further examination of the 
drivers of structural change. The two effects do not exactly sum to the structural 
change effect in the conventional decomposition because the extended 
decomposition uses final demand per capita as its fifth decomposition factor, 
rather than total output per capita, which is used in the conventional 
decomposition. Final demand describes all the goods and services bought in the 
UK, whether for the purpose of consumption or investment. The use of final 
demand in the analysis is required to incorporate the global supply chains that 
are associated with final demand in the UK. Since total final demand and total 
output generally develop in a similar fashion, the results of the conventional and 
extended decomposition analysis remain comparable. 
The offshoring effect describes the ratio of domestic sector output divided by the 
global sector output embodied in UK demand. The global output embodied in 
UK final demand is obtained from the UKMRIO model (Owen et al., 2017) and  
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describes the total monetary output (in each sector) that is used globally to 
satisfy the final demand of goods and services in the UK, taking into account 
intermediate consumption along the whole supply chain. For the steel sector this 
includes all steel used at some point in the supply chain of the products bought 
in the UK. For example this could be steel that is produced in China, if it is then 
made into a car in Germany and sold in the UK. The embodied output effect in 
turn describes the global sector output embodied in each unit of final demand in 
the UK, for instance how much steel has been used in the world for each £ of 
goods bought for UK final demand. The terms offshoring and embodied output 
are used here as a convenient shorthand. The offshoring effect does not 
exclusively capture the deliberate movement of industry from the UK to other 
countries. Instead it can be interpreted as an indicator of the potential direct 
sectoral capacity that the UK economy possesses to satisfy the final demand for 
goods and services in the UK. For example it compares the amount of steel 
embodied in UK final demand to the steel produced in the UK, even if the latter 
is not necessarily used for products sold in the UK. Similarly the embodied 
output effect captures a variety of potential changes both in the composition of 
UK final demand as well as in the structure of the global supply chains satisfying 
this demand. In effect, the offshoring and embodied output effects determine 
whether structural changes in the UK have been matched by structural changes 
in the economic output embodied in UK final demand. If the structural change in 
the UK (e.g. a relative decline of manufacturing) is not matched by changes in 
the embodied output it is considered to constitute a type of offshoring.  
2.2.2 The decomposition index 
This study employs the Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI). The LMDI 
method has been identified as one of the most suitable methods for energy 
decomposition because it gives complete decomposition without residuals, it has 
a sound theoretical foundation, it passes the test of time reversal and factor 
reversal and is easy to implement (Hoekstra and van den Bergh, 2003; Ang, 
2004; Su and Ang, 2012). It is also well suited to multidimensional and multilevel 
energy data, as used for this study, because it gives perfect decomposition at the 
sub-category level and is consistent in aggregation (Ang and Wang, 2015). The 
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LMDI index can be used in two different ways, either in an additive or in 
multiplicative form. This choice does not affect the conclusions from the study 
because the results from either method can be transformed into the other by a 
simple formula (Ang, 2004). In this study the additive version of the LMDI index 
is used as it was considered that its results are easier to interpret. 
The subject of this study is the decomposition of the total direct final energy 
consumption in the UK economic sectors (E) which is subdivided into the direct 
energy consumption of economic sectors, denoted by subscript i. For the purpose 
of the decomposition analysis E is expressed as a product of n factors, 𝐸 =
 ∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑥1,𝑖 ∗  𝑥2,𝑖 ∗ 𝑥3,𝑖 ∗ … ∗ 𝑥𝑛,𝑖𝑖 . The factors used in this analysis are 
described in Section 2.2.1. 
The additive LMDI method is then used to allocate the overall difference in 
energy consumption between a time period 0 and a time period T (∆E) to the 
respective factors: 
 
∆𝐸 = 𝐸𝑇 − 𝐸0 =  ∆𝐸𝑥1 +  ∆𝐸𝑥2 + ∆𝐸𝑥3 + ⋯ + ∆𝐸𝑥𝑛  (2-3)  
 
Drawing on Ang (2004) the following LMDI formula was used to determine the 
contribution of the kth factor to the change in energy consumption (version 
LMDI-I): 
 













  (2-4)  
 
This study uses decomposition analysis to investigate the change in energy 
consumption over a multi-year time period. As annual data are available this 
study employs a chained decomposition methodology. This means that the 
change of direct energy consumption is always decomposed for two consecutive 
years rather than comparing each year to a common base-year. The chaining 
method should be preferred when annual data are available as it better represents 
the true change and the results are independent from a choice of base year (Ang 




Data describing the direct final energy consumption in the UK economic sectors 
were obtained from the Digest of UK Energy Statistics  and the Energy 
Consumption in the UK data collection (Department for Business Energy & 
Industrial Strategy, 2016b). The Digest of UK Energy Statistics (Department for 
Business Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2016a) contains a category of “unclassified 
industrial energy use” which introduces an element of uncertainty into the 
analysis. For this article the “unclassified industrial energy use” was allocated to 
the Other Industries sector. The data showed that significant decreases in one of 
the two categories was often accompanied by significant increases in the other 
category. This suggests that the data in both categories are strongly influenced by 
statistical re-classifications of different energy uses between the two sectors. 
Therefore it was considered most consistent to add the unclassified energy use to 
the direct energy use in the Other Industries sector, although this is likely to 
overestimate the direct energy use in the latter. While results for the Other 
Industries sector should therefore be interpreted with caution, this treatment 
does not affect the results for the industrial sector as a whole.  
There has been some discussion in the literature about the measure of economic 
output that is best used to measure the energy intensity of direct economic 
sectors (Patterson, 1996). This literature is mainly concerned with the question 
whether it is better to use physical or monetary values, and, if the latter are used, 
which kind of monetary value to use (for a good summary see Hammond and 
Norman, 2012). In this study only monetary output measures are used, as this 
allows a comparable and consistent treatment of all sectors. There are different 
monetary output measures that can be used, including value added and total 
value of production. While value added is most frequently used, Hammond & 
Norman (2012) concluded that there is no evidence that one measure is superior. 
In this study the total value of production is used to measure output, as given in 
the national supply and use tables. This measure was chosen because it fits better 
into the input-output framework used in the extended decomposition.  
All the economic data were obtained from the UKMRIO model, which is based 
on the national accounts produced by the UK Office for National Statistics 
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(Owen et al., 2017). The economic data obtained include figures for the annual 
production of the fifteen investigated sectors, production of the UK economy as a 
whole, levels of final demand in the UK as well as the global output of each sector 
embodied in UK demand. Monetary variables in the UKMRIO model were 
converted into constant prices by applying the double deflation method (Lan et 
al., 2016). As is conventional in input-output analysis, the sector output 
embodied in UK final demand was obtained by multiplying the Leontief inverse 
of the input-output table with the vector of UK final demand for each year. A 
more detailed description is available in Owen et al. (2017). This method implies 
that the boundary for calculating embodied sector outputs includes only the 
intermediate demand of goods and services in each year, but not capital 
expenditures.  
The analysis in this article is restricted to the time period from 1997 to 2013, 
because the input data obtained from the UK MRIO model are only available for 
this time period. However, the time period is adequate as it captures the change 
in trend from stagnating to decreasing direct final energy consumption in the UK 
economic sectors observed around 2001 (Figure 2-1).  
Data on the direct useful exergy used in each sector was produced by the authors. 
The useful exergy data are calculated in three steps. First the direct final energy 
used in each sector is mapped to the main useful work categories (heat, 
mechanical drive, electricity and muscle work) and then to individual task levels 
within these categories (e.g. work done by cars, light bulbs, etc.). Second, for each 
individual task level conversion efficiencies (final energy to useful exergy) are 
estimated based on the literature or new calculations. Third, the task-level final 
energy values and final-to-useful conversion efficiencies are then multiplied 
together, and summed to obtain the direct useful exergy used in each sector. A 
more detailed description of the methodology can be found in Brockway et al. 
(2014; 2015).  
2.3 Results 
The conventional decomposition shows that reductions in direct final energy 
consumption in the UK economic sectors between 1997 and 2013 were achieved 
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despite significant upward pressures on energy consumption from increased 
output per capita and population growth (Figure 2-3a). Direct energy 
consumption declined because these upward pressures were more than offset by 
reductions from the energy intensity and structural change effects, with the 
reductions allocated to the energy intensity effect being significantly bigger than 
the reductions allocated to the structural change effect.   
 
Figure 2-3: Aggregate results showing the allocation of change in final energy 
consumption in the economic sectors to the decomposition factors in (a) the 
conventional decomposition analysis and (b) the extended decomposition 




Despite using more and slightly different factors, the extended decomposition 
analysis produces very similar results (Figure 2-3b). There are no differences in 
the qualitative patterns and the quantitative differences between the output and 
demand effects as well as between the structural change effect and the combined 
offshoring and embodied output effects are small. This gives confidence that the 
results are comparable. A number of interesting observations stand out. 
Firstly, the useful exergy intensity effect is larger than the final-to-useful 
efficiency effect, when the whole time period is considered (Figure 2-3b). 
However, up to 2005 the final-to-useful efficiency effect contributes more 
reductions in direct energy consumption. The relationship between the useful 
exergy intensity effect and the final-to-useful efficiency effect differs between 
sectors. While the two are of equal magnitude in the industrial sectors, the useful 
exergy intensity effect is significantly larger in the non-industrial sectors. Within 
the industrial sectors the bulk of reductions in energy consumption is very much 
concentrated in two sectors, namely Iron & Steel and Chemicals. These two 
sectors account for over 60% of reductions in direct energy use in the industrial 
sectors and 60% of the reductions assigned to the energy intensity effect in 
industry, even though they only used 32% of all direct industrial energy in 1997. 
An important contributor to this concentration is the useful exergy intensity 
effect. Almost 75% of the direct energy savings allocated to this effect in the 
industrial sectors occur in the Iron & Steel and the Chemicals sectors (detailed 
sectoral results are provided in Table A1 in Appendix A). 
Secondly, the direct energy savings attributed to the offshoring effect are much 
bigger than the energy savings attributed to the embodied output effect, with 
virtually no reductions in direct energy consumption due to the embodied output 
effect at the aggregate level (Figure 2-3b). This pattern is the result of direct 
energy savings attributed to the embodied output effect in the industrial sectors 
(Figure 2-4a) being cancelled out by increases in direct energy consumption 
attributed to the embodied output effect in the non-industrial sectors (Figure 2-
4b). All the energy savings from the offshoring effect occur in the industrial 
sector with no changes in direct energy consumption in the non-industrial 




Figure 2-4: Results of the extended decomposition analysis showing the 
allocation of change in final energy consumption to the decomposition factors for 
(a) the industrial sectors and (b) the non-industrial sectors. For each year the 
cumulative change since 1997 is shown. 
significant reduction in direct energy use due to the offshoring effect, the size of 
the sector is so small that it hardly shows up in the aggregate total for the non-
industrial sectors.  
Lastly, the importance of the different effects varies significantly over time (Table 
2-3). Both the final-to-useful efficiency effect and the offshoring effect contribute 
to direct energy savings but at declining rates, with very low contributions after 
2009. The useful exergy intensity effect contributes strongly to reductions in 
direct energy consumption between 2001 and 2009 and also at a more moderate 
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rate thereafter. The demand effect increases direct energy use except for the time 
of the crises. However, even after 2009 contributions from the demand effect 
remain subdued.  This means that after 2009 the contributions from all factors 
are significantly smaller than they were in the time before the crisis  (Table 2-3).  
Table 2-3: Results of the extended decomposition analysis for different time 
periods and decomposition factors. The results are obtained by first applying 
equation 2-4 to each effect, sector and year and then summing the results across 
all sectors and over the relevant time periods. 
ktoe   1997-2001 2001-2005 2005-2009 2009-2013 Total 
Final-to-useful efficiency -3046 -3418 -1061 -272 -7797 
Useful exergy intensity  653 -6139 -7591 -1660 -14737 
Offshoring  -4939 -1602 -2066 25 -8582 
Embodied output 1501 -1671 375 -13 191 
Demand 6630 7130 -220 1233 14773 
Population  767 1168 1505 1313 4754 
Total 1566 -4533 -9057 626 -11398 
2.4 Discussion  
2.4.1 The role of final-to-useful efficiency in energy intensity   
The significant reductions in energy intensity identified in this study present an 
encouraging trend and have been the key driver in reducing direct final energy 
consumption in the UK despite significant increases in output.  Direct energy 
intensity reductions have been happening across the whole time period studied 
and across virtually all sectors, with the Textiles, Clothing, Leather & Footwear 
sector presenting the only exception. However, when interpreting the results it 
needs to be considered that a decomposition analysis cannot determine whether 
the trends in the different factors are independent from each other. For example 
the analysis cannot indicate whether direct energy intensity reductions (or 
structural changes) would have been similar without growth in output leading to 
even larger reductions in energy use. For example there is some evidence that 
output growth and reductions in direct energy efficiency are interlinked 
(Brockway et al., 2017).  
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The novel features employed in this article have produced more detailed in 
insights into the underlying drivers of improved direct energy intensity. 
Unexpectedly, the reductions in the final-to-useful conversion efficiency have 
contributed much less to energy savings than reductions in the useful exergy 
intensity of production. This finding suggests that direct energy intensity is not 
necessarily a good proxy for the direct final-to-useful energy efficiency.  
In the non-industrial sectors this result is not so surprising because in these 
sectors monetary output is less related to the production of physical products. 
However, even in the industrial sectors, the relative proportions of direct energy 
savings allocated to the final-to-useful efficiency and useful exergy intensity 
effects vary widely between sectors. In the Construction and Textiles, Clothing, 
Leather & Footwear sectors, the two effects even have opposite signs, with one 
effect increasing direct energy use and one effect reducing direct energy use. The 
inconsistent contributions of the final-to-useful conversion efficiency to direct 
energy intensity reductions make it difficult to assess what has been driving the 
reductions in direct energy intensity in the UK. The useful exergy intensity effect 
captures the components of direct energy intensity reductions that are not 
attributed to an increasing direct final-to-useful conversion efficiency. It 
incorporates many factors not captured elsewhere. This makes it difficult to 
determine what has been driving the reductions in direct useful exergy intensity.  
On the one hand the useful exergy intensity effect might capture real reductions 
in the ratio of the direct useful exergy needed to produce the monetary output of 
a sector. For example, if higher quality products are produced using similar 
conversion processes and similar amounts of useful exergy. Another source of 
reductions in the ratio could be structural change within sectors. The structural 
change effect in this study only captures shifts in output between the 15 sectors 
analysed. Any energy savings produced by output shifts within the 15 sectors 
would therefore show up in the useful exergy intensity effects. Using very 
detailed data for the US, Weber (2009) shows that energy savings can shift 
significantly from the energy intensity to the structural change effect if a more 
detailed resolution of sectors is employed. In the UK economic sectors the 
Chemicals sector provides the largest share of direct energy savings allocated to 
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the useful exergy intensity effect in the industrial sectors, accounting for 45%. 
Some of these reductions in useful exergy intensity are almost certainly due to 
structural changes within the sector as the output share of the pharmaceutical 
sector within chemicals, which has a relatively low direct energy-intensity, has 
significantly risen. However, the lack of detailed sectoral energy data for the UK 
makes it difficult to assess how important this effect could be across all the 
sectors.  
On the other hand the useful exergy intensity effect might also be influenced by 
inaccuracies in the data. For example increases in sector output might not be 
related to increased physical production if the monetary production data are not 
appropriately corrected for inflation. Similarly uncertainties in the energy data 
would influence the energy intensity effect. For example a key uncertainty in this 
analysis is the treatment of the industrial energy consumption that is 
“unclassified” and hence not allocated to a specific industrial sector. This 
category of direct energy use was added to the energy consumed by the Other 
Industries sector because there was some evidence that the changes of the two 
were inversely related. However, this presents a very crude assumption. Despite 
accounting for 20% of all direct industrial energy consumption in 1997, the Other 
Industries sector only contributes 2% of the reductions in direct industrial energy 
use between 1997 and 2013. This disproportionally small contribution might 
indicate that some of the direct energy intensity reductions in the other sectors 
have been exaggerated by the reallocation of direct energy consumption from 
specific sectors to the “unclassified” category. However, such a reallocation would 
not affect the direct energy intensity values for the industrial sectors as a whole.  
2.4.2 The role of offshoring in structural change  
The MRIO model results used in this study have allowed a more detailed 
investigation of the drivers of structural change, which are generally not 
considered in other decomposition analyses. Three key results stand out from the 
analysis. 
Firstly, the direct energy savings attributed to the offshoring effect are a lot larger 
than the direct energy savings attributed to the embodied output effect, even 
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within the industrial sectors. Interestingly, this result is not caused by a general 
divergence between the shares of industrial output in the UK and in the output 
embodied in UK final demand. In fact, the relative decline of industrial output in 
the UK has been mirrored by a similar decline in the industrial output embodied 
in UK final demand. This decline in the industrial output embodied in UK 
demand produces the direct energy savings associated with the embodied output 
effect in the industrial sectors (Figure 2-4a). However, the direct energy savings 
assigned to the offshoring effect are significantly bigger than the savings assigned 
to the embodied output effect, because of different structural changes within the 
industrial sectors. While industrial sector output in the UK has, in relative terms, 
moved away from high-energy sectors such as Iron & Steel, Chemicals or Textiles, 
Leather & Clothing, this trend has been less strong or even reversed for the 
industrial output embodied in UK final demand.  
The second key result is the fact that the direct energy savings from the 
embodied output effect in the industrial sectors are completely offset by 
increased direct energy use associated with the embodied output effect in the 
non-industrial sectors. Given that the non-industrial sectors have a lower direct 
energy intensity this result is somewhat counterintuitive. This result can be 
explained by the fact that the sectors analysed in this study do not constitute the 
total economy. Specifically the transport and fuel-producing sectors are excluded. 
Both of the excluded sectors show declining shares in total UK output, with the 
changes being especially pronounced in the fuel producing sector which declines 
from 10% to 5% in total output over the period of the study. The overall neutral 
contribution of the embodied output effect in this analysis is therefore the result 
of two different structural changes in the UK economy. Firstly, there is a shift 
from industrial to non-industrial sectors, which should yield a net reduction in 
direct final energy consumption as non-industrial sectors are less energy 
intensive. Secondly, however, the overall output of the economic sectors analysed 
in this study is increasing its share in total UK output, as the shares of the 
transport and fuel producing sectors are declining. This reduces the observed 
impact of the structural change effect on direct final energy consumption. Both of 
these changes happen similarly in the UK economy as well as in the output 
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embodied in UK consumption so that they only show up in the embodied output 
effect but not in the offshoring effect.  
The third key result is the strong decline in the rate of direct energy savings 
attributed to the offshoring effect. This temporal pattern of the offshoring effect 
essentially reflects the change in the gap between industrial output in the UK and 
the industrial output embodied in UK demand. Up to 2009 UK industrial output 
generally grew more slowly (or declined more strongly) than the industrial 
output embodied in UK demand leading to direct energy savings from the 
offshoring effect. However, this trend was reversed between 2009 and 2013 as 
industry output in the UK grew slightly more than the industrial output 
embodied in UK final demand. However, while the level of offshoring is no longer 
increasing, the production of the goods and services embodied in UK demand is 
still highly dependent on industrial production in other countries. For all 
industrial sectors, except construction, the ratio of output in the UK to global 
output embodied in UK demand is below 1 in 2013. For four sectors it is even 
below 0.5, namely in the Iron & Steel, Non-ferrous metals, Electrical & 
Instrument Engineering sectors as well as the Textiles, Clothing, Leather & 
Footwear sector. 
The observed results are supported by the results of other studies investigating 
the UK energy, carbon and material footprints, which generally show a widening 
gap between consumption and production-based accounts up to the financial 
crisis and a change in trend thereafter (Barrett et al., 2013; Wiedmann et al., 2015; 
Lan et al., 2016; Owen et al., 2017; Owen et al., 2018). However most of these 
studies do not extend far beyond the financial crises. It is interesting to see that 
there has been no return to regular direct energy savings from the offshoring 
effect up to 2013.  
2.4.3 Implications for the future of final energy consumption in the UK  
Overall the reduction in direct final energy consumption in the UK economic 
sectors has been driven by some trends that can be considered desirable from the 
perspective of climate change mitigation. There have been significant reductions 
in direct energy intensity across sectors and there have also been direct energy 
80 
 
savings from a reduced dependence on industrial production, both in the UK and 
in the output embodied in UK final demand.  
However, in spite of these encouraging trends, this analysis has highlighted 
several features that question whether there will be an imminent return to the 
rates of reduction in direct energy consumption that were observed between 
2001 and 2009: 
1. Rates of increase in the final-to-useful conversion efficiency and of 
reduction in the useful exergy intensity of production have been slowing 
down and are very small between 2009 and 2013. In addition direct energy 
savings from the two effects before 2009 were very concentrated in the 
Iron & Steel and Chemicals sectors. Although there remains some 
potential for further savings it is unlikely that these two sectors can 
contribute further direct energy savings at the same magnitude as 
observed before 2009 (Allwood, 2013; Griffin et al., 2018).  
2. Energy savings from structural change have been very important and 
absolute reductions in direct final energy consumption in the economic 
sectors would have been much smaller without these contributions. 
However, it is questionable whether further direct energy savings from 
structural change are forthcoming and whether these are desirable from 
the perspective of climate change mitigation, as outlined in points 3 and 4.  
3. The UK government is currently pursuing an active industrial strategy 
with the aim of increasing labour productivity and competitiveness of the 
economy and ending the period of low growth after the crisis (HM 
Government, 2017). While the strategy explicitly refers to the whole 
economy and not only the sectors conventionally considered to be 
“industrial”, it is difficult to imagine that it can achieve its aims while 
continuing the trend of deindustrialisation that the UK has seen over the 
past decades. This is likely to reduce further direct energy savings from 
structural change in the UK.  
4. To contribute to global efforts of climate change mitigation any direct 
energy savings from structural change in the UK would have to be 
matched by similar structural changes in the economic output embodied 
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in UK final demand. The magnitude of the offshoring effect in this article 
as well as other evidence suggests that such an alignment has been very 
limited in the past (Barrett et al., 2013; Owen et al., 2017). Hence a return 
to higher growth rates of GDP and final demand is likely to lead to 
renewed growth in the embodied energy use associated with UK final 
demand. 
These findings point to three key implications for energy and economic policy in 
the UK.  
Firstly, efforts to further reduce direct energy consumption in the UK will need to 
target a wide range of sectors. One interesting option would be to explore how 
the materials produced by energy-intensive sectors could be more efficiently used 
in later stages of the industrial supply chain (Barrett and Scott, 2012). In addition 
there also needs to be a strong focus on non-industrial sectors of the economy. 
After years of reduction in direct energy consumption in the industrial sectors, 
the non-industrial sectors now account for almost half the total direct energy 
consumption in the UK economic sectors. The Public Administration sector in 
the UK presents an encouraging example, as direct energy consumption was 
reduced by 25% between 1997 and 2010 even though sector output grew by 79%. 
The UK government has had carbon reduction targets for the Public 
Administration sector in place for several years (The Carbon Trust, 2012). The 
results of this study suggest that these targets have been effective, but further 
research would be useful to determine how the Public Administration sector in 
the UK has achieved its reductions in direct energy consumption.  
Secondly, it should be a priority for policy makers to ensure that the industrial 
strategy will shape the UK economy towards a low-energy structure. If past 
trends continue, increasing efficiency on its own is unlikely to lead to substantive 
reductions in direct final energy consumption in the economic sectors, especially 
in combination with economic growth.  
Thirdly, in order to effectively contribute to global climate change mitigation 
efforts, energy and economic policy in the UK needs to consider the energy 
consumption in other countries that is associated with UK final demand. This is 
not an easy task, as the interconnected and globalised nature of the economy 
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means that there are very different forces shaping the structure of the UK 
economy and the structure of output embodied in UK final demand.  
Overall, the future development of direct final energy consumption in the UK 
economic sectors is very uncertain. Between 2009 and 2013 direct energy 
consumption in the economic sectors was characterised by a peculiar phase of 
stagnation with very little change in the decomposition factors investigated in 
this study (Table 2-3). This is a reflection of the wider economic stagnation. More 
recent data on direct final energy consumption suggest that there also have only 
been very small further reductions in direct final energy consumption in 2014 
and 2015 and that direct final energy consumption in the economic sectors (as 
well as in the transport and domestic sectors) has actually slightly increased in 
2016 (Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2017). Whether and 
how this period of stagnation ends, and the nature of economic development that 
will follow, will be crucial in determining whether the UK can continue to reduce 
direct final energy consumption and achieve its climate change targets.  
This article has focused its attention on direct energy consumption in the 
economic sectors. These sectors are only responsible for a part of final energy 
consumption in the UK with large amounts of energy used for transport and 
residential purposes. While the latter two purposes are often treated separately, 
energy use for transport and residential purposes is related to wider economic 
developments, such as growth and structural change. These links are complex 
and work through a variety of mechanisms. For example energy use for personal 
transport and residential purposes is linked to growth in income and associated 
changes in lifestyle. Similarly, all the technological devices that consume energy 
for transport or in homes are ultimately produced in the economic sectors (e.g. 
cars, houses, TVs). The widespread adoption of new technologies and shifts in 
behaviour intended to reduce energy consumption will therefore have significant 
impacts on the economic sectors. Such interlinkages between the sectors would 






This study has introduced two novel features into a decomposition analysis of the 
direct final energy consumption in the UK economic sectors. These features have 
provided new insights into the drivers of direct energy savings.  Estimates of the 
conversion efficiency from final energy to useful exergy have been included to 
further break down the measure of direct energy intensity and multi-regional 
input-output analysis has been employed to assess the contribution of offshoring 
to structural change in the UK. The analysis has revealed some trends between 
1997 and 2013 that are encouraging with regard to climate change mitigation. 
Direct energy intensity reductions have been the biggest contributor to the 
reductions in direct energy consumption and are driven by both increasing 
conversion efficiency from final energy to useful exergy as well as from reductions 
in the ratio of useful exergy used per unit of monetary output. In addition there 
are some indications of desirable structural change with a slight de-
industrialisation of the economic output embodied in the goods and services 
produced for final demand in the UK. However, the analysis also highlights 
several issues suggesting that further reductions in direct energy consumption at 
the rate seen between 2001 and 2009 cannot be taken for granted. Firstly, rates 
of increase in the final-to-useful conversion efficiency as well as rates of reduction 
in the useful exergy intensity have been slowing down.  Secondly, savings from 
direct energy intensity reductions have only slightly exceeded increases in direct 
energy use from increased output. Hence, direct energy savings from structural 
change have played a key role in delivering absolute reductions in direct energy 
consumption. However, this analysis suggest that almost all these savings from 
structural change are a result of offshoring as they have not been matched by a 
similar change in the structure of economic output embodied in UK final 
demand.  
The trends in energy consumption strongly reflect the economic stagnation 
between 2009 and 2013, with a significant slow-down in the growth rates of 
output and final demand, as well as in the rates of direct energy savings from 
structural change, final-to-useful efficiency and useful exergy intensity. How the 
ongoing economic stagnation is resolved will have significant impacts on the 
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direct energy consumption in the UK. Therefore the industrial strategy currently 
developed by the UK government presents a unique opportunity to shape the 
economic development in the UK for a low-energy future. However, to take up 
this opportunity, policy aimed at reducing energy consumption has to be 
rethought in a more holistic way. It needs to go way beyond the energy-intensive 
industrial sectors and pay equal attention to the less energy-intensive industries 
as well as the non-industrial sectors, such as public administration and 
commercial services. In addition energy policy needs to go beyond the UK 
borders and consider how energy consumption in the UK and abroad is driven by 
the growth and changing nature of UK final demand.  
More research is needed to support the development of effective policy 
interventions for reducing energy consumption. This article has studied the effect 
of offshoring on direct energy consumption in the UK but it has not investigated 
the change in the embodied energy associated with UK final demand. Gaining a 
better understanding of what is driving changes in the embodied energy of UK 
final demand would be a fruitful area for further research. Another interesting 
avenue would be the relationship between changes in energy intensity and 
economic structure on the one hand and prices and costs in the economy on the 
other. Research on this topic would be useful to assess the potential economic 
impacts of policies intended to significantly reduce energy consumption. This 
topic is also related to the question of how energy consumption in the transport 
and domestic sector might be linked to energy consumption in the economic 
sectors studied here.  
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Chapter 3  
Structural change for a post-growth economy: Investigating the 
relationship between embodied energy intensity and labour productivity 
Lukas Hardt, John Barrett, Peter G. Taylor and Timothy J. Foxon  
Abstract:  
Post-growth economists propose structural changes towards labour-intensive 
services, such as care or education, to make our economy more sustainable by 
providing meaningful work and reducing the environmentally damaging 
production of material goods. Our study investigates the assumption underlying 
such proposals. Using a multi-regional input-output model we compare the 
embodied energy intensity and embodied labour productivity across economic 
demand sectors in the UK and Germany between 1995 and 2011. We identify five 
labour-intensive service demand sectors, which combine low embodied energy 
intensity with low growth in embodied labour productivity. However, despite 
their lower embodied energy intensities, our results indicate that large structural 
changes towards these demand sectors would only lead to small reductions in 
overall embodied energy. Our results also suggest that labour-intensive service 
sectors in the UK have been characterised by higher rates of price inflation than 
other sectors. This supports suggestions from the literature that labour-intensive 
services face challenges from increasing relative prices and costs. We do not find 
similar results for Germany, which is the result of low overall growth in embodied 
labour productivity and prices. This highlights that structural change is closely 
associated with economic growth, which raises the question of how structural 
changes can be achieved in a non-growing economy. 
Keywords: post-growth economics; degrowth; structural change; energy 





Sustainable development requires us to “meet the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987) and this principle has 
been enshrined in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (United 
Nations General Assembly, 2015). However, human activities are currently 
breaching several planetary boundaries, threatening to destroy the ecological life-
support systems of our planet for future generations (Rockström et al., 2009; 
Steffen et al., 2015). These planetary boundaries represent thresholds in Earth-
system processes “which, if crossed, could generate unacceptable environmental 
change” (Rockström et al., 2009, p.472). Avoiding large-scale environmental 
crises will require the elimination of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, significant 
reductions in energy use and material throughput, as well as the reversal of 
trends in land-use change and biodiversity loss over the space of mere decades 
(Opršal et al., 2018; Hickel and Kallis, 2019). The critical challenge of 
sustainability is therefore how we can provide for human needs while reversing 
our environmental impacts to stay within the planetary boundaries (O’Neill et al., 
2018). 
One of the key drivers of environmental degradation has been the growth in 
economic activities, measured by GDP (Raupach et al., 2007; Peters et al., 2017). 
Therefore, ecological economists propose that we have to transform the 
economies of developed countries towards post-growth approaches to address 
the sustainability challenge (Jackson, 2017). Such post-growth economies are 
defined as economies that prioritise the reduction of environmental impacts and 
the enhancements of other measures of prosperity over GDP growth. Similar 
proposals have been discussed under different names such as degrowth (Kallis, 
2011; D’Alisa et al., 2015) or a steady-state economy (Daly, 1990; O’Neill, 2015). 
While these approaches feature some important differences, we focus on their 
commonalities in this study and will therefore refer to them collectively as post-
growth approaches. 
One important part of the proposed strategies for achieving the post-growth 
economy is structural change in economic output and employment away from 
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material production and consumption and towards labour-intensive services such 
as education, care or repair (Kallis et al., 2012; Jackson, 2015). Labour-intensive 
services are considered to be those services where the value of the service 
provided is inextricably linked to the labour time invested, so that it is difficult or 
undesirable to increase labour productivity in these services. We distinguish such 
labour-intensive services from labour-light services that feature a higher potential 
for labour productivity growth, such as communication services. The objective 
for such a structural change towards labour-intensive services in a post-growth 
economy is two-fold (Jackson, 2017). Firstly, these labour-intensive services are 
important for human flourishing and can provide meaningful jobs. As it is 
undesirable and difficult to improve labour productivity in such services, they can 
reduce the threat of unemployment in a non-growing economy. Secondly, it is 
considered that such labour-intensive services have lower environmental impact 
than material goods. However, so far, there has been very little empirical 
investigation in the post-growth economics literature of which sectors in the 
economy show the characteristics of labour-intensive services and whether 
structural change in output, employment and demand towards such sectors can 
contribute to the desired objectives. 
In this study, we address this gap in the literature by investigating the 
relationship between the embodied final energy intensity and embodied labour 
productivity across economic demand sectors in the UK and Germany. The 
adoption of an embodied perspective, which allows us to examine the embodied 
energy and labour inputs, is one of the key novelties of our analysis. To our 
knowledge, we provide the first study that compares embodied energy intensity 
and embodied labour productivity for different demand sectors, although there 
are a few examples of similar approaches used to examine the relationship 
between embodied labour and GHG intensities (Jackson et al., 2014; Gazheli et 
al., 2016; Sakai et al., 2017). The embodied approach, which is based on input-
output analysis, takes into account the labour and energy inputs along the whole 
global supply chain involved in the production for the demand in different 
sectors. We refer to the calculated measures as “embodied” energy intensity and 
“embodied” labour productivity of different demand sectors, to distinguish them 
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from conventional measures, which we will refer to as “direct” energy intensity 
and labour productivity. We consider an embodied perspective important for 
investigating structural change for a post-growth transition, because it allows us 
to examine whether changes in energy intensity and labour productivity are 
consistent with the overall goals of the post-growth economy. For example, a 
conventional perspective cannot show whether changes in direct energy intensity 
or direct labour productivity in specific sectors have been achieved at the expense 
of changes in energy or labour inputs in other parts of the supply chain. 
Using an embodied perspective has a long tradition in ecological economics for 
the calculation of energy, GHG and material footprints associated with the final 
demand in a particular country (Wiedmann et al., 2006; Barrett et al., 2013; 
Wiedmann et al., 2015; Lan et al., 2016). Supply chain approaches have also been 
used in the economics literature on structural change, for example, to investigate 
the implications of diverging levels of embodied labour-productivity in different 
sectors for overall economic stability (Pasinetti, 1981; Pasinetti, 1993). Our study 
combines these two strands of literature. 
Our approach allows us to investigate three important topics regarding the 
assumptions and feasibility of structural change towards labour-intensive services 
for a post-growth economy. Firstly, it is generally assumed that service sectors, 
including labour-intensive services, have a lower energy intensity than other 
sectors. There is evidence that this is the case when measuring the direct energy 
intensity without taking into account the supply chain (Mulder and de Groot, 
2004; Mulder et al., 2014). However, it is debated how much structural change in 
economic output towards service sectors in developed countries over the past 
decades have contributed to reducing the overall direct energy intensity of 
economies (Henriques and Kander, 2010; Mulder et al., 2014). We investigate 
whether the assumption of lower energy intensity in service sectors holds when 
an embodied perspective is used. In addition, we estimate a second measure of 
energy use that we consider relevant from a post-growth perspective, namely the 




1. Do service demand sectors have a lower embodied energy intensity and a 
lower embodied energy-labour ratio than other sectors? 
Secondly, there have been very few systematic assessments of which economic 
sectors show the characteristics of labour-intensive services desirable for a post-
growth economy, although Jackson (2017, p.220) lists “nutrition, education, care, 
maintenance and repair, recreation, craft, creativity, culture”, as examples. The 
key characteristics of the labour-intensive services promoted in the post-growth 
literature are the possibility to provide meaningful jobs, low energy intensity and 
low rates of labour-productivity growth (Jackson, 2017). For the purpose of our 
study, we focus on the latter two elements. We therefore identify which demand 
sectors show the characteristics of labour-intensive services by answering our 
second research question: 
2. Which demand sectors feature low embodied energy intensity combined 
with low rates of growth in embodied labour productivity? 
A full discussion on which demand sectors and activities can be considered as 
labour-intensive services desirable for a post-growth economy also requires a 
thorough assessment of the first characteristic, namely whether they can provide 
meaningful jobs. Such an assessment is beyond the scope of this paper as it 
requires careful consideration of how to define meaningful work. It is also more 
usefully conducted from a direct perspective, as the types of work carried out 
within direct sectors are likely to be more homogeneous than the embodied work 
in different demand sectors.  However, further research conducting such 
assessments is very important for the development of strategies for a post-growth 
economy. Druckman and Mair (2019) provide a good example of research 
assessing the potential of the health care sector to provide meaningful jobs. 
Thirdly, it has been proposed that labour-intensive services face an economic 
disadvantage compared to other sectors due to Baumol’s cost disease. The theory 
of Baumol’s cost disease, proposed by William Baumol and co-authors (Baumol 
and Bowen, 1965; Baumol, 1967; Baumol et al., 1985; Baumol, 2012), suggests that 
sectors with low labour productivity growth rates face relative cost and price 
increases compared to sectors with high labour productivity growth rates. While 
Baumol’s theory is highly stylised, there is considerable evidence that the 
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processes it describes play a role in shaping the economy in the US (Nordhaus, 
2006), the EU (Hartwig, 2011; Fernandez and Palazuelos, 2012), South Korea (Oh 
and Kim, 2015) and across the OECD (Hartwig, 2012; Hartwig, 2015). While there 
is evidence for the existence of Baumol’s theories across these countries and 
regions, the strength of the effect varies in line with different contexts. Baumol 
(2012) himself suggests that his theory has significant implications for the 
transition to a sustainable economy, because manufacturing sectors with a high 
environmental impact are getting continuously cheaper compared to the labour-
intensive services with low environmental impacts. We therefore investigate 
whether we can find evidence for such an effect by answering our third research 
question: 
3. Do demand sectors with low embodied energy intensity and low rates of 
growth in embodied labour productivity also have higher rates of price 
inflation compared to other demand sectors? 
3.2 Materials and methods 
3.2.1 Calculating embodied energy intensity and embodied labour 
productivity 
For our purposes, we define the embodied energy intensity, tE,I, in each demand 
sector i as the ratio of embodied inputs of energy, gE,i, and the monetary final 
demand that is spent in this demand sector, yi (Equation 3-1). For embodied 
labour productivity, pL,i, we divide the monetary final demand that is spent in this 
demand sector, yi, by the embodied inputs of labour, gL,i (Equation 3-2). We 
define the embodied energy-labour ratio in each demand sector, ri, as the ratio of 
















For convenience, we will refer to gE,i and gL,i as the embodied energy and labour 
of the relevant demand sectors. The embodied energy and labour capture the 
inputs that are used in all stages along the supply chain of a certain end-product. 
For example, the embodied energy of the UK demand for goods from the vehicles 
sector includes any direct energy that is used around the world in the supply 
chain, such as any direct energy used to produce the required steel in China or 
car parts in Eastern Europe. 
We obtain the embodied energy and labour for all demand sectors in the UK and 
Germany using the standard approach based on multi-regional input-output 
analysis (Miller and Blair, 2009; Owen et al., 2017). Calculating the embodied 
energy and labour for each demand sector requires three elements of monetary 
data that we obtain from the multi-regional input-output (MRIO) database 
EXIOBASE (Stadler et al., 2018). Figure 3-1 shows a graphic representation of an 
MRIO database and the three elements. The first element is a vector that includes 
the total economic output for each direct sector in each country (x). This output 
represents the sum of all sales, including to intermediate and final demand. The 
second element is the flow matrix Z that contains the flow of money from each 
direct sector in each country to all other direct sectors in all countries. These 
flows represent the intermediate inputs in the production process. In our case, Z 
represents a square matrix with i number of rows and j number of columns, 
where i and j are equal to the number of sectors. The third element is a relevant 
vector of final demand (y) for which we want to calculate the embodied energy or 
labour. The vector y gives the sum of global final consumption expenditure by 
households, non-profit organisations and the government, as well as gross fixed 
capital formation, changes in inventories and changes in valuables for each 
demand sector. 
The total output in each sector, xi, is equal to the sum of final demand in the 
sector yi and all the intermediate inputs the sector delivers to other sectors, i.e., 
the row elements of Z (Equation 3-4). 




Figure 3-1: Basic MRIO structure. The Z matrix contains all inter-sector 
transactions. Vector x represents the total economic input or output and vector y 
represents sales to final demand. Z, x and y are in financial units. Vector f is the 
energy or labour extension, which is in energy or labour units. Adapted from 
Brockway et al. (2019). 
To obtain the embodied inputs, we firstly need to calculate how much of the 
economic output from each sector in each country is part of the supply chain for 
the different demand sectors in each country. This means that we need to express 
x as a function of y.  
To do so we define a matrix A, with the same dimensions as Z, that expresses the 
total intermediate inputs in each sector, recorded in Z, as a fraction of the total 






We can use Equation 3-5 to substitute the elements of Z in Equation 3-4 and 
obtain in matrix notation: 
𝐱 = 𝐀𝐱 + 𝐲  (3-6) 
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Now Equation 3-6 can be rearranged to express x as a function of y: 
𝐱 = (𝐈 − 𝐀)−𝟏𝐲 = 𝐋𝐲 (3-7) 
where I is the identity matrix and L is usually referred to as the Leontief inverse. 
Equation 3-7 can tell us how much economic output from different sectors 
around the world is embodied in the supply chain of the final demand in 
different demand sectors and countries. We can calculate the embodied energy 
and labour of those final demand sectors by using information on the direct 
energy and labour intensity of output in different direct sectors and different 
countries that are part of the supply chain. Such extension vectors constitute the 
fourth element needed for the calculation. The vector fE describes the total inputs 
of direct energy in each sector in each country. We can divide this by the total 
output of each sector, x, to obtain the direct output intensity of energy in each 
sector (e). 
𝐞 = 𝐟𝐄 𝐱
−1 (3-8) 
A vector with a “hat” ( ̂ ) represents a diagonal matrix, whose diagonal elements 
are the elements of the vector. We can multiply both sides of Equation 3-7 with e 
to obtain: 
𝐟𝐄 = 𝐞𝐋𝐲  (3-9) 
To calculate the embodied energy, we can obtain a flow matrix FE by 
diagonalising e and y: 
𝐅𝐄 = 𝐞𝐋𝐲  (3-10) 
The flow matrix has the same dimensions as Z. Each column of FE shows the 
supply-chain energy inputs associated with the final demand for the 
corresponding demand sector. Summing the columns of FE gives the vector that 
contains the embodied energy associated with each sector of final demand, gE. To 
obtain the embodied labour, gL, the same procedure is employed but using a 
vector fL that describes the total labour inputs and provides a flow matrix FL. 
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To calculate rates of change over time in prices and intensities we fit a log-linear 
regression model to the relevant variable over the whole time period to obtain 
the compound rate of growth in the variable as suggested by Gujarati (1995). 
3.2.2 Data sources 
We use the EXIOBASE V3.4 database (Stadler et al., 2018), to obtain the relevant 
data of x, Z, and y for our analysis. The database covers the period from 1995 to 
2011 and represents the global economy using 44 countries and 5 rest-of-the-
world regions. EXIOBASE disaggregates the economy into 163 sectors based on 
the NACE rev. 1.1 classification. However, for our purposes we aggregate all the 
data to a level of 70 sectors, largely by removing the very detailed sub-
classifications in the sectors of agriculture, food production, metal mining and 
processing and recycling. Direct labour inputs for each sector and region (fL) 
were also obtained from EXIOBASE in the form of total hours worked in each 
year. 
Direct energy inputs for MRIO analysis can be constructed in different ways 
representing different stages of the energy conversion chain (Owen et al., 2017). In 
this study we are interested in the relationship between energy and labour 
productivity. Therefore, we focus on inputs at the final energy stage, because we 
consider those to be closer to the labour inputs than energy inputs at the primary 
energy stage. At the time of writing, EXIOBASE V3.4 provides a number of energy 
extension vectors. However, these cover only primary energy inputs (such as primary 
energy supply) or final energy inputs in the form of gross energy accounts, which 
cannot be used to calculate the embodied energy of demand sectors due to double 
counting (Stadler et al., 2018). The final energy extension vector use in the analysis 
(fE) was therefore prepared by the authors (see Section 3.2.4). 
While EXIOBASE V3.4 covers the whole global economy, we focus on the two 
countries of Germany and the UK. The reason is that there is very limited 
information available on direct final energy consumption in the service sectors in 
a standardised format covering the global economy over the time period of our 
analysis (see Section 3.2.4). As the service sectors are a special focus of our study, 
we require more detailed information on sectoral final energy consumption in 
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the service sectors than is provided in international energy databases. In the 
absence of standardised information, such detailed information can only be 
obtained from national data sources. While such information from national 
sources is available for many countries, it requires considerable work to obtain 
and process the relevant data to make them compatible with the input-output 
database. Obtaining and processing such national data for more than two 
countries was not possible within the constraints of our study. We chose the UK 
and Germany as case studies, because they represent two developed nations that 
have maintained different economic models and industrial structures (Peck and 
Theodore, 2007). 
3.2.3 Preparing the final demand vectors 
The flow matrices FE and FL can be used to calculate the embodied energy and 
labour for different subsets of the final demand vector (y). We use two different 
kinds of such subsets in our analysis. 
Firstly, for comparing demand sector shares in demand and embodied energy and 
labour, as well as comparing embodied intensities of demand sectors in current 
prices, we try to capture as much as possible of the embodied energy and labour 
associated with UK and German final demand. Therefore, we use the final demand 
from both domestic and imported sources for each demand sector in Germany and 
the UK respectively. However, the total embodied energy calculated in this study 
does not include energy use for non-commercial purposes, such as for residential 
use or private transport. Results of this analysis are presented in Section 3.3.1. 
Secondly, to investigate the rates of change in embodied energy and labour 
intensities in constant prices we only include the domestic final demand. The 
reason is that we require sectoral price indices to deflate final demand. These 
were not available for all countries from which parts of final demand are 
imported. Therefore, we only investigate the embodied intensities of the 
domestic components of final demand. This includes all final demand for 
products in the UK and Germany where the end product is produced 
domestically. It excludes final demand for imported finished products. However, 
the embodied energy and labour of this domestic demand still include global 
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inputs of intermediate products along the supply chain. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. 
To obtain time series of embodied energy and embodied labour productivity for 
domestic demand in constant prices we first obtain the relevant intensities for 
each demand sector in current prices and then deflate the final demand (the 
denominator) using a price index. For price indices we use the sectoral implied 
GVA deflators for the UK and Germany provided by the Eurostat database 
(Eurostat, 2018). These were the only price indices that we could obtain in a 
consistent format covering all demand sectors in both countries and the whole 
time period. Using the price indices, we produce time series of final demand in 
constant 2010 prices using chained volume indices (Lequiller and Blades, 2014). 
We do not convert the input-tables into constant prices, as for example done by 
Lan et al. (2016), because our analysis is focused on the total embodied energy 
and labour in each demand sector and does not analyse how structural changes 
in the global economy change these values over time. We therefore consider that 
a deflation of the input-output tables would only add unnecessary uncertainty to 
our results. 
All analysis was conducted at the level of the 70 direct and demand sectors; we 
aggregate the results to 25 demand sectors to reduce the uncertainty related to 
the embodied energy and labour measures and for increased clarity of 
presentation (Table 3-1). After the calculation of embodied inputs and intensities 
some demand sectors were excluded from the presentation because they do not 
feature any direct final energy consumption themselves. These include the 
energy-producing sectors and the sector of “Private Households with Employed 
Persons” (see Section 3.2.4).  
A large part of the output and final demand in the Real Estate sector consists of 
imputed rents for owner-occupied housing. We remove these from the figures for 
output and demand in the sector to obtain a more realistic value of the embodied 
labour productivity in the demand sector. For Germany, no information of the 




Table 3-1: Sector classification used for presenting results 
Demand sector NACE Codes (Rev. 1.1) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 01, 02, 05 
Mineral Products 13, 14, 26 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15, 16 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 17, 18, 19 
Paper, Printing, Publishing 21, 22 
Chemicals 24 
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 27, 28 
Machinery, Electrical Equipment, Computers 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 
Transport Equipment 34, 35 
Other Manufacturing 20, 25, 36, 37 
Construction 45 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 50, 51, 52 
Hotels and Restaurants 55 
Transport 60, 61, 62, 63 
Finance and Insurance 65, 66, 67 
Real Estate Activities 70 
IT and Communication 64, 72 
Business Services 71, 73, 74 
Public Administration 75 
Health 85 
Education 80 
Other Services 41, 90, 91, 92, 93 
Sectors not Presented in Results  
Fuel Producers 10, 11, 23 
Production and Distribution of Electricity, Gas, Steam, 
Hot Water 
40 
Private Households with Employed Persons 95 
Therefore, we only include the demand sector in the first part of the analysis, 
which estimates embodied energy intensities and embodied labour productivities 
in 2011. We exclude the Real Estate demand sector from the second part of the 
analysis covering the rates of change in embodied labour productivity. Any 
aggregate totals of demand, embodied energy and embodied labour that are 
presented in the following analysis exclude the embodied energy and labour 
associated with the demand for the energy-producing sectors, private households 
and imputed rents. They also exclude any energy use for non-commercial 
purposes, such as residential use and private transport.  
3.2.4 Preparing the energy extension vector 
This section provides a summary of the methods and data sources used to 
construct the energy extension vector. A more detailed description can be found 
in the supplementary information (Appendix C). 
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As outlined above, we focus on the embodied final energy in this study. Final 
energy use represents any final energy carriers (e.g., petrol, natural gas, 
electricity) that are consumed by end users, such as firms, households or the 
government. It excludes any energy that is used in the extraction of primary 
energy carriers (e.g., oil and gas extraction) or in the transformation of such 
primary energy into final energy (e.g., oil refineries). Final energy consumption 
also excludes any losses that occur in the transformation and distribution of 
energy (e.g., losses in thermal power stations). For brevity we will use the term 
“energy” to describe final energy inputs in the reminder of this article. 
As outlined above, calculating the embodied energy for the different demand 
sectors requires information on the direct final energy inputs into each of the 
EXIOBASE sectors in each region, captured in the vector fE. We use a two-stage 
process to prepare the vector of direct energy inputs. In the first step we use data 
on direct final energy consumption provided by the International Energy Agency 
(IEA, Paris, France) to construct a complete vector fE for all countries and 
regions. In a second step we use national data sources to construct more detailed 
vectors of direct energy inputs for Germany and the UK which then replace the 
relevant entries for the UK and Germany in the vector produced in the first step. 
For the first step, we draw on data from the IEA World Energy Balances (IEA, 
2018), which provide details on the total final consumption (TFC) of energy in 
more than 140 countries. The IEA World Energy Statistics and Balances can be 
downloaded with institutional or other user licence. From TFC, we exclude non-
energy use and the energy consumption by private households for residential and 
transport purposes, because our study focuses on energy inputs into economic 
production. This leaves us with the relevant direct final energy consumption in 
each country disaggregated into 23 IEA flows. 
To produce fE the IEA countries are firstly aggregated into the 49 EXIOBASE 
countries and regions. Secondly, the 23 flows of direct final energy consumption 
in the IEA data are split and allocated to the 70 EXIOBASE sectors in our 
analysis. This allocation process requires additional information and 
assumptions. For most sectors, we split the relevant IEA flows proportionate to 
monetary output or energy expenditure obtained from EXIOBASE. This approach 
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has the advantage that it can be implemented easily and consistently across all 
countries. However, the assumption of proportionate energy and monetary flows 
also introduces an amount of uncertainty into the analysis. This is especially the 
case for the service sectors, as the direct energy consumption in all service sectors 
(excluding transport) is represented in a single flow in the IEA energy balances. 
To address this limitation, we focus our analysis on the UK and Germany and 
construct more detailed energy inputs for these countries in the second step, 
paying particular attention to the service sectors. This limits the uncertainty 
because service sector outputs are traded less than manufactured goods. 
A second limitation of the IEA energy balances for our purposes is presented by 
the fact that they are assembled based on a territorial principle, while national 
economic accounts and EXIOBASE follow a residency principle (Stadler et al., 
2018). This is particularly problematic for the transport sector. As a detailed 
modelling of the different transport flows is beyond the resources and time 
available for this study, we resolve these issues using a number of simplifying 
assumptions (see Supplementary Information in Appendix C). 
In the second step we construct direct energy input vectors for the UK and Germany 
using national data sources that offer more detail than the IEA data. For the UK 
these data sources include the “Energy consumption in the UK” dataset (Department 
for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2018) and for Germany the sources 
include the German energy balances (AG Energiebilanzen, 2019) as well as reports 
on energy use in the service (Geiger et al., 1999; Schlomann et al., 2004; Schlomann 
et al., 2009; Schlomann et al., 2013) and transport sectors (Adler, 2005; Statistisches 
Bundesamt (Destatis), 2018). 
3.2.5 Limitations 
Constructing the input-output tables, as well as the labour and energy extension 
vectors covering the global economy presents a challenging task that relies on 
many assumptions and interpolations to correct for gaps and inconsistencies in 
the data. Uncertainties in input-output results are difficult to quantify and are 
not commonly reported (Owen et al., 2014). Uncertainties arise from the 
methods used in constructing the input-output tables as well as from the 
104 
 
construction and use of extension vectors. Peters et al. (2012) compare the 
aggregate carbon footprints for different countries calculated by different studies. 
They conclude that the results are broadly consistent and that differences in the 
footprint results are largely due to differences in extension vectors and 
differences in definitions for allocating emissions to international trade, rather 
than differences in the footprinting methods and MRIO databases. Lenzen et al. 
(2010) conduct a Monte Carlo analyses to estimate the uncertainty associated 
with carbon emissions embodied in imports and exports from the UK. They 
report standard deviations for total embodied emissions in the range of 3–8%. 
However, they also highlight that, firstly, uncertainty at the level of individual 
demand sectors can be considerably higher and secondly, that their method 
cannot capture systematic errors associated with the calculation of embodied 
inputs. 
While our results therefore need to be considered with caution, we utilise the best 
data and methods available and consider the results a useful addition to the post-
growth economics literature. More detailed information on underlying assumptions 
and uncertainties associated with the construction of the EXIOBASE 3 database and 
the labour extension vector is provided in Stadler et al. (2018), while more 
information on the construction of the energy extension is available in the 
supplementary information to this article (Appendix C). 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Comparing embodied energy intensities across demand sectors 
Even though we are using embodied energy intensity measures, our results show 
that service demand sectors, with the exception of transport, have a lower 
embodied energy intensity than other demand sectors (Figure 3-2, Table 3-2). In 
both countries, the embodied energy intensity of the service demand sectors is in 
the range of 0.9–1.9 MJ/EUR, while the production demand sectors, which 
include the manufacturing and mining demand sectors, show values between 3.5 
to 7.6 MJ/EUR. An outlier is the Other Manufacturing demand sector in the UK 
with 11.0 MJ/EUR. However, this is likely to be an overestimate as it includes all 
the unclassified industrial energy use in the UK (see Appendix C). The 
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Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing demand sector shows values in the same range as 
the production demand sectors (4.3 MJ/EUR and 5.6 MJ/EUR). In both countries 
the Transport demand sector has the highest embodied energy intensity with 
values of 13.2 and 11.0 MJ/EUR. The position of the Construction demand sector 
is somewhat different in the two countries. While embodied energy intensity in 
the Construction demand sector is in the range of the service demand sectors in 
the UK, it sits between the service and manufacturing demand sectors in 
Germany (Table 3-2). 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Sectoral embodied energy intensity plotted against sectoral final 
demand (top row) and sectoral embodied energy-labour ratio plotted against 
sectoral embodied labour (bottom row). The areas covered by the rectangles 
represent the total embodied energy associated with the final demand in the 
respective countries (excluding the embodied final energy of energy-producing 




Table 3-2: Embodied energy intensities, embodied energy-labour ratios and final 
demand share in 2011 for the 22 energy-using demand sectors in the UK and 
Germany. 
 2011 


















Agriculture       
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing 
4.3 10 1.4 5.6 17 1.2 
Production & Construction 
Mineral Products 4.5 65 0.9 7.3 101 0.6 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
4.3 38 4.2 4.6 49 5.4 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 5.8 30 1.7 5.5 31 1.8 
Paper, printing, 
Publishing 
4.8 79 1.3 4.4 132 1.3 
Chemicals 7.4 86 1.2 7.6 143 3.1 
Metals and Fabricated 
Metal Products 
5.5 78 1.1 5.3 94 1.4 
Machinery, Electrical, 
Equipment, Computers 
4.3 54 3.7 3.5 55 7.9 
Transport Equipment 4.0 62 3.3 3.7 72 6.0 
Other Manufacturing 11.0 128 1.8 5.8 82 2.9 
Construction 1.7 39 8.8 2.9 70 8.5 
Labour-light Services       
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
1.7 46 5.4 1.5 38 2.2 
Transport 13.2 229 3.2 11.0 242 2.9 
Finance and Insurance 1.0 32 4.2 1.2 38 3.6 
Real Estate Activities 1.5 34 4.2 0.9 68 6.4 
IT and Communication 1.0 21 3.3 1.2 42 3.0 
Business Services 1.1 36 2.3 1.6 43 2.8 
Labour-intensive Services 
Hotels and Restaurants 1.3 23 5.9 1.9 38 3.4 
Public Administration 1.5 34 9.8 1.5 47 8.8 
Health 1.5 33 11.0 1.4 49 6.3 
Education 1.5 27 14.6 1.5 36 12.5 
Other Services 1.9 44 6.8 1.8 61 8.1 
Total * 2.6 44 100 2.9 59 100 
*Totals exclude demand and embodied energy and labour inputs for the energy-producing sectors, 




When considering the embodied energy-labour ratios the results are somewhat 
different from the results for embodied energy intensities. Firstly, the clear 
distinction between the service demand sectors and other demand sectors 
becomes more blurred. The Textiles, Clothes and Leather demand sector, the 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco demand sector and the Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing demand sector all have values of the embodied energy-labour ratio that 
are similar or lower than many service demand sectors (Table 3-2). For all of 
these three demand sectors, a large proportion of the supply-chain labour inputs 
are performed abroad in low-wage countries (Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix B). 
The common perception that the production and agriculture demand sectors are 
“high-energy” is therefore partially the result of ignoring the dependence of some 
of these demand sectors on low-wage labour in other parts of the world. 
3.3.2 Identifying labour-intensive services  
To investigate the rates of change in embodied labour productivities, we only 
consider the final demand for domestic sectors in the UK and Germany (see 
Section 3.2.3). 
Based on our results, we identify five demand sectors as labour-intensive services. 
These include the demand sectors Hotels and Restaurants, Public 
Administration, Health, Education and Other Services. These five demand 
sectors show embodied energy intensities smaller than 2 MJ/EUR (Table 3-2) and 
rates of change in embodied labour productivity smaller than 1% per year in both 
countries (Table 3-3, Figure 3-3). The remaining service demand sectors with low 
embodied energy intensity show either higher rates of growth in embodied 
labour productivity in at least one of the two countries. We will be referring to 
this group of demand sectors as labour-light services. 
The Wholesale and Retail Trade demand sector and the IT and Communications 
demand sector show consistently higher rates of growth in embodied labour 
productivity in both countries, well exceeding 2% and 3% per year respectively 
(Table 3-3, Figure 3-3). In contrast the results for the Finance and Insurance 
demand sector and the Business Services demand sector diverge between the two 
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Table 3-3: Rates of change in embodied energy intensity and embodied labour 
productivity as well as in the embodied energy-labour ratio for domestic demand 
sectors. Intensities represent embodied energy and labour inputs per unit real 
demand (const. 2010 EUR). 
 Cumulative Annual Growth Rate between 1995 and 2011 (%)  














Agriculture       
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing 
−4.7 3.3 −2.2 −3.3 2.4 −1.4 
Production & Construction 
Mineral Products 1.6 −2.7 2.2 −0.7 0.3 0.6 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
−2.4 1.7 −0.2 −0.1 −2.0 1.3 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 0.0 3.0 −0.9 −1.8 −0.2 −0.2 
Paper, printing, Publishing −1.8 2.3 −0.3 −1.9 3.0 −1.6 
Chemicals −4.8 3.3 −0.9 −0.4 0.1 −0.1 
Metals and Fabricated Metal 
Products 
−3.6 1.9 −0.6 −2.4 0.5 1.0 
Machinery, Electrical, 
Equipment, Computers 
−4.3 3.3 −1.8 −2.5 0.6 −1.2 
Transport Equipment −4.6 3.4 −1.0 −1.5 −0.6 0.9 
Other Manufacturing 0.7 1.6 1.2 0.6 0.1 1.1 
Construction −0.3 −1.0 2.9 0.3 −0.7 1.2 
Labour-light Services       
Wholesale and Retail Trade  −2.0 2.6 1.4 −3.8 2.8 −0.4 
Transport −2.4 1.6 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.9 
Finance and Insurance −4.5 3.5 2.0 6.0 −5.2 9.1 
Real Estate Activities - - - - - - 
IT and Communication −6.5 6.9 −3.8 −2.6 3.8 −3.8 
Business Services −3.8 2.6 0.5 −0.2 −1.3 0.8 
Labour-intensive Services       
Hotels and Restaurants −1.4 0.0 1.6 −0.9 0.9 2.2 
Public Administration −1.6 −0.5 2.6 −2.1 0.8 0.9 
Health −0.8 −2.5 4.9 −0.9 −1.3 2.2 
Education −0.7 0.6 1.8 −1.0 0.1 0.3 
Other Services −0.7 0.0 3.6 −1.0 −0.3 1.6 






Figure 3-3: Relationship between change in embodied labour productivity and 
the average embodied energy intensity for domestic demand sectors between 
1995 and 2011 in (a) the UK and (b) Germany. 
countries. Both these demand sectors show relatively high rates of growth in 
embodied labour productivity in the UK but negative rates of change Germany. 
The Finance and Insurance demand sector in Germany presents a strong outlier 
with rates of change in embodied labour productivity of −5.2% driven by an 
increase in the price index by 9.1%. This is not a result of the financial crisis as the 
rates of change in embodied labour productivity and prices between 1995 and 
2006 are similar (Table A4, Appendix B). However, the rate of change in direct 
labour productivity of GVA is much less extreme showing −0.6% per year (Table 
A5, Appendix B). This could indicate that, for this demand sector, the use of the 
implied GVA deflator is not well suited to deflate final demand. This is likely to 
be related to the challenges associated with measuring real output in the sector 
in general (Inklaar et al., 2008; Christophers, 2011). 
The low rates of direct labour productivity growth in the labour-intensive service 
sectors is often contrasted with high rates of direct labour productivity growth in 
the manufacturing, transport and agriculture sectors (Mulder and de Groot, 
2004; Maroto and Rubalcaba, 2008). However, our results using an embodied 
perspective only fit this pattern in the UK but not in Germany. 
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In the UK, the production demand sectors, the Transport demand sector, as well 
as the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing demand sector show rates of growth in 
embodied labour productivity that are considerably higher than in the labour-
intensive services, ranging from 1.6% to 3.4% per year (Table 3-3, Figure 3-3a). 
The only exception is the Mineral Products demand sector, which records a 
considerable reduction in embodied labour productivity over the time period 
studied. 
The results for Germany differ considerably from the UK. Most strikingly the 
production demand sectors as well as the Transport demand sector show only 
very low growth rates or even reductions in embodied labour productivity over 
the time period studied (Table 3-3). The only exception is the demand sector 
Paper, Printing and Publishing which shows a rate of change in the embodied 
labour productivity of 3% per year. Similar to the UK, the Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing demand sector also shows relatively high rates of growth in embodied 
labour productivity of 2.4% per year. 
The low rates of growth in embodied labour productivity in the German 
production demand sectors are not a result of low growth in the direct labour 
productivity of the German direct production sectors. Calculating the growth of 
direct labour productivity, in the form of GVA in constant 2010 prices per hour of 
work, shows relatively high and positive rates of growth in the German 
manufacturing sectors over the same time period (Table A5, Appendix B). The 
low rates of embodied labour productivity growth are therefore the result of low 
direct labour productivity growth in other parts of the supply chain offsetting the 
direct labour productivity growth in German production sectors. A similar effect 
can also be observed for the UK, with direct labour productivity growth rates in 
the production sectors being higher than the growth in embodied labour 
productivity in the corresponding demand sectors (Table A5, Appendix B). 
However, the effect is weaker so that the embodied rates of growth are still 
relatively large and positive for the UK.The time period covered by our results 
includes the financial crisis starting in 2008, which could have a distorting 
impact on our results. We therefore conducted the same analysis covering only 
the time period from 1995 to 2006. While restricting the time period changes the 
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results for some demand sectors, especially some UK manufacturing demand 
sectors, the overall patterns are very similar to the ones described for the full 
time period (Figures A1 and A2 and Table A4, Appendix B). 
We can now compare the importance of the different demand sector groups in 
the total final demand, total embodied energy and total embodied labour 
considered in this study. These totals exclude the final demand and associated 
embodied inputs for the energy-producing sectors, for the demand sector Private 
Households with Employed Persons and the demand for imputed rents. The total 
embodied energy also does not include any energy used for non-commercial 
purposes in each country, for example for residential use or private transport. 
The comparison reveals some common features across both countries (Figure 3-
4). The share of the two service demand sector groups makes up the majority of 
final demand, but their combined share in the total embodied energy and labour 
is much smaller. Of the two service demand sector groups, the labour-intensive 
services take up a considerably bigger share than the labour-light services in final 
demand and in embodied labour. The difference between the embodied energy 
shares of the labour-intensive services and the labour-light services is much  
 
Figure 3-4: The shares in total final demand, embodied energy and embodied 
labour in the UK and Germany associated with different demand sectors for the 
year 2011. Totals exclude demand and embodied energy/labour inputs for the 
energy-producing sectors, private households and imputed rents. 
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smaller, because the labour-light service sectors include the embodied energy of 
the transport demand sector. The main difference between the two countries is 
related to the demand sector group Production & Construction, which has a 
considerably bigger share in Germany across all three categories. 
3.3.3 Evidence of Baumol’s cost disease in low-energy demand sectors 
Baumol (2012) highlights that the cost disease might have negative 
environmental consequences if the environmentally damaging products from 
sectors of high environmental impact and high labour productivity growth get 
continuously cheaper compared to the services provided by low-energy service 
sectors with low labour productivity growth. This has important implications for 
the labour-intensive services proposed for a post-growth economy, as these 
would fall into the latter category. 
To test Baumol’s suggestion, we investigate the relationship between the 
embodied energy-labour ratio and the rate of change in the price index. We use 
the embodied energy-labour ratio instead of the embodied energy intensity 
because the former can be calculated independent of the price index. 
We find that the results for the UK largely support Baumol’s suggestion. The 
labour-intensive service demand sectors, as well as the Construction demand 
sector, show low embodied energy-labour ratios combined with relatively high 
rates of price inflation, ranging from 1.6% to 4.9% per year. In contrast, the 
production demand sectors as well as the Transport sector and the Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing demand sector show higher energy-labour ratios combined with 
falling prices (Figure 3-5a, Table 3-3). Exceptions to this pattern are the demand 
sectors Mineral Products and Other Manufacturing, which show increases in 
prices despite high embodied energy-labour ratios. For the labour-light service 
demand sectors the results are mixed. They show a wide range of price inflation 
rates ranging from −3.8% per year in IT and Communications to low rates of 
increase in Business Services (0.5%) and higher rates in Wholesale and Retail 
Trade (1.4%) and Finance and Insurance (2.0%). 
For Germany, the results are less clear cut. Overall the rates of price inflation in 




Figure 3-5: Relationship between change in sector price indices and the average 
embodied energy-labour ratio in (a) the UK and (b) Germany.  
to 2.2% per year. The rates of price inflation in the labour-intensive service 
sectors are also not distinctly higher than the rates in many of the production 
demand sectors, with the latter exhibiting a wide range of values from −1.6% to 
1.3% (Figure 3-5b). The lack of a clear distinction in price inflation rates between 
labour-intensive service demand sectors and production demand sectors is not 
surprising given that there is also less of a distinction in the rates of change in 
embodied labour productivity, discussed in Section 3.3.2. 
Similar to the UK the labour-light services show a wide range of price inflation 
rates ranging from falling prices in IT and Communications (−3.8%) and 
Wholesale and Retail Trade (−0.4%), over low rates of increase in Business 
Services (0.8%) to extremely high rates in Finance and Insurance (9.1%). 
3.4 Discussion 
3.4.1 Comparing our results to the literature 
To our knowledge, there are no other studies that compare embodied energy 
intensity to growth rates of embodied labour productivity across demand sectors. 
Gazheli et al. (2016) compare embodied carbon intensity with direct labour 
productivity growth across sectors in Germany, Spain and Denmark. They do not 
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find evidence for a correlation between embodied carbon intensity and direct 
labour productivity growth in any of the countries. Our results would suggest 
that this lack of a correlation could be due to the fact that some of the labour-
light services show relatively low levels of embodied energy intensity with 
relatively high rates of growth in embodied or direct labour productivity. Jackson 
et al. (2014) briefly compare the levels (but not growth rates) of embodied GHG 
intensities and embodied labour intensity across demand sectors in the UK or 
Canada. They highlight that the personal and social services demand sector 
provides a very high level of embodied labour intensity with a low level of 
embodied GHG intensity. 
We can also compare our results to the literature on Baumol’s cost disease, which 
includes a discussion on which service sectors can be considered to be part of the 
“stagnant” group of sectors with low potential labour productivity growth. Our 
results are similar to other empirical assessments, even though the other studies 
use a direct rather than an embodied perspective. Using an analysis of different 
direct labour productivity measures, Baumol et al. (1985) identify the following 
service sectors in the US to be stagnant according to the majority of measures: 
finance and insurance; hotels, personal and repair; auto repair and service; 
movies and amusement; medical, educational and non-profit; government 
enterprises; government industry. In a more recent study, Maroto and Rubalcaba 
(2008) determine different rates of direct labour productivity growth in different 
EU service sectors and estimate low or negative rates of direct labour productivity 
growth (< 1% per year) in the sectors hotels and restaurants, real estate activities, 
business services and social & personal services. They estimate a slightly higher 
rate of direct labour productivity growth in the public sector (1.67% per year), but 
this is still considerably lower than the direct labour productivity growth they 
estimate for the manufacturing sectors (5.93% per year). 
Jackson (2017, p.220) lists the activities of “nutrition, education, care, 
maintenance and repair, recreation, craft, creativity, culture” as examples of 
labour-intensive services desirable for a post-growth economy. The five broad 
service demand sectors that we identify as being labour-intensive encompass all 
of these activities. Our results therefore support the assumptions in the post-
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growth literature that these activities could potentially be demand sectors able to 
support job creation in a post-growth economy. 
The Construction demand sector presents an interesting case. In both countries it 
is showing relatively low values of embodied energy intensity. In addition, it is 
showing negative rates of change in embodied labour productivity, which means 
that it largely fulfils the two criteria we applied to identify labour-intensive 
services. However, while our estimated values of embodied energy intensity in 
the demand sector are quite low, the construction sector is generally considered 
to have high environmental intensities with regard to other environmental 
impacts, especially with regard to overall material use and GHG emissions from 
cement production (Giesekam et al., 2014). We have therefore not included it in 
the category of labour-intensive services. Nevertheless, our results highlight that 
construction activities are labour-intensive and that the demand sector could 
therefore provide an important source of jobs in a post-growth economy, as long 
as it can be made less environmentally intensive, for example in the area of 
retrofitting houses or in the construction of low-impact housing. 
3.4.2 Potential energy savings from structural change 
Our results confirm that most service sectors are less energy intensive than 
manufacturing and transport sectors, even from an embodied perspective. The 
picture still holds when the embodied energy-labour ratio is considered, although 
the distinction is not quite as clear, with some manufacturing demand sectors 
showing values similar to service demand sectors. Overall, a shift in final demand 
away from sectors with high embodied energy intensity towards labour-intensive 
service sectors would therefore reduce the embodied energy of final demand in 
Germany and the UK. 
To estimate the potential magnitude of reductions in embodied energy we can 
imagine a radical scenario in which the share in final demand of all demand 
sectors with high embodied energy intensity (>3 MJ/EUR) in 2011 is reduced by 
half, this includes the production demand sectors as well as the Transport 
demand sector and the Agriculture, Forestry Fishing demand sector. The value of 
demand reduced in the energy-intensive demand sectors is redistributed to the 
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five labour-intensive service demand sectors, according to their shares in demand 
in 2011, so that overall demand is unchanged. We can then calculate new, 
hypothetical, values for the embodied energy and labour using the embodied 
energy and labour intensities for 2011. Such a hypothetical scenario would reduce 
the total embodied energy of the demand sectors covered in this study by about 
22% in both Germany and the UK. As our study excludes energy consumption for 
residential purposes and private transport, the reductions in the total final energy 
footprint in the UK and Germany would be smaller. 
Such reductions in embodied energy would constitute an important step towards 
reducing environmental impacts. However, they are relatively small, given that 
the scenario describes structural changes that are very large by historical 
standards. In addition, the scenario is very simple and might not be achievable in 
practice as some categories of energy-intensive demand might not be easily 
reduced because they constitute important human needs, such as food or 
clothing. 
For a post-growth economy, it is not only the overall embodied energy that needs 
to be reduced by structural change, but also the overall energy-labour ratio. In 
our scenario the overall embodied energy-labour ratio would be reduced by 8% 
and 11% in Germany and the UK respectively. The potential contribution that 
structural change towards labour-intensive services can make to lower the 
embodied energy-labour ratio is therefore even smaller than the one for 
embodied energy. However, a large part of the embodied labour for both 
countries is employed abroad. The ratio of domestic and foreign labour inputs in 
the supply chain varies significantly between demand sectors, with the 
production demand sectors and the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing demand sector 
generally being associated with larger proportions of labour employed abroad 
(Tables A2 and A3, Appendix B). Any shifts towards labour intensive services 
imagined in the post-growth literature would therefore reduce the energy-labour 
ratio within the UK and Germany and increase employment domestically, even if 
it does not lead to big changes in the aggregate embodied energy-labour ratio. 
The sustainability challenge requires us to find ways to provide for human needs 
within planetary boundaries. Overall, our results indicate that structural change 
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towards labour-intensive services can make a contribution to the goals of a post-
growth economy and to addressing the sustainability challenge, by reducing 
energy consumption and creating employment. It is difficult to define how much 
final energy consumption has to be reduced in developed countries to ensure 
environmental sustainability. However, we would suggest that the magnitudes of 
energy savings discussed in this section on their own are unlikely to be sufficient 
for avoiding environmental crises from climate change and other environmental 
impacts. 
Therefore, it is important to focus on other strategies that can reduce energy use 
across sectors. One way to achieve this is to increase policy efforts to reduce their 
energy intensity. This is especially relevant for the service sectors which have 
generally lagged behind other sectors with regard to energy intensity reductions 
(Mulder et al., 2014; Hardt et al., 2018). An important question for the post-
growth literature is then how such efforts to innovate and reduce energy 
intensity interact with labour productivity, as there is evidence that increased 
efforts for environmental innovation increase productivity (Aldieri et al., 2019). 
Another possibility to reduce energy consumption would be through policies for 
targeted reductions in unnecessary economic demand. This is likely to be most 
effective in production demand sectors that have a high energy intensity and 
already have exhausted many options for easy energy intensity improvements. In 
those sectors related to land-use change, such as agriculture or forestry, another 
important objective for the post-growth economy would be to restore the 
capacity of the land to provide important ecosystem services (Pechanec et al., 
2019). 
Nevertheless, even if the energy savings of high-level shifts in demand towards 
labour-intensive that we examine here are limited, there might still be other 
reasons why such shifts towards labour-intensive services have to form an 
important part of the post-growth transition. Such reasons can include the ability 





3.4.3 Baumol’s cost disease as a barrier to the post-growth transition 
The theory of Baumol’s cost disease rests on a stylised division of the economy in 
sectors with high labour productivity growth and sectors with low labour 
productivity growth. Our results for the UK largely fit with Baumol’s theory. 
There are high rates of growth in embodied labour productivity in the production 
demand sectors and the labour-light service demand sectors compared to low 
rates of growth in the labour-intensive service demand sectors. We find relative 
price increase in labour-intensive service demand sectors relative to high-energy 
production demand sectors. In contrast the results for Germany show stagnating 
value in embodied labour productivity in many of the production and labour-
light service demand sectors that are similar to those in the labour-intensive 
services. 
The diverging results with regard to embodied labour productivity in the 
production demand sectors in Germany and the UK highlight that it is important 
to go beyond the stylised division and take into account local context and 
complexity. This complexity has also been highlighted in other research on the 
topic (Hartwig, 2011; Fernandez and Palazuelos, 2012). The adoption of an 
embodied perspective demonstrates one aspect of this complexity, namely the 
interconnectedness of the different direct sectors. Most demand sectors rely on a 
mix of inputs from direct labour-intensive and non-labour-intensive activities, 
which shapes the rates of embodied labour productivity improvements. As our 
results demonstrate, this can lead to considerable differences in the rates of change 
of labour productivity between direct and embodied measures. 
Nevertheless, drawing on our results for the UK and the wider evidence in the 
literature, we consider that Baumol’s cost disease should be taken seriously when 
developing strategies for a transition to a post-growth economy. At first glance it 
might appear that Baumol’s cost disease already supports a post-growth 
transition, as it leads to a shift of labour and demand in current prices towards 
labour-intensive services and might even act to reduce economic growth. 
However, as a general tendency we would suggest that Baumol’s cost disease 
would act as a barrier to the post-growth transition for two reasons. Firstly, the 
shift in demand towards labour-intensive service demand sectors is largely a 
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result of price changes and not mirrored in real production. The share of energy-
intensive production demand sectors in demand does not decline strongly in real 
terms and hence energy demand is not strongly reduced by these changes 
(Henriques and Kander, 2010). 
Secondly, as Baumol (2012) himself argues, some of the fundamental features of 
the cost disease are working against sustainability concerns. Manufactured goods, 
which have a high direct energy intensity, are becoming ever cheaper compared 
to labour intensive services with low direct energy intensity. In addition, the 
rising relative costs of repair foster a throw-away society. The only reason that 
Baumol’s cost disease produces a shift in labour and output in current prices 
towards some labour-intensive services is the fact that these services are so 
important that demand for them is kept up despite increasing relative prices and 
costs (e.g., health care, education). Other labour-intensive services, which are not 
essential, such as theatre, become luxury products or are completely priced out of 
the market (Baumol, 2012). Even those labour-intensive services that are seen as 
essential and are often publicly provided (e.g., health care) face a continuous 
uphill battle from rising costs which need to be constantly justified. 
Post-growth economics proposes that a sustainable economy will require a much 
larger share of activities to be concentrated in labour-intensive services. Baumol’s 
cost disease suggests that a shift of demand towards such sectors would provide 
considerable challenges as these demand sectors will constantly struggle with 
rising relative costs and prices. An important question for the post-growth 
economics literature is therefore how to change the economic system to reduce 
the disadvantage that labour-intensive service demand sectors face from 
Baumol’s cost disease. This presents a difficult challenge as Baumol’s cost disease 
relates to some fundamental features of our market economy, such as 
competition and the important role of labour costs. Our analysis shows that 
many of the demand sectors showing low or negative price inflation also have a 
higher embodied energy-labour ratio. A reform of the tax system that moves 
taxes away from labour and onto energy use or GHG emissions could therefore 
make a start in addressing the disadvantage faced by labour-intensive services. 
Such tax reforms are a common suggestion in the post-growth literature (Cosme 
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et al., 2017). Other policies could be targeted at specific labour-intensive services, 
for example obligations for companies to offer repair services together with their 
products. Another possible way to increase labour-intensive services would be to 
increase the non-market provision of such services through communities or the 
state, especially where such services are already provided in a non-market 
environment. 
3.4.4 Structural change and economic growth are intertwined 
Our results for Germany and the UK do not only show differences with regard to 
rates of change and embodied labour productivity in production demand sectors, 
but also the economy as a whole. The embodied labour productivity of all 
demand sectors covered in this study is essentially stagnant in Germany, while it 
shows a positive rate of growth in the UK. Similarly, the overall rate of price 
inflation is well below 1% in Germany but considerably higher in the UK. Our 
results reflect different rates of aggregate GDP growth in the two countries. 
Between 1995 and 2011, real GDP in the UK grew considerably more than in 
Germany, and the difference is even more pronounced for nominal GDP (Table 3-
4).  
Table 3-4: GDP growth in the UK and Germany between 1995 and 2011 
 Growth in nominal GDP 
between 1995 and 2011 (%) 
Growth in real GDP between 
1995 and 2011 (%) 
Germany 36.2 24.2 
UK 86.5 41.6 
Data source: Eurostat (2020)   
The diverging results between the two countries therefore highlight another key 
feature of the wider literature on structural change. This is the fact that structural 
change is closely linked to the process of economic growth, as stressed by 
Kuznets (1973).  Two of the main causes of structural change that have been 
identified in the literature are differential rates of labour productivity growth in 
different sectors (Baumol, 1967) and changes in demand composition associated 
with rising incomes (Pasinetti, 1993). Both of these mechanisms can be expected 
to operate only weakly in an economy that is not showing growth in aggregate 
labour productivity, income and demand. Without high productivity growth in at 
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least some sectors, we also would not expect the manifestation of Baumol’s cost 
disease. 
This raises important questions for post-growth economists as they generally 
envision structural change towards labour-intensive services in a non-growing 
economy or even as a strategy to lower economic growth. However, the literature 
on structural change so far has very little insights to offer on how structural 
changes can be achieved in a non-growing economy. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Our current economic system is not sustainable as it is increasingly destroying 
the ecological life support systems of our planet. To address the sustainability 
challenge, we need to find ways to rapidly reverse environmental destruction 
while simultaneously meeting human needs and improving living conditions. 
Post-growth economists propose that structural changes in our economy away 
from material production and towards labour-intensive services, such as health 
care, education, arts and crafts or repair services, can make an important 
contribution to addressing the sustainability challenge by reducing the 
environmental impact of the economy and provide meaningful jobs. 
Our study produces some empirical evidence regarding the realisation of this 
proposal by investigating the relationship between embodied energy intensity 
and embodied labour productivity of final demand sectors in the UK and 
Germany between 1995 and 2011. Specifically, we investigate three questions, 
namely whether service demand sectors feature lower levels of embodied energy 
intensity than other demand sectors, which service demand sectors can be 
considered labour-intensive and whether these labour-intensive service demand 
sectors might be affected by Baumol’s cost disease. Our results confirm some of 
the assumptions in the post-growth economics literature but also raise some 
important challenges. 
Firstly, we confirm that service demand sectors show lower values of embodied 
final energy intensity than other demand sectors and we identify five demand 
sectors as labour-intensive, combing low levels of embodied energy intensity with 
low rates of growth in embodied labour productivity. These include Hotels and 
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Restaurants, Public Administration, Education, Health Care and Other Services. 
Given the lower embodied energy intensity of these demand sectors, structural 
change in final demand towards these labour-intensive service sectors would 
likely reduce the embodied energy associated with the final demand in Germany 
and the UK. 
Secondly, however, our results also suggest that the magnitude of reductions in 
embodied energy that can be achieved from structural change in final demand 
towards labour-intensive services are relatively small and, on their own, are 
unlikely to be sufficient for reducing the environmental impacts of the respective 
economies to sustainable levels. This is the case because large fractions of 
demand as well as the embodied labour are already concentrated in demand 
sectors with low embodied energy intensity. While labour-intensive service 
demand sectors provide very important services for human flourishing, 
increasing their share in demand is no panacea for reducing environmental 
impact. To achieve rapid reductions in energy footprints it is therefore important 
to achieve improvements in energy intensity within sectors as well as reductions 
in overall economic demand and production. 
Lastly, our results highlight some potential challenges to achieving such 
structural changes towards labour-intensive services for a post-growth transition. 
For the UK we find some support for the theory of Baumol’s cost disease with 
rates of price inflation in labour-intensive services being higher than in other 
sectors, especially compared to production sectors with high embodied energy-
labour ratio. Baumol’s cost disease suggests that the tendency of our economic 
system to chase labour productivity improvements poses a considerable 
challenge to labour-intensive demand sectors. As it is undesirable and/or difficult 
to improve embodied labour productivity in these demand sectors, they face 
continuously rising costs and prices relative to other demand sectors that are able 
to increase labour productivity. Such rising costs threaten their existence in the 
market place or their political justification, if they are provided publicly, and 
therefore provide a potential barrier to the expansion of labour-intensive services 
envisioned in the post-growth literature. 
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For Germany we do not find evidence supporting Baumol’s cost disease as rates of 
growth in embodied labour productivity and price inflation are low across the 
whole economy, including the manufacturing demand sectors. These results 
highlight another challenge to the post-growth proposals, namely the fact that 
structural change is closely intertwined with the process of economic growth. 
There are currently no theories to explain how structural change might happen in 
an economy that is not growing. 
Our research improves our understanding of the implications and challenges of 
structural changes towards labour-intensive services. However, it also highlights 
some important unanswered questions for the post-growth transition: How can 
we reduce the environmental impacts of labour-intensive services even further? 
How can structural change towards labour-intensive services be achieved without 
further economic growth? How can we create an economic environment that 
allows such labour-intensive services to flourish in the face of increasing labour 
productivity in other sectors? If we are serious about fostering labour-intensive, 
community-based services as part of a post-growth transition we need further 
research to answer these questions. 
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Chapter 4  
What structural change is needed for a post-growth economy: A 
framework of analysis and empirical evidence  
Lukas Hardt, John Barrett, Peter G. Taylor, Timothy J. Foxon   
 
Abstract 
In order to avoid environmental catastrophe we need to move to a post-growth 
economy that can deliver rapid reductions in environmental impacts and 
improve well-being, independent of GDP growth.  Such a move will entail 
considerable structural change in the economy, implying different goals and 
strategies for different economic sectors. So far there are no systematic 
approaches for identifying the desired shape of structural change and sectoral 
goals in terms of output, demand and employment. We present a novel analysis 
that addresses this gap by classifying economic sectors into groups with similar 
structural change goals. Our framework for the classification considers sectoral 
characteristics along three dimensions, which are (a) the final energy intensity, 
(b) the potential for labour productivity growth and (c) the relationship between 
labour productivity and the energy-labour ratio. We present empirical evidence 
on the three framework dimensions for economic sectors in the UK and Germany 
and derive structural change goals for four sector groups sharing particular 
combinations of the sector characteristics. Our analysis allows us to discuss the 
specific role of different economic sectors in the structural change envisioned in 
the post-growth transition and the most important challenges they might be 
facing.  
Keywords: Post-growth Economics; Degrowth; Structural Change; Energy 
Footprint; Labour Footprint;   
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4.1 Introduction  
To avoid serious environmental crises, global society needs to drastically reduce 
resource use and eliminate global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in a few 
decades (UNEP, 2016; IPCC, 2018). Up to now, growing GHG emissions and 
resource use have been closely coupled to growing economic activity, as 
measured by GDP (Wiedmann et al., 2015; Csereklyei et al., 2016). As long as 
global GDP continues to grow, achieving the necessary reductions in GHG 
emissions and resource would require rates of decoupling that are much higher 
than any rates achieved in the past (Hickel and Kallis, 2019; Parrique et al., 2019; 
Wiedenhofer et al., 2020; Haberl et al., 2020). Achieving the necessary 
reductions in GHG emissions and resource use will therefore likely (but not 
certainly) lead to reductions in GDP growth rates and even in GDP levels in high-
income countries (Kallis, 2018, p.112). Without a radical economic 
transformation, such reductions in GDP growth rates or levels will have 
detrimental social impacts (Jackson, 2017, pp.82–83).  
High-income countries therefore face the challenge of transforming their 
economies to simultaneously increase human well-being and deliver the 
necessary reductions in GHG emissions and resource use, independent of 
whether GDP grows or contracts. Fortunately, GDP is not a good measure of 
human well-being, so the challenge is difficult but not impossible (Stiglitz et al., 
2010; Costanza et al., 2014). We refer to an economy that meets this challenge as 
a “post-growth economy” following Jackson and Victor (2011) and Jackson (2017, 
p.160). The literature features other, similar approaches under the terms of 
degrowth  (D’Alisa et al., 2015; Kallis, 2018) or steady-state economics (Daly, 
2008; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). For the purpose of our article the commonalities 
of these approaches are more important than their differences and we will refer 
to them collectively as the “post-growth literature”.  
The transformation to a post-growth economy will not affect all sectors of the 
economy equally. Production and consumption will have to be reduced in some 
sectors but expanded in others, leading to changes in the sectoral composition of  
output, demand and employment (Kallis, 2011). For the purpose of our study we 
refer to such changes in the sectoral composition of demand, output and 
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employment as “structural change”, although structural change in a wider sense 
can also refer to other aspects, such as institutions, industrial organisation or 
technology (Ciarli and Savona, 2019).  
Even though structural change is recognised as an important feature of the post-
growth transition, the post-growth literature does not yet provide a systematic 
discussion of the structural change that is desired and of how it can be achieved. 
Scattered references identify sectors considered harmful to the post-growth 
transition, such as marketing (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013, p.96), speculative finance 
(Daly, 2008) or resource extraction (Sekulova et al., 2013). A somewhat more 
comprehensive discussion is provided of the sectors that are desired. This 
discussion focuses especially on the provision of labour-intensive services to 
create meaningful employment (Jackson and Victor, 2011; Jackson, 2017, pp.147–
149).  
Such discussions of specific sectors are a useful starting point for a post-growth 
structural change analysis, but they have not been integrated into a 
comprehensive framework that systematically identifies sector goals and 
strategies. Without such a framework the post-growth literature leaves many 
open questions on structural change, for example: Which sectors specifically 
need to expand or shrink in terms of their output, demand or employment share? 
And what does that mean for sector-specific goals, for example with regard to 
labour productivity or energy intensity?  
Developing a framework that can answer such questions would advance the post-
growth agenda in three ways. Firstly, given that structural change will inevitably 
be part of the post-growth transition, the development of effective strategies to 
achieve the transition will require a clear picture of the structural change needed, 
including sector-specific goals and strategies. Secondly, such a framework helps 
to make the often abstract vision of the post-growth economy more concrete, 
because it describes a vision for specific sectors, while still maintaining a 
comprehensive view of the whole economy. Thirdly, having such a concrete 
vision can help with the communication of post-growth ideas to policy-makers 
and businesses. Policy makers and businesses are familiar with using sectoral 
approaches, even if the goals they pursue are different from the objectives of a 
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post-growth economy. For example the UK government has developed sector 
roadmaps for energy efficiency (e.g. DECC, 2015) and includes “sector deals” in its 
industrial strategy (HM Government, 2017).  Similarly, the German Council of 
Economic Experts (2019) suggests that “there could be justification for a vertical 
policy intervention that is tailored to individual sectors or technologies”.  
To address this gap in the post-growth literature we present a novel framework to 
systematically define the structural change required for a post-growth economy. 
We use the framework to classify economic sectors in the UK and Germany into 
groups and define the sectoral goals for each group with regard to the sectoral 
share in output, final demand and employment as well as with regard to sectoral  
labour productivity growth. Sectors are allocated into groups based on their 
characteristics along three dimensions, derived from the overarching structural 
change objectives for a post-growth economy.  The three dimensions are (a) the 
sectoral final energy intensity, (b) the potential for labour productivity growth 
and (c) the relationship between the growth in labour productivity and the 
growth in the energy-labour ratio. For each sector in the UK and Germany we 
present empirical evidence on each of the three dimensions from both a direct 
and an embodied perspective.   
We build on the analysis presented in Hardt et al. (2020) and Chapter 3 of my 
thesis, but go beyond its results to present a new and complementary analysis as 
well as new results. Firstly, Hardt et al. (2020) focus specifically on labour-
intensive services. The analysis we present here covers the whole economy 
outlining sector goals and discussing challenges for all parts of the economy. 
Secondly, Hardt et al. (2020) only investigate the embodied energy intensity and 
embodied labour productivity growth rates. The analysis we present here adds 
new results regarding an important third dimension, namely the relationship 
between labour productivity and the energy-labour ratio. Thirdly, Hardt et al. 
(2020) consider only sectoral characteristics from an embodied perspective. The 
analysis we present here compares the sectoral characteristics from a direct and 
embodied perspective.   
Based on the analysis and discussion we highlight important gaps in current 
research on the post-growth transition and identify where more research and 
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democratic discussion is needed to determine sector goals and policies to achieve 
them.  Our analysis is intended as a first demonstration of our framework as 
applied to the economy as a whole. It therefore faces limitations in terms of the 
level of sectoral detail and depth of discussion in each sector. We envision our 
framework to be further developed and applied across different scales in the 
future, for example to guide the development of more fine-grained strategies for 
different sectors in different countries.  
4.2 Analytical approach   
4.2.1 Definition of economic sectors  
We are concerned with structural change in terms of the sectoral composition of 
the economy, which requires a classification of economic sectors. We use the 
sectoral classification from the system of national accounts, because it allows us 
to use the available data on sectoral gross value added (GVA), final demand and 
employment.   
Within the framework of national accounts, economic sectors can be represented 
from two perspectives. We refer to the first as the direct perspective, because it 
defines economic sectors by similar activities. From a direct perspective the 
Transport Equipment sector includes all businesses producing transport 
equipment. Sectoral data are conventionally presented from a direct perspective 
in the national accounts.  
We refer to the second perspective as the embodied perspective, because it 
defines economic sectors based on the supply chain inputs of a product or unit of 
final demand. We therefore use the term of “demand sector” to refer to sectors 
conceptualised from this perspective. From an embodied perspective the 
Transport Equipment demand sector includes not only the assembly of the 
equipment itself but also all the intermediate inputs used in the production 
process, such as steel, computer software or electricity. The embodied inputs for 
different demand sectors can be derived from the input-output tables published 
as part the national accounts. An embodied perspective has been employed for 
structural change analysis  (Pasinetti, 1981; Pasinetti, 1993) as well as for the 
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analysis of emissions or energy use embodied in trade (e.g. Barrett et al., 2013; 
Lan et al., 2016).  
We use the same set of sectors for each perspective. That means that for each 
direct sector there exists a corresponding demand sector whose embodied inputs 
are coming from the corresponding direct sector, but also other direct sectors 
along the supply chain. The characteristics of the corresponding sectors and 
demand sectors are therefore related and give complementary insights. In this 
study we therefore do not classify sectors and demand sectors separately. Instead, 
we use the term “sector” to refer to the two together and assign the 
corresponding sectors and demand sectors to the same sector group. We use the 
information given by the different perspectives to inform different aspects of the 
classification process and of the identification of structural change goals. For 
example the information provided by the embodied perspective is useful to 
determine goals with regard to structural change in final demand and can be 
used to ensure that structural change goals and policies are consistent with 
overarching, global objectives of the post-growth economy. In turn, the direct 
perspective can be more easily related to real businesses and features more 
homogenous production processes. It is therefore more useful for informing goals 
and policies targeting production-related aspects, such as energy intensity and 
labour productivity.  
4.2.2 A framework for structural change 
The post-growth literature does not feature a systematic discussion of structural 
change. But we can identify the goals post-growth economists want to achieve 
from structural change by analysing the references to sectors that are desired or 
not. Two overarching objectives stand out (Figure 4-1). Firstly, increasing the 
share of sectors with lower environmental impact in output and demand will 
reduce the overall environmental impact of economic production (Cosme et al., 
2017). Here we focus mostly on final energy use as one important element of 
environmental impact. Secondly, increasing the share of labour-intensive sectors 
and demand sectors in GVA and demand can provide meaningful employment 
and offset job losses from reduced production and demand or increased labour 




Figure 4-1: Framework for determining individual sector goals 
The purpose of our framework is to translate the two overarching objectives into 
goals for specific sectors. We specifically identify sector goals in four categories 
(Figure 4-1). The first category is the change in the sector share in output and 
final demand, where the goal could be an increase or a decrease in the sector 
share. The second category is the change in the sectoral employment share. The 
two categories effectively break down the structural change in the economy into 
its sector-specific components. But it is difficult to determine the goals in the first 
two categories without knowing the desired changes to sectoral labour 
productivity and energy intensity. We therefore add a third category, which is the 
change in labour productivity, and a fourth category, which is the change in 
energy intensity. The framework produces for each economic sector a set of 
goals, describing whether the sector share in output, final demand, and 
employment is expected to increase or decrease and whether labour productivity 
and energy intensity are expected to increase or decrease.  
How the two overarching objectives are translated into sector-specific goals is 
determined by the inherent characteristics of different sectors. For example the 
GVA share of energy-intensive steel production needs to be reduced to achieve 
the overarching objective of reducing aggregate energy use. While the sectoral 
goals might seem obvious for some sectors, difficulties arise where there are 
trade-offs between the different goals. For example, taken on their own, energy 
intensity reductions are desirable in all sectors. But in some sectors reductions in 
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energy intensity might clash with the goal of labour productivity growth. To 
strike a balance between comprehensiveness and ease of application we 
determine sector goals based on sector characteristics in three dimensions, which 
we assess both from a direct and an embodied perspective. The three dimensions 
are the energy intensity, the potential for future labour productivity growth and 
the relationship between labour productivity and the energy-labour ratio (Figure 
4-1). Another important dimension that can inform structural change goals is the 
desirability of labour productivity growth. For the transition to a post-growth 
economy, labour productivity growth might not be desirable in all sectors where 
it is possible. We do not empirically assess this dimension or use it in this study 
to classify sectors and demand sectors, but we discuss some of its implications.  
The three dimensions omit any assessment of the ability of a sector to contribute 
to the provision of basic human needs and well-being. Arguably, such an ability is 
a key determinant for the sector goals in the transition to a post-growth 
economy. We omit such a dimension in our framework because it cannot be 
assessed based on economic statistics alone and requires democratic discussion. 
Our framework can therefore give indications about the directions of the sector 
goals but not necessarily the desired magnitude of change. For example we 
identify sectors in which final demand should be reduced. But in order to 
determine by how much it should be reduced, further assessment of the 
contribution of such sectors to human well-being is necessary.  
4.2.2.1 Dimension 1: Final energy intensity 
The first dimension describes the final energy intensity of a sector. We include 
final energy intensity in the framework because it determines how much a 
change in the sector share in output or final demand can contribute to the 
overarching objective of reducing aggregate energy use and therefore the wider 
overarching objective of reducing environmental impacts. It also determines the 
importance of further energy intensity reductions in the sector in comparison 
with other goals. 
The first overarching structural change objective for a post-growth economy is 
the reduction of overall environmental impact. For the purpose of our analysis we 
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focus on the empirical assessment of final energy intensity at the expense of other 
measures of environmental impact, such as GHG emissions or resource use. We 
do so for two reasons. Firstly, final energy use is closely related to other 
environmental impacts, such as carbon emissions and nitrogen pollution (Owen 
et al., 2018). Secondly, final energy use features a prominent role in the post-
growth literature because it is related to labour productivity growth (see Section 
4.2.2.3). However, in cases where we consider that the energy-intensity alone is 
not a good proxy for the environmental impact of a sector, we also take into 
account information on other environmental impacts from the literature. Most 
importantly this applies to the Construction sector. Further research that extends 
our framework to systematically include other measures of environmental impact 
would be a useful addition to the post-growth literature.  
We define the direct energy intensity of a sector as the direct final energy 
consumption per Euro of GVA in constant prices, as is commonly done in the 
literature (Hammond and Norman, 2012). We define the embodied energy 
intensity for each sector as the embodied final energy consumption per Euro of 
final demand in constant prices. We restrict the analysis to the domestic 
components of final demand, as price deflators for non-domestic components are 
not readily available. 
For the purpose of allocating economic sectors into groups we distinguish two 
types of sectors, namely sectors of high energy intensity and those of low energy 
intensity. We will refer to sectors of high energy intensity as energy-intensive 
sectors and to sectors with low energy intensity as energy-light sectors.  
Defining an exact threshold above which a sector or demand sector counts as 
energy-intensive is always arbitrary to some degree. For the purpose of this study 
we generally consider sectors as energy intensive if their direct and embodied 
energy intensity exceeds 3 MJ/EUR. We derive this threshold from the results on 
embodied energy intensity presented in Chapter 3. In the UK the embodied 
energy intensity divides the demand sectors into two distinct groups, one with 
embodied energy intensities below 2 MJ/EUR and one with embodied energy 
intensities above 4 MJ/EUR (Figure 3-2). In Germany a similar, but somewhat less 
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distinct, jump is visible around 3 MJ/EUR. We therefore consider this a suitable 
threshold for our analysis.  
4.2.2.2 Dimension 2: Potential for labour productivity growth 
The second dimension describes the potential for labour productivity growth in a 
sector. We include the dimension in the framework because it determines how 
changes in the employment and output share of a sector can contribute to the 
overarching objectives of creating meaningful employment. Sectors and demand 
sectors with low potential for labour productivity growth are generally those that 
comprise large shares of activities in which the reductions of labour inputs would 
directly reduce the quality of the output, such as care services or education. Such 
sectors and demand sectors are often considered desirable in the post-growth 
literature because they can slow down aggregate labour productivity growth, or 
even reduce the level of aggregate labour productivity, and therefore mitigate the 
threat of unemployment in a non-growing economy (Jackson and Victor, 2011). In 
addition it is often considered that such activities are likely to provide 
meaningful work because they deliver a high social value (Jackson, 2015). 
However, while such sectors might have the potential for meaningful work, they 
do not necessarily feature good working conditions in the current system, as 
explored by Druckman and Mair (2019).  
In order to assess the potential of future sectoral labour productivity growth we 
use the historical rates of labour productivity growth as an indicator. Using 
historical rates has the advantage that they can be calculated easily and 
consistently across economic sectors from existing data. But there are also large 
uncertainties in how far historical rates of labour productivity growth will be 
similar to future rates. For example, past labour productivity growth might have 
exhausted the potential for further growth in some sectors, or the development of 
new technologies might redistribute the potential for labour productivity growth 
between sectors (Frey and Osborne, 2017).  
Based on historical values of labour productivity growth we distinguish two 
potential values for the dimension in our analysis, which are based on different 
rates of historical direct and embodied labour productivity growth. We refer to 
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labour-light sectors as those sectors that have a high potential for labour 
productivity growth. We refer to labour-intensive sectors as those sectors that 
have a low potential for labour productivity growth. We use rates of labour 
productivity growth rather than levels of direct and embodied labour intensity for 
the reasons outlined in Section 4.2.2.4. In order to distinguish between labour-
light and labour-intensive sectors we use the threshold of a 1% annual rate of 
direct and embodied labour productivity growth. Baumol et al. (1985) use a 
similar threshold to define “stagnant” sectors in their analysis based on a distinct 
gap in direct labour productivity growth rates observed in their data. A similar 
gap can be observed in our own results, with direct and embodied labour 
productivity growth rates being either lower than 1% per year or higher than 1.5% 
per year, with only a single exception (see Section 4.3).  
We define the direct sectoral labour productivity as the sectoral GVA in constant 
prices divided by the hours of direct labour inputs. We define the embodied 
labour productivity as the amount of final demand in constant prices per 
embodied hour worked. We obtain the annual compound rate of growth in direct 
and embodied labour productivity in each sector by fitting a log-linear regression 
model over the whole time period (Gujarati, 1995, pp.169–171).  
In general policy discourse it is usually assumed that labour productivity growth 
should be pursued in all sectors that have the potential for it. However, from a 
post-growth perspective labour productivity growth is not necessarily desirable 
and there might be sectors in which it is possible to increase labour productivity 
but where it might be undesirable. The post-growth literature offers several 
potential reasons. Labour productivity growth can eliminate meaningful jobs, for 
example if highly skilled craft work is replaced by repetitive factory work 
(Nørgård, 2013; Mair et al., 2020). Labour productivity growth can harm the well-
being of workers if it increases job demands or job insecurity (Isham et al., 2020). 
Labour productivity growth can also come at the cost of worsening 
environmental impacts. Factory workers might be replaced by energy-intensive 
machines or farm workers by bee-harming pesticides. Indirectly, labour 
productivity growth may increase environmental impacts if it makes 
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environmentally-damaging products cheaper than environmentally-friendly ones 
(Baumol, 2012, pp.71–73).  
We do not include the desirability of labour productivity growth in our 
framework here because it is difficult to assess empirically which sectors and 
demand sectors could provide meaningful work. While such an analysis is 
possible, it lies beyond the time and resource constraints of our research project. 
The lack of such an analysis is an important limitation of our framework and of 
the wider post-growth literature and should be addressed in future research. 
More empirical research into the desirability of labour productivity growth in 
different sectors is vital for the development of a post-growth strategy.  
4.2.2.3 Dimension 3: Relationship between labour productivity and the energy-
labour ratio 
The third dimension in our framework describes the relationship between the 
growth in labour productivity and the growth in the energy-labour ratio in 
different sectors. We include the dimension in the framework because it is 
important for assessing the potential trade-offs between sector goals. The 
previous two dimensions treat energy intensity and labour productivity 
separately and do not consider potential trade-offs between them, for example 
whether increasing or reducing labour productivity might come at the cost of 
increased energy use. Simply examining the relationship between labour 
productivity and energy intensity, however, does not yield useful information 
about how changes in labour productivity might influence energy intensity, 
because energy intensity is influenced by a range of factors. It is therefore 
difficult to tell whether energy intensity is changing because of or despite labour 
productivity growth, and how further changes in labour productivity would 
influence energy intensity.  
The literature considers that energy use and labour productivity are linked, 
because an increased availability of energy has allowed for the increasing 
replacement of labour with machines and for more efficient ways of organising 
labour (Elkomy et al. 2020). Empirical evidence indicates that historical growth 
in aggregate labour productivity has been associated with a growing energy-
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labour ratio (Kander et al., 2013; Semieniuk, 2016). On a sectoral level the 
evidence on the relationship between labour productivity and the energy-labour 
ratio is limited. Two studies by Mulder and de Groot (2004) and Witt and Gross 
(2019)  suggest that there might be a correlation between growth in direct labour 
productivity and in the direct energy-labour ratio in the manufacturing and 
transport sectors, but not in the service sectors.  
To explore the link between energy intensity and labour productivity it is 
therefore useful to decompose the growth in energy intensity into the growth of 
the energy-labour ratio and the growth of labour productivity (Semieniuk, 2016). 
Examining the relationship between the two growth rates can provide insights 
into the potential trade-offs between the goals in our framework. The first 
important question is whether the two ratios are generally moving in the same or 
opposite directions. For example sectors which are expected to increase labour 
productivity and reduce energy intensity face a trade-off between the two goals, if 
increases in labour productivity are associated with increases in the energy-
labour ratio, but not if they move in opposite directions. Whereas sectors in 
which reductions in labour productivity are considered useful to increase 
employment would face a trade-off with reductions in energy intensity if labour 
productivity and the energy-labour ratio move in opposite directions, but less so 
if they move in the same direction. Of course, if labour productivity and the 
energy-labour ratio are not related at all, there are no trade-offs. In addition to 
the general direction of change of the two ratios, the relative rates of change also 
provide information on the magnitude of the potential trade-offs. For example 
even if they move in the same direction, the trade-off between labour 
productivity growth and energy intensity can be quite small if labour productivity 
grows faster than the energy-labour ratio, as this would still allow for reductions 
in energy intensity.  
Ideally, the dimension should be empirically assessed by examining the statistical  
correlation between labour productivity and the energy-labour ratio in each 
sector. However, doing so would require the implementation of several statistical 
tests for each sector, the description and discussion of which is beyond the scope 
of this article.  Instead, to obtain a first indication for this dimension, we 
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calculate the rates of change in the direct and embodied energy-labour ratio and 
compare them to the rates of change in the direct and embodied labour 
productivity. The direct energy-labour ratio is the direct final energy 
consumption divided by the hours of direct labour inputs in each sector. The 
embodied energy-labour ratio is the embodied final energy consumption of each 
demand sector divided by the embodied amount of hours worked.  
To classify economic sectors in our framework we divide sectors into two groups, 
depending on whether the changes in the energy-labour ratio and labour 
productivity are in the same or opposite direction, and consider the relative 
magnitude of the rates of change in the discussion. In the future, however, it 
would be useful to explore the relationship between the energy-labour ratio and 
labour productivity at a sectoral level using more sophisticated econometric 
methods. 
4.2.2.4 Levels or rates of change 
As outlined in the previous section, we use the level of energy intensity to classify 
economic sectors. But for our dimensions of labour productivity and the energy-
labour ratio we use the rate of change rather than the level. 
For energy intensity we consider the level more useful than the rate of change for 
translating the overarching structural change objective to reduce energy use into 
sectoral goals.  Firstly, the use of energy intensity, measured as direct or 
embodied energy use per GVA or final demand, is a meaningful and commonly 
used measure for comparing the level of direct and embodied energy intensity 
across sectors (Hammond and Norman, 2012; Lan et al., 2016). Shifting GVA and 
final demand towards sectors with lower embodied energy intensity therefore 
contributes directly to the overarching goal of reductions in aggregate direct and 
embodied energy use. Secondly, the direct and embodied energy intensity of 
energy-intensive sectors is often considerably higher than for energy-light sectors 
(see empirical results in Section 4.3). Energy-intensive sectors and demand 
sectors are therefore likely to remain relatively more energy intensive, even if 
they feature higher rates of reductions in direct or embodied energy intensity. 
Therefore we consider it more useful for structural change to shift GVA and 
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demand towards sectors with low levels of direct and embodied energy intensity, 
rather than to sectors with high rates of reduction in direct and embodied energy 
intensity. For our classification we therefore use the calculated levels of direct 
and embodied energy intensity presented in Section 4.3. However, the rates of 
change of direct and embodied energy intensity are presented in Table A10 in 
Appendix D.  
For labour productivity growth, the situation is somewhat different and we 
consider it more useful to focus on the rates of growth in direct and embodied 
labour productivity. Firstly, the overarching structural change objective to create 
meaningful employment is motivated equally by the need to create jobs now and 
by the need to prevent future unemployment resulting from aggregate 
productivity growth in a non-growing economy (Jackson and Victor, 2011). In 
order to achieve the objective, it is therefore useful to not only focus on reducing 
the static level of labour productivity but also its growth rate.  
Secondly, and more importantly, we consider that it is difficult to meaningfully 
compare the level of labour productivity or its inverse, labour intensity, across 
sectors. For example, based on a low level of embodied energy intensity and a low 
rate of embodied labour productivity growth, we identified five labour-intensive 
service demand sectors in Chapter 3. These sectors align well with the activities 
that have been identified intuitively as labour-intensive in the post-growth 
literature. However, when comparing the average level of embodied labour 
intensity of those demand sectors between 1995 and 2011 (in constant prices), 
they do not show a higher level of embodied labour intensity than other demand 
sectors (Figure 4-2, Table A11). If anything, their embodied labour intensity is 
often lower than the one of other demand sectors with higher embodied energy 
intensity. When comparing the direct sectors the picture is very similar. The 
direct sectors corresponding to the five labour-intensive demand sectors 
identified in Chapter 3 feature a low level of energy intensity, but their level of 
labour intensity is in the same range as that of other sectors (Figure 4-2, Table 
A11). Our findings are therefore at odds with the results of Jackson et al. (2014), 
who find a higher level of embodied labour intensity for their demand sector of 





Figure 4-2: Relationship between sectoral energy and labour intensity in the UK 
and Germany for both direct and embodied perspective. Ratios are calculated 
with GVA and final demand values in constant 2010 EUR and averaged across 
1995-2011. Labour-intensive services refer to the labour-intensive service sectors 
identified in Chapter 3.  
We would suggest that the five sectors fail to measure a higher level of direct or 
embodied labour intensity, because the nominator (direct or embodied labour 
input) and the denominator (GVA or final demand) of the ratio are not 
independent. In the theory of Baumol’s cost disease (Baumol, 1967; Nordhaus, 
2006),  Pasinetti’s theory of structural change (Pasinetti, 1981; Pasinetti, 1993) as 
well as in post-Keynesian economic theory (Herr, 2009) it is assumed that labour 
costs are an important determinant of prices. If this is true, then any reductions 
in the labour input needed for a specific product would reduce its price and 
therefore the value of the monetary denominator (output, demand) in the labour 
intensity ratio. The overall value of the ratio would remain largely unchanged as 
long as the wage rate remains constant.  For example if technological 
improvements in the vehicles demand sector would allow for the production of 
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the same car using less hours of embodied work, arguably indicating a real 
reduction in embodied labour-intensity, the price of the car and therefore the 
value of monetary final demand would also be reduced, showing a much lower 
reduction in measured embodied labour intensity in current prices, or no 
reduction at all.  
This issue of the interdependency between labour inputs and monetary GVA or 
demand is less of a problem when investigating the rate of change of labour 
intensity. The rate of change compares the direct or embodied labour intensity of 
the same sector and therefore the monetary measures of GVA or final demand 
can be corrected for price inflation over time. But such a correction is not 
possible when comparing the level of labour intensity across sectors, because the 
physical output of the different sectors cannot be meaningfully compared. Price 
effects from the interdependency of labour inputs and GVA or final demand 
cannot be corrected for. The relative levels of direct and embodied labour 
intensity across sectors, as measured using monetary GVA and demand values, 
might therefore not reflect the labour intensity as measured in physical terms 
very well, if at all. Instead the relative monetary direct and embodied labour 
intensities are likely determined more strongly by the wage rate and other 
factors, such as the wage-profit distribution in the sector (Shaikh, 2016a).  
For example, for energy-intensive sectors, the embodied labour-intensity is 
generally higher than the direct labour intensity in our results (Figure 4-2). The 
same is not the case for energy-light sectors. One factor explaining the difference 
could be that embodied wage rates in the energy-intensive demand sectors are 
lower than the direct wages in the corresponding direct sector. The energy-
intensive demand sectors are largely made up of the manufacturing demand 
sectors which feature a high proportion of embodied labour performed abroad 
(Tables A2 and A3, Appendix B), which is likely to be paid wages that are lower 
than the ones in the corresponding direct sectors in the UK and Germany. 
However, any definite conclusions on this matter would require a more detailed 
analysis of the wages embodied in the different demand sectors. 
For the reasons outlined above we consider it more meaningful for our study to 
identify labour-intensive sectors based on lower rates of growth in direct and 
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embodied labour productivity rather than based on higher levels of direct and 
embodied labour intensity. 
4.2.3 Sector goals  
Based on the sector characteristics in the three framework dimensions, we 
identify the sector goals in each sector. For the purpose of our study, sectors can 
only be assigned one of two possible values in each of the three dimensions, for 
example they are either energy-intensive or energy-light. Two values in three 
dimensions gives eight possible combinations of sector characteristics. Each of 
the eight combinations represents a group of sectors with its own set of goals, 
derived from their specific characteristics.  Table 4-1 provides an overview of 
those sector goals for the different groups. To increase the clarity of presentation 
and discussion, we group the eight possible combinations into four overarching 
groups based on the first two dimensions. Each of these four groups has then 2 
sub-groups according to the characteristic in the third dimension.  
The goals outlined in Table 4-1 are derived purely from theoretical 
considerations. In summary, the need to reduce the overall energy use in the 
economy suggests that output and energy use associated with sectors of high 
energy intensity should be reduced relative to other sectors. In addition labour 
productivity growth in the labour-light sectors should be supported. Such 
support assumes that growth in direct and embodied labour productivity is 
desired where it is possible. From a post-growth perspective such growth might 
not always be desired and we briefly discuss the potential implications of this in 
Section 4.4.  The share of the labour-intensive sectors in output, demand and 
employment should be increased in order to reduce aggregate labour 
productivity growth and create meaningful employment. Energy intensity should 
also be reduced throughout the economy, but there might be trade-offs with 
labour productivity goals, depending on the relationship between labour 
productivity and the energy-labour ratio. The resolution of these trade-offs 
depends on the other characteristics in each sector.  
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Table 4-1: Overview of proposed framework dimensions and sector-specific policy goals for a post-growth economy 
Sector 
group 
Dimension 1:  
Energy 
intensity  




Dimension 3: Change in 
energy-labour ratio 
relative to change in 
labour productivity  
Sector goals  
Group 1a High  High  Same direction  
 
1. Reduce sector share in final demand and output 
2. Reduce energy intensity  
3. Increase labour productivity if compatible with energy intensity reductions (labour 
productivity growth > energy-labour ratio growth)  
4. As a result of reductions in demand and output, combined with increases in labour 
productivity, sector share in employment is likely to fall  
Group 1b High High Opposite direction  
 
1. Reduce sector share in final demand output 
2. Reduce energy intensity  
3. Increase labour productivity as there is no trade-off with energy intensity 
4. As a result of reductions in demand and output, combined with increases in labour 
productivity, sector share in employment is likely to fall 
Group 2a High  Low or 
negative 
Same direction  
 
1. Reduce sector share in final demand and output 
2. Reduce energy intensity  
3. Consider reductions in labour productivity if it can help achieve point 2 (fall in labour 
productivity < fall in energy-labour ratio).   
4. Impact on employment share depends on balance between reductions in 
output/demand and relative labour productivity growth in other sectors  
Group 2b High Low or 
negative 
Opposite direction 1. Reduce sector share in final demand and output 
2. Reduce energy intensity  
3. Maintain labour productivity as reductions would increase the energy-labour ratio and 
energy intensity  
4. Impact on employment share depends on balance between fall in output/demand share 





Dimension 1:  
Energy 
intensity  




Dimension 3: Change in 
energy-labour ratio 
relative to change in 
labour productivity  
Sector goals  
Group 3a Low  Low or 
negative  
Same direction  1. Expand output and demand share in order to increase employment share  
2. Reduce energy intensity  
3. Potentially reduce labour productivity to create employment, but only if compatible 
with energy intensity reductions (fall in labour productivity < fall in energy-labour 
ratio) 
Group 3b Low  Low or 
negative 
Opposite direction 1. Expand output and demand share in order to increase employment share  
2. Reduce energy intensity  
3. Maintain labour productivity as reductions would increase energy-labour ratio and 
energy intensity 
Group 4a Low  High   Same direction 1. Reduce sector share in final demand output 
2. Reduce energy intensity  
3. Increase labour productivity if compatible with energy intensity reductions (labour 
productivity growth > energy-labour ratio growth)  
4. As a result of reductions in demand and output, combined with increases in labour 
productivity, sector share in employment is likely to fall 
Group 4b Low  High Opposite direction  1. Reduce sector share in final demand and output 
2. Reduce energy intensity  
3. Increase labour productivity as there is no trade-off with energy intensity reductions 
4. As a result of reductions in demand and output, combined with increases in labour 






In practice, some combination of sector characteristics are likely to be more 
prevalent than others and some might not exist at all. We therefore discuss the 
sector goals in more detail in Section 4.4 in the context of our empirical results.   
4.2.4 Empirical data 
We demonstrate the application of our framework by providing empirical 
estimates for the three framework dimensions and for different economic sectors. 
We calculate sectoral values for final energy intensity, the rate of change in 
labour productivity and the rate of change in the energy-labour ratio, both from a 
direct and embodied perspective. Our empirical evidence covers sectors in the 
UK and Germany between 1995 to 2011.  
Our empirical results build on the work of Hardt et al. (2020), presented in 
Chapter 3, and we utilise their estimates of embodied final energy intensity and 
the rate of change in embodied labour productivity. We extend the analysis by 
calculating the rate of change in the embodied energy-labour ratio as well as 
presenting direct measures for all three dimensions.  
Our analysis draws on the EXIOBASE V3.4 database, which provides data on the 
global economy from 1995 to 2011 (Stadler et al., 2018). EXIOBASE disaggregates 
the economy into 163 sectors based on the NACE rev. 1.1 classification. For our 
analysis we aggregate all the data to a level of 70 sectors. For presentation, the 
results are further aggregated into 21 sectors (Table A12, Appendix D). By 
definition, direct energy-producing sectors, such as coal mining, oil refining or 
electricity production, do not feature any direct final energy consumption. 
Energy-producing sectors are therefore not included in the 21 sectors for which 
results are presented. In addition we exclude the Real Estate sector from the 
empirical analysis, because the large fraction of real and imputed rents in the 
sector makes it difficult to calculate meaningful values of labour productivity. 
From EXIOBASE we obtain (a) symmetrical input-output tables indicating the 
flows of intermediate demands between all sectors in all countries, (b) the final 
demand for products from different sectors in the UK and Germany, (c) the 
sectoral gross value added (GVA) for sectors in the UK and Germany and (d) the 




worked. EXIOBASE provides all monetary data in current prices only. We convert 
the data on GVA and final demand to constant 2010 prices using GVA deflators 
obtained from the Eurostat database (Eurostat, 2018). 
To calculate the direct and embodied final energy use for each economic sector 
we use the energy extension vector calculated by Hardt et al. (2020). The 
extension vector is based on data from the IEA World Energy Balances (IEA, 
2018), with additional detail for the UK and Germany obtained from country-
specific sources. For brevity we will use the term “energy” to describe final energy 
inputs in the reminder of this article. More details on the method for calculating 
the direct and embodied energy measures can be found in Hardt et al. (2020).  
4.3 Empirical sector classification  
4.3.1 Group 1: Energy-intensive and labour-light sectors 
Group 1 includes sectors that are energy intensive and have a high potential for 
labour productivity growth. In the empirical classification we present here, we 
consider a high rate of historical labour productivity growth as a proxy for the 
potential of future labour productivity growth. We allocate the manufacturing 
sectors (with the exception of Mineral Products) as well as the Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing sector and the Transport sector to Group 1.  
All of the Group 1 sectors have an embodied energy intensity of more than 3 
MJ/EUR, which compares to embodied energy intensities between 1.0 and 2.3 
MJ/EUR for the sectors in Group 3 and Group 4 (Tables 4-2 and 4-3). Similarly 
most of the sectors in Group 1 feature levels of direct energy intensity of more 
than 3 MJ/EUR. The only exceptions are the Machinery, Electrical, Equipment, 
Computers sector in both countries and the Transport Equipment sector 
Germany, which feature values of direct energy intensity that are lower than 3 
MJ/EUR and are in the same range as the service sectors. We still assign these 
sectors to Group 1, because  we consider that the embodied energy intensity is 
more important for our classification, given that the overarching structural 





Table 4-2: Energy intensity and annual rates of change in labour productivity and 
energy-labour ratio for sectors in the UK. 


























Group 1       
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing 
3.5 4.1 -0.5 3.7 3.3 -1.5 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
7.1 3.7 0.9 5.5 1.7 -0.8 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 4.8 4.8 6.6 4.5 3.0 3.0 
Paper, Printing, 
Publishing  
5.1 3.0 2.0 5.2 2.3 0.4 
Chemicals  8.5 6.4 0.2 6.5 3.3 -1.7 
Metals and Fabricated 
Metal Products  
8.9 3.1 -3.5 6.1 1.9 -1.7 
Machinery, Electrical 
Equipment, Computers  
1.8 5.6 2.2 4.5 3.3 -1.1 
Transport Equipment  3.3 5.4 0.8 6.6 3.4 -1.4 
Other manufacturing  11.6 3.2 4.8 9.5 1.6 2.3 
Transport 13.6 3.0 0.8 13.6 1.6 -0.8 
Group 2       
Mineral Products  3.8 -1.2 3.1 4.1 -2.7 -1.2 
Construction 0.6 -0.2 -3.1 1.9 -1.0 -1.2 
Group 3       
Hotels and Restaurants 1.1 1.0 -1.1 1.3 0.0 -1.4 
Public Administration 1.2 -0.6 -4.4 1.7 -0.5 -2.0 
Health  1.4 -2.8 -5.0 1.7 -2.5 -3.3 
Education  0.8 1.1 -2.9 1.7 0.6 -0.1 
Other Services  2.0 0.8 -0.1 2.2 0.0 -0.7 
Group 4       
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade  
1.8 2.6 0.6 2.0 2.6 0.5 
Finance and Insurance 0.2 6.6 2.4 1.4 3.5 -1.2 
IT and Communication 0.7 7.9 1.4 1.7 6.9 0.0 
Business Services  0.7 3.7 0.8 1.4 2.6 -1.3 






Table 4-3: Sectoral energy intensity and rates of change in labour productivity 
and energy-labour ratio for sectors in Germany 


























Group 1       
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing 
9.6 4.3 1.7 7.1 2.4 -1.0 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
5.8 -1.3 -0.4 4.6 -2.0 -2.1 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 6.5 3.7 1.9 5.3 -0.2 -2.1 
Paper, Printing, 
Publishing  
7.6 6.4 5.1 4.1 3.0 1.0 
Chemicals  7.7 2.1 2.5 6.9 0.1 -0.3 
Metals and Fabricated 
Metal Products  
11.0 2.0 0.1 5.9 0.5 -1.9 
Machinery, Electrical 
Equipment, Computers  
0.6 4.2 0.5 3.1 0.6 -2.0 
Transport Equipment  1.5 3.3 0.9 4.0 -0.6 -2.1 
Other manufacturing  3.4 2.5 2.6 3.7 0.1 0.7 
Transport 12.6 4.6 2.6 10.3 0.4 0.5 
Group 2       
Mineral Products  10.6 3.3 2.0 7.9 0.3 -0.4 
Construction 1.0 0.1 0.8 2.8 -0.7 -0.4 
Group 3       
Hotels and Restaurants 2.1 1.9 0.7 2.2 0.9 0.0 
Public Administration 1.1 1.7 -1.8 1.9 0.8 -1.3 
Health  1.1 -1.7 -2.7 1.5 -1.3 -2.2 
Education  0.9 1.0 -2.1 1.6 0.1 -0.9 
Other Services  1.6 0.2 -1.6 2.1 -0.3 -1.3 
Group 4       
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade  
2.1 2.0 -0.9 2.3 2.8 -1.1 
Finance and Insurance 0.4 -0.6 -0.5 1.0 -5.2 0.5 
IT and Communication 0.9 4.1 -0.5 1.6 3.8 1.1 
Business Services  1.1 -2.2 -1.7 1.8 -1.3 -1.5 






Group 1 sectors also well exceed 1% annual growth in direct labour productivity in 
both countries. The exception is the Food, Beverages and Tobacco sector which 
only achieves such rates in the UK (Tables 4-2 and 4-3). Our estimates are in line 
with results in the literature that have estimated high rates of direct labour 
productivity growth for the manufacturing, agriculture and transport sectors 
across different high-income countries and time periods (Baumol et al., 1985; 
Mulder and de Groot, 2004; Maroto and Rubalcaba, 2008).  
Growth in embodied labour productivity, however, is generally lower than 
growth in direct labour productivity in Group 1 sectors (Tables 4-2 and 4-3). In 
the UK, embodied labour productivity growth in all Group 1 sectors still exceeds 
1% per year. In contrast, embodied labour productivity growth in most of 
Germany’s Group 1 sectors is well below 1% or even negative. It seems that the 
growth in direct labour productivity in Germany’s Group 1 sectors has been offset 
by lower labour productivity growth in other parts of the supply chain. Given the 
short time frame of our analysis we cannot say whether the pattern of low 
embodied labour-productivity growth in Germany’s Group 1 sectors presents a 
long-term trend. On balance, we decided to assign these sectors to Group 1, given 
the consistency in high direct labour productivity growth rates in both countries 
and the inconsistent embodied labour productivity growth rates between the two 
countries. In addition we consider the direct perspective somewhat more relevant 
for defining sector goals with regard to labour productivity, as direct labour 
productivity growth can be more easily conceptualised and targeted by policies 
than embodied labour productivity growth. 
The third dimension of the framework asks whether labour productivity growth 
in Group 1 sectors has been associated with growth in the energy-labour ratio. 
Only very few of the sectors in Group 1 give results for this dimension that are 
consistent across the direct and embodied perspective and the two countries. 
When presenting the results in Tables 4-2 and 4-3, we therefore do not allocate 
the sectors into the two subgroups identified in Table 4-1. But we discuss the 
findings below.  
For Group 1 sectors, the results for the third dimension are relatively consistent 




For the direct perspective, most Group 1 sectors show the two ratios moving in 
the same direction, with a positive growth rate in the direct energy-labour ratio 
in combination with growth in direct labour productivity (Figure 4-3). The 
exceptions are the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing sector and the Metals and 
Fabricated Metals sector in the UK, which show falling rates of the direct energy-
labour ratio, despite a growth in direct labour productivity (Table 4-2). Group 1 
therefore generally fall into the subgroup 1a from a direct perspective. In most 
sectors the growth rate of the direct energy-labour ratio is below the growth rate 
of direct labour productivity, leading to a decline in direct energy intensity 




Figure 4-3: Relationship between the average growth rates in embodied labour 
productivity and the embodied energy-labour ratio between 1995 and 2011 for 





The growth rate of embodied labour productivity in Group 1 sectors is generally 
lower than the growth rate of direct labour productivity. Such lower rates are due 
to the fact that the supply chains of Group 1 demand sectors contain inputs from 
the direct sectors of other groups, which generally have lower rates of growth in 
the direct energy-labour ratio. For many sectors in Group 1 the embodied growth 
in the energy-labour ratio is reduced to negative values. As a result, from an 
embodied perspective, the results for the third dimension are still consistent 
between the two countries. But, compared to the direct perspective, several 
sectors show the embodied labour-productivity and embodied energy-labour 
ratio moving in opposite directions, combing positive growth rates of the former 
with negative growth rates of the latter (Figure 4-3). For the majority of sectors in 
which the two ratios move in the same direction, growth rates in embodied 
labour productivity are still higher than those in the embodied energy-labour 
ratio, indicating reductions in the embodied energy intensity.  
4.3.2 Group 2: Energy-intensive and labour-intensive sectors 
In our empirical classification Group 2 includes sectors with high energy intensity 
but low rates of labour productivity growth. We allocate the Mineral Products 
and Construction sectors to Group 2.  
The Mineral Products sector is the only sector that mostly fits these 
characteristics. Its direct and embodied energy intensity exceeds 3 MJ/EUR in 
both countries (Tables 4-2 and 4-3). It also features a declining direct and 
embodied labour productivity in the UK and a low growth of 0.3% in embodied 
labour productivity in Germany. Only the direct labour productivity growth in 
Germany defies the pattern with a 3.3% annual rate of growth. However, the 
values for the third dimension show an inconsistent pattern, which makes it 
difficult to allocate it to one of the subgroups. The two ratios both grow in 
Germany from a direct perspective and both decline in the UK from an embodied 
perspective. But they move in opposite directions in Germany from an embodied 
perspective and in the UK from a direct perspective. 
We also allocate the Construction sector to Group 2, because it shows low rates 




not strictly fit the characteristics of Group 2 because its energy intensity is low, 
with values below 3 MJ/EUR for direct and embodied energy intensity. We still 
consider it useful to allocate the sector to Group 2 because it shows large 
environmental impacts in other aspects, particularly a high material intensity 
(Giesekam et al., 2014). For the third dimension the results show that the direct 
labour productivity and direct energy-labour ratio and the embodied labour 
productivity and embodied energy-labour ratio are consistently moving in the 
same direction, placing the sector and demand sector in subgroup 2a.  
4.3.3 Group 3: Energy-light and labour-intensive sectors 
In our empirical classification Group 3 includes sectors that show low energy 
intensity and low rates of labour productivity growth. We allocate five sectors to 
this group, namely the sectors Hotels & Restaurants, Public Administration, 
Health, Education and Other Services (Tables 4-2 and 4-3). These are the same as 
the labour-intensive services identified in Hardt et al. (2020), Chapter 3 of my 
thesis, who only draw on embodied measures. Here we add results from a direct 
perspective which confirm the allocation of the five sectors to Group 3.  
The direct energy intensities of all five Group 3 sectors range from 0.8 MJ/EUR to 
2.1 MJ/EUR, while the embodied energy intensities range from 1.3 MJ/EUR to 2.2 
MJ/EUR (Tables 4-2 and 4-3). Such values are all well below the 3 MJ/EUR 
threshold and considerably lower than the ones recorded for Group 1 sectors.  
The five sectors also show growth rates in embodied labour productivity at or 
below 1% per year (Tables 4-2 and 4-3). From a direct perspective, the picture is 
less consistent. In the UK  the Education sector lies slightly above the threshold 
with a growth rate of direct labour productivity at 1.1 % per year. In Germany, the 
growth rates in direct labour productivity in the Hotels & Restaurants and Public 
Administration sectors measure 1.9% and 1.7% respectively. Such rates are well 
above our threshold but still below the growth rates of direct labour productivity 
growth in Group 1 sectors. On balance we decided to allocate the sectors to 
Group 3, as they show consistently low rates of embodied labour productivity 
growth, whereas none of the sectors show high rates of direct labour productivity 




Again the results for the third dimension are very inconsistent between countries 
and between the embodied and direct perspective so that it is difficult to assign 
the sectors to sub-groups. The only sectors with consistent results are the Health 
sector, where the two ratios always move in the same (declining) direction and 
the Education sector, which combines a growing direct and embodied labour 
productivity with a growing direct and embodied energy-labour ratio in both 
countries.  
For the other sectors and demand sectors the pattern is much less consistent. 
However, some important tendencies can be observed. Firstly, in those cases 
where the two ratios move in the opposite direction, there are no sectors that 
combine reductions in the direct or embodied labour productivity with increases 
in the direct or embodied energy-labour ratio (Figure 4-3). Such combination 
would be the most problematic from a post-growth perspective because it 
indicates strong growth in the direct or embodied energy intensity. Secondly, in 
those cases where the ratios move in the same direction, the growth rate of direct 
or embodied labour productivity is always higher than the growth rate of the 
direct or embodied energy-labour ratio, indicating reductions in energy intensity 
and only limited trade-offs (Figure 4-3).  
4.3.4 Group 4: Energy-light and labour-light sectors  
In our empirical classification, Group 4 contains sectors of low energy intensity 
but high rates of labour productivity growth. We allocate the sectors of 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Finance and Insurance, IT and Communications and 
Business Services to this group.  
For the first dimension, the direct energy intensities of Group 4 sectors range 
from 0.2 MJ/EUR to 2.1 MJ/EUR, while the embodied energy intensities range 
from 1 MJ/EUR to 2.3 MJ/EUR (Table 4-2 and 4-3). Such values are well below the 
threshold of 3 MJ/EUR and very similar to the ones in Group 3.  
For the second dimension only the IT and Communications sector and the 
Wholesale and Retail Trade sector show consistently high rates of direct and 
embodied labour productivity growth in both countries, well exceeding our 1% 




Services sector, the growth rates of labour productivity show very different values 
in the two countries. In the UK direct and embodied labour productivity grew by 
more than 2.6% per year in both sectors (Table 4-2). In Germany direct and 
embodied labour productivity fell in both sectors (Table 4-3). Such divergent 
results can also be found in the literature where different studies come to 
different conclusions on direct labour productivity growth in the two sectors for 
different countries and time periods (Baumol et al., 1985; Maroto and Rubalcaba, 
2008). We decided to allocate the two sectors to Group 4 because the high rates 
of labour productivity growth in the UK seem to indicate that the two sectors 
have a potential for labour productivity growth, even if it was not realised in 
Germany.  
For the third dimension the relationship between the energy-labour ratio and 
labour productivity for Group 4 sectors varies between countries and between the 
direct and embodied perspective, so that it is difficult to assign the sectors and 
demand-sectors into the relevant sub-groups.  
In the UK the picture is very similar to the one in Group 1. The direct energy-
labour ratio is growing in combination with growing direct labour productivity in 
all Group 4 sectors (Figure 4-3a). But growth rates in the embodied energy-
labour ratios are generally lower, so that two sectors feature a combination of a 
growing embodied labour productivity but falling embodied energy-labour ratio 
(Figure 4-3c). In those sectors where the ratios are moving in the same direction, 
the growth in direct or embodied labour productivity is higher than the growth in 
direct or embodied energy-labour ratio, indicating reductions in the direct or 
embodied energy intensity (Figure 4-3).  
In Germany the combinations are even less consistent. From a direct perspective, 
the sectors split evenly into two sectors which combine growth in direct labour 
productivity with declines in the direct energy-labour ratio and two sectors which 
combine declines in direct labour productivity with declines in the direct energy-
labour ratio (Figure 4-3b). From an embodied perspective the four German 
sectors in this group show all four possible combinations of growing or declining 




4.3.5 Group comparison 
After allocating economic sectors into the four groups, we can compare the 
structure of total GVA, final demand, direct and embodied energy use and 
employment covered in this study with regard to the four groups (Figure 4-4). 
These totals exclude the GVA, final demand, direct energy and labour and 
embodied energy and labour associated with the energy-producing sectors and 
the sector “Private Households with Employed Persons”.  The total direct and 
embodied energy also excludes the energy use for non-commercial purposes in 
the two countries, such as for residential use and private transport.  
A key feature that is consistent across countries is the high share of Group 1 in 
direct and embodied energy use. The share of Group 1 in direct and embodied 
energy use is much higher than the group’s share in GVA and final demand,  
which follows from the higher direct and embodied energy intensity of Group 1 
sectors. The main difference between the two countries is a larger share for 
Group 1 sectors in Germany across all direct and embodied measures.  
 
 
Figure 4-4: Sector shares in 2011 in (a) GVA, direct energy use and direct 
employment and (b) final demand, embodied energy and embodied labour. GVA 
and final demand are in current prices and exclude the energy-producing sectors, 
the sector “private households with employed persons” and imputed rents. Direct 
and embodied energy use also excludes energy use for private transport and 




Two differences stand out between the direct and embodied perspectives. Firstly, 
the share of Group 1 sectors in direct employment is much smaller than the share 
of Group 1 sectors in embodied employment. The difference highlights that the 
demand for industrial and agricultural products in high-income countries is now 
strongly dependent on labour abroad (Simas et al., 2015; Sakai et al., 2017). 
Secondly, the share of Group 4 is of similar size as the share of Group 3 for the 
direct measures, but the share of Group 4 is much smaller for the embodied 
measures. The difference highlights that the output of Group 4 sectors is mostly 
used as intermediate input into other sectors rather than directly bought as final 
demand.  
4.4 Sector goals and challenges  
In Section 4.2 we identify theoretical structural change goals for different sector  
groups based on different combinations of characteristics in our three framework 
dimensions (Table 4-1). In Section 4.3 we allocate real sectors from the UK and 
Germany to the sector groups based on empirical data (Table 4-2 and Table 4-3). 
Combining the insights presented in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3, we can now 
provide a first discussion of what structural change for a post-growth economy 
might look like.  
4.4.1 Group 1: Energy-intensive and labour-light sectors   
We allocate to Group 1 the sectors producing agricultural goods, transport 
services, and manufactured goods (with the exception of mineral products).  
An important structural change goal for the post-growth transition is to reduce 
the share of Group 1 sectors in output and final demand. Such a reduction is 
important to reduce aggregate energy intensity and energy use, given that Group 
1 sectors are responsible for the majority of direct and embodied energy use 
covered in this study in both Germany and the UK (Figure 4-4). But there are 
limits to the magnitude of reductions in energy intensity and energy use that can 
be achieved from relative shifts in output and final demand alone (Hardt et al., 
2020; Chapter 3 of my thesis).  
A second important goal for the post-growth transition is therefore the reduction 




the magnitude of energy savings that can be achieved from intensity reductions 
also faces limits from thermodynamic laws and rebound effects (van den Bergh, 
2011; Brockway et al., 2017). In light of such limitations, the transition to a post-
growth economy might not only need relative, but also absolute, reductions in 
the output and final demand of Group 1 sectors.  
The post-growth and climate change mitigation literature offers a range of policy 
proposals to achieve the goal of reducing the share of energy-intensive sectors in 
output and final demand. Some policies aim to reduce demand for energy-
intensive goods and services by increasing their relative prices, for example 
through taxes or cap-and-trade schemes (Cosme et al., 2017; Hardt and O’Neill, 
2017).  It is assumed that an increase in the relative price of Group 1 sectors 
would entice consumers to shift their demand towards sectors with lower 
embodied energy intensity. Such a shift in final demand would also lead to a 
reduction in the share of the direct output of Group 1 sectors. In addition, higher 
relative prices might induce producers to reduce their need for high-energy 
inputs in the supply chain, for example by increasing resource efficiency (Barrett 
and Scott, 2012). Such changes in supply chains could lead to further reductions 
in the direct output share of Group 1 sectors, as well as reductions in the 
embodied energy-intensity of sectors across the board. Other proposals promote 
a shift to business models that sell the services derived from energy-intensive 
products rather than the products themselves, for example selling washing 
services rather washing machines (Jackson, 2017, p.142; Moran et al., 2018). Such 
a shift in business models would lead to a shift in final demand from Group 1 
sectors to service sectors (e.g. machinery rental). At the same time the products 
would be used more efficiently, so less production would be needed, reducing the 
direct output of Group 1 sectors.  
Equity considerations pose a key challenge to the implementation of any policies 
that aim to achieve reductions in the final demand and output of Group 1 sectors. 
Many Group 1 sectors provide essential goods which often make blanket policies, 
such as energy or carbon taxes, regressive (Owen and Barrett, 2020). To ensure 
that reductions in the final demand for Group 1 sectors are perceived as fair, a  




what kind of products, and by how much. Baumol’s cost disease might provide 
another challenge to the effectiveness of price-based policies aimed at reducing 
demand for Group 1 sectors. If the embodied labour productivity in Group 1 
sectors continues to grow relative to other groups, the relative prices Group 1 
sectors might fall, counteracting the effect of price-based policies (Baumol, 2012, 
pp.71–73). 
Increasing labour productivity in Group 1 sectors constitutes another goal for the 
post-growth transition, where it is desirable (Table 4-1). Given the high direct and 
embodied energy intensity of Group 1 sectors we suggest that the goal to reduce 
energy intensity should receive priority over the goal to increase labour 
productivity (Table 4-1). But our empirical results suggest that trade-offs are 
limited. Group 1 sectors have often achieved reductions in energy intensity and 
growth in labour productivity at the same time, both from a direct and an 
embodied perspective. Still, direct labour productivity growth in Group 1 sectors 
might come at the cost of a higher direct energy-labour ratio. We do not consider 
such a cost to be problematic because the share of the labour force employed in 
Group 1 sectors will likely become quite small, given the combination of growing 
labour productivity and shrinking output.  
Strategies to achieve the goals of reducing energy intensity and increasing labour 
productivity are more easily developed from a direct perspective, because direct 
sectors feature more homogenous production processes and because direct 
sectors fall under the jurisdiction of individual countries. The policy goals of 
reducing direct energy intensity and increasing direct labour productivity are not 
unique to the post-growth transition and are discussed extensively in the wider 
economics literature. We do not discuss the literature here but we want to point 
out an important challenge that is unique to the post-growth transition. In the 
post-growth transition labour productivity growth in Group 1 sectors is aimed to 
be achieved while simultaneously reducing output and final demand in the 
sectors. In the mainstream economics literature, labour productivity growth in a 
sector is considered to be a pre-condition or even a driver of output growth 
(Nordhaus, 2005). Kaldor’s growth laws suggest that labour productivity growth 




the manufacturing sectors themselves but also in the wider economy (Thirlwall, 
1983; Marconi et al., 2016). Achieving labour productivity growth in Group 1 
sectors under the conditions of contracting output might therefore pose 
difficulties. Or, in reverse, the achievement of labour productivity growth in 
Group 1 sectors might jeopardise the goal of reducing demand and output in such 
sectors.  
In addition, labour productivity growth might not be desired in all Group 1 
sectors from a post-growth perspective. In some Group 1 sectors it might be 
desirable to adopt more labour-intensive production methods to create 
meaningful jobs, for example by moving to small-scale, artisanal methods 
(Nørgård, 2013; Mair et al., 2020). In Australia, the rise of artisan bakeries has 
already been recognised to lower labour productivity growth (Ferguson, 2015). 
The existence of different labour productivity goals in different Group 1 sectors 
would rise a special challenge for the post-growth economy, because policies will 
have to be tailored to achieve opposite outcomes in different parts of the 
economy. 
While the transformation towards labour-intensive production methods in Group 
1 sectors is a common theme in the post-growth literature, the literature does not 
offer a detailed discussion of its implications. No systematic analysis is provided 
that identifies in which sectors the adoption of more labour-intensive methods 
would be feasible and desirable. There might be many sectors, such as steel 
production, in which small-scale, labour-intensive production is not possible or 
desirable. In the few sectors for which the literature identifies labour-intensive 
production methods as desirable, there is little analysis of the consequences of a 
large-scale uptake of such methods. For example, post-growth economists 
propose small-scale, labour-intensive farming techniques, such as organic and 
permaculture approaches, on the ground that they are efficient in terms of energy 
and land use. But the literature offers hardly any scientific assessments of how a 
large-scale shift towards labour-intensive farming would impact yields, food 
availability and labour requirements (Infante Amate and González De Molina, 
2013). Kostakis et al. (2018) suggest that an approach of “design global, 




Their approach features local, decentralised production using simple 
technologies or 3D printing, based on designs developed in a global digital 
commons. It is not clear whether such an approach would be more or less labour-
intensive or energy-intensive than current industrial production.  
Once it is clearer in which sectors more labour-intensive production methods are 
desired for a post-growth economy, achieving the adoption of such methods will 
require the removal of important barriers. In our current market system, 
businesses are continuously under pressure to reduce production costs, a key 
driver of labour productivity growth (Jackson and Victor, 2011; Shaikh, 2016b). 
Except in niche areas, labour-intensive, small-scale manufacturing businesses 
cannot compete against the low prices of goods mass-produced in energy-
intensive factories and by cheap labour abroad. Ecological tax reform that shifts 
tax burdens from labour to environmental impacts have been proposed to reduce 
the energy intensity relative to labour intensity (Daly, 2008). But in a system 
where competition is based on costs and prices, labour-intensive production 
methods will always struggle, even if price incentives are somewhat shifted in 
their favour. The adoption of labour-intensive methods in Group 1 sectors 
requires a system that puts greater value on quality, durability and fair working 
conditions. Johanisova et al. (2013) propose that an increase in the use of social 
enterprises, not-for-profit organisations and other “non-market capitals” can play 
an important part in creating such a system. In order for such organisations to 
flourish, however, consumers would also need to be willing to shift away from 
mass consumption to buy fewer, more expensive and high-quality products.  
4.4.2 Group 2: Energy-intensive and labour-intensive sectors  
In our empirical analysis we only allocate the Construction sector and the 
Mineral Products sector to Group 2 based on potential direct and embodied 
labour productivity growth.  
As Group 2 sectors are labour-intensive, expansion of production and 
consumption in Group 2 sectors would contribute to the overarching objective to 
create meaningful employment by reducing aggregate labour productivity 




would suggest that the overarching objective to reduce energy intensity and 
energy demand should take priority. In that case, the most important goal for 
Group 2 sectors is to reduce their share in output and final demand, similar to 
Group 1 sectors (Table 4-1).  
The sector goals for the remaining production in Group 2 sectors are not clear 
cut, because there are potential trade-offs between different goals. On the one 
hand, it might be desirable to reduce labour productivity in order to create 
meaningful jobs and reduce aggregate labour productivity growth. On the other 
hand, such reductions in labour productivity could increase the energy intensity 
of production. If labour productivity and the energy labour-ratio move in 
opposite directions, reductions in labour productivity increase the energy-labour 
ratio and energy intensity. Even in the case of increasing energy intensity, Kallis 
(2018, p.134) suggests that the adoption of more labour-intensive production 
methods could be worthwhile because lower aggregate labour productivity 
restricts the overall scale of production and environmental impact. Still, there 
might be better ways to provide meaningful employment and lower aggregate 
labour productivity without increasing the energy intensity in already energy-
intensive sectors. If the labour productivity and the energy-labour ratio are 
moving in the same direction, the trade-offs are much smaller, especially if the 
latter falls faster than the former.   
The Mineral Products sector shows very inconsistent results in our study, more 
research is therefore needed to identify the relevant sector goals and trade-offs 
with regard to energy intensity and labour productivity in specific contexts, both 
from a direct and an embodied perspective. In the Construction sector the direct 
and embodied labour productivity consistently move in the same, declining, 
direction as the direct and embodied energy-labour ratio. However, the balance 
between the two differs between the two countries.  While the former falls faster 
than the latter in Germany, indicating increases in the direct and embodied 
energy intensity, the pattern is reversed in the UK, indicating reductions in direct 
and embodied energy intensity. The Construction sector is therefore a potential 
candidate for considering reductions in labour productivity to create 




4.4.3 Group 3: Energy-light and labour-intensive sectors  
In our empirical analysis we allocate five sectors to Group 3, namely Hotels & 
Restaurants, Public Administration, Health Care and Other Services. The five 
sectors are the same as the labour-intensive services already identified in Hardt et 
al. (2020), Chapter 3 of my thesis.  
The sectors in Group 3 have a low direct and embodied energy intensity, so that 
employment-related goals can take priority over energy-related goals. The most 
important goal for Group 3 sectors is therefore to increase their share in direct 
and embodied employment (Table 4-1). Such shifts would serve to offset 
employment losses in other sectors, and to reduce the growth in aggregate direct 
and embodied labour productivity to prevent potential unemployment in the 
future.   
Many of the Group 3 sectors are largely publicly provided, such as Health, 
Education and Public Administration. A straightforward policy option for 
expanding output, demand and employment in Group 3 sectors is therefore to 
increase public expenditure in such areas. However, such expansions in public 
expenditure could indirectly lead to expansions in demand and output of Group 1 
sectors, through the increased income and expenditure of workers employed in 
Group 3 sectors (Horen Greenford et al., 2020). Increases in public expenditure 
therefore need to be combined with measures to reduce demand and output in 
Group 1 and Group 2, as discussed in Section 4.4.1. Increasing output, demand 
and employment in Group 3 sectors that are not publicly provided, such as 
Hotels & Restaurants and Other Services, is more difficult. Potential policy 
options to support such sectors would be the creation of affordable spaces for 
such businesses by local authorities, and public information campaigns to 
emphasise the positive value that such labour-intensive services can bring to the 
community in comparison to material consumption.  
While Group 3 sectors and demand sectors have a low direct or embodied energy 
intensity relative to Group 1 and Group 2 sectors, Group 3 sectors still account for 
a non-negligible fraction of the direct and embodied energy use in the UK and 




output and final demand share of Group 3 sectors therefore needs to be 
combined with reductions in energy intensity (Table 4-1). 
In addition to shifting output and final demand towards Group 3 sectors, 
reducing the direct and embodied labour productivity in the group could help to 
create meaningful employment in the transition to a post-growth economy 
(Table 4-1). However, reducing labour productivity could clash with the goal to 
reduce energy intensity, if labour productivity moves in the opposite direction as 
the energy-labour ratio (Table 4-1). Our evidence does not find any examples for 
such a relationship in Group 3 sectors, neither from a direct nor from an 
embodied perspective. There are some sectors where the ratios for dimension 3 
move in opposite directions, but in all of these cases they combine positive 
growth in the direct or embodied labour productivity with negative growth in the 
direct or embodied energy-labour ratio. More research is needed to identify 
whether the two ratios would continue to move in the same direction if the 
growth in direct or embodied labour productivity is reversed. Our results show 
that in those sectors and demand sectors where the two ratios move in the same 
direction, the growth in direct or embodied labour productivity is always bigger 
than the growth in the direct or embodied energy-labour ratio, so that there are 
only limited trade-offs with reductions in the direct or embodied energy 
intensity.  
As a caveat it is worth noting that many of the Group 3 sectors constitute non-
market services, for which economic output and final demand is difficult to 
define and measure (Eurostat, 2016, pp.34–38). It is therefore not completely 
clear how the pursuit of increased employment in Group 3 sectors will impact the 
sector shares in output and final demand. Increases in employment can manifest 
either as increases in output or as reductions in labour productivity, depending 
on how output is measured. For example, adding an additional teacher into each 
school class could lead to increased output if output is measured as teacher-
hours, or to reduced labour productivity if output is measured as number of 
students taught. Overall it is likely that the share of Group 3 in output and final 





We already discuss the challenges for achieving an expansion of Group 3 sectors  
in Hardt et al. (2020), Chapter 3 of my thesis, and will only provide a brief 
summary here. Firstly, Group 3 sectors feature low direct and embodied labour 
productivity growth and therefore face increasing relative costs compared to 
sectors with high direct and embodied labour productivity growth (Baumol, 1967; 
Baumol et al., 1985; Baumol, 2012). Such a cost disadvantage has already pushed 
several market services that are important for a post-growth economy, such as 
repair services, into the margins of our economy. Non-market services, such as 
health care and education, face continuous political discussions about the 
justification of increasing public expenditure. Secondly, new and existing jobs in 
Group 3 sectors need to be made high quality. At the moment, many jobs in these 
sectors are low-paid and associated with difficult working conditions, for example 
for nurses (Currie and Carr Hill, 2012; Druckman and Mair, 2019) or hospitality 
workers (Kotera et al., 2018). Lastly, any expansion of Group 3 sectors needs to 
consider the boundary between paid and unpaid work. Even though our 
framework focuses only on the formal economy, the development of strategies for 
the post-growth transition needs to take into account all work performed in 
society, whether it is paid or not (Sekulova et al., 2013).  In the context of a post-
growth economy it might be useful to assess where it makes sense that products 
and services are delivered by the formal economy, especially if other policies 
reduce the need for monetary income from work (D’Alisa and Cattaneo, 2013; 
Nørgård, 2013). Such a question is particularly relevant for Group 3 sectors, 
because many of them already straddle the boundary between paid and unpaid 
work, for example in the areas of health care, education or art.  
4.4.4 Group 4: Energy-light and labour-light sectors   
In our empirical analysis we allocate four sectors to Group 4. The four sectors are 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Finance and Insurance, IT and Communications and 
Business Services. Here, we also discuss the Real Estate sector as part of Group 4, 
even though we do not present empirical results for it.   
It is difficult to determine structural change goals for Group 4 sectors, because 
they cannot contribute strongly to any of the overarching objectives. Direct and 




sectors are not a potential source of meaningful employment. Direct and 
embodied energy intensity is low, so there is no strong rationale for reducing 
output and final demand from an environmental perspective either. While the 
direct and embodied energy intensity is low, Group 4 sectors still account for a 
non-negligible fraction of the direct and embodied energy use covered in this 
study in the UK and Germany (Figure 4-4). A post-growth perspective would 
therefore suggest that output and final demand in Group 4 sectors should be 
reduced, unless such output and final demand is necessary for meeting basic 
needs or increasing wellbeing. In effect the structural change goals for Group 4 
sectors are therefore similar to those for Group 1: reduce final demand and output 
where possible, reduce the energy intensity of the remaining production and 
increase labour productivity (Table 4-1).  
Another reason why it is difficult to define structural change goals for Group 4 
sectors, is the fact that Group 4 direct sectors largely provide intermediate inputs 
into other sectors rather than final demand. As Figure 4-4 shows, the share of 
Group 4 sectors in value added is much larger than the share of Group 4 sectors 
in final demand. The group’s share in final demand is also dominated by the Real 
Estate sector, which largely consists of real and imputed rent payments (Table 4-
4). Defining and achieving structural change goals for Group 4 sectors therefore 
requires an analysis of how production is interconnected with other sector 
groups.  
Table 4-4: Sector shares of labour-light services in final demand 
 Demand share in 2011 (%) 
Sector UK DE 
Share of Group 4 sectors  in total final demand 25.7 20.4 
Sector shares within Group 4   
Wholesale and Retail Trade 18.3 10.0 
Finance and Insurance 14.4 16.4 
Real Estate 47.4 43.7 
IT and Communications 11.2 13.8 





More than other groups in our framework, Group 4 sectors highlight the 
limitations of the national accounts and of our framework that relies on national 
accounts data. For many sectors in Group 4 it is difficult to measure final demand 
and value added in constant prices. As the services delivered are intangible and 
heterogeneous, it is difficult to separate any price increases into quality 
improvements or inflation (Eurostat, 2016, p.112). Such difficulties are more 
serious for financial services and business services than for communication 
services and wholesale and retail trade (Schettkat and Yocarini, 2006; Inklaar et 
al., 2008). Similar difficulties apply for the non-market services in Group 3. But 
because the structural change goals for Group 3 sectors are clearly focused on 
employment, it is less of an issue. Group 4 sectors not only highlight 
measurement difficulties, but also problems with the underlying conventions in 
the national accounts, defining what counts as a productive activity and what 
does not. It is a social and political decision which forms of income count as a 
productive activities and contribute to GDP and which ones are classified as 
transfer payments distributing the production from other parts of the economy. 
For some Group 4 sectors it is not clear cut in how far they contribute to the 
creation of new value. For example, the income of the finance sectors has only 
recently been included as a productive activity contributing to GDP 
(Christophers, 2011). It is likely that a considerable part of the income obtained in 
the sectors of this group, especially in the Finance & Insurance, Real Estate and 
Communication & IT sectors can be considered as economic rent payments. Such 
rent payments have important implications for inequality in the post-growth 
transition (Stratford, 2020). A full review of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but it serves to highlight the difficulties of defining output, demand and 
value added in many sectors in this group.  
The difficulties of defining structural change goals for Group 4 sectors do not 
mean that the sectors are not important for the post-growth transition. On the 
contrary, the sectors in this group are very much at the heart of many important 
challenges that our society is facing. Such challenges include unaffordable land 
and housing (Kenny, 2019), the impacts of financial speculation (Jackson, 2018), 




power of communication companies to exploit personal data and influence 
democratic processes (Hind, 2019). Group 4 sectors present a very diverse set of 
challenges that will require specific strategies for reform. Such strategies will 
undoubtedly affect the output, demand and employment of Group 4 sectors, but 
it might be less useful to define sector goals in such terms.  
4.5 Conclusion 
In order to avoid environmental catastrophe, the environmental impacts from 
economic production and consumption in high-income countries have to be 
reduced rapidly. Given the close coupling of GDP and environmental impacts, 
achieving the necessary reductions in high-income countries will likely lead to 
lower GDP growth, or even reductions in GDP. In high-income countries, we 
therefore need to create a post-growth economy that can simultaneously increase 
human well-being and deliver rapid reductions in environmental impacts, 
independent of whether GDP is growing or declining.  
The transformation to a post-growth economy will require structural change in 
the sectoral composition of output, final demand and employment as well as 
strategies tailored to specific sectors. There will be winners and losers, sectors 
that will expand, and sectors that will contract. Politicians are often not explicit 
about the necessity of such structural change. They are especially not willing to 
identify sectors that will lose out in the transition to a sustainable economy. 
Sometimes not even in obvious cases, such as the oil and gas industry. As post-
growth economists, we need to start defining the necessary structural change in 
order to stimulate a discussion about which sectors need to expand and which 
sectors need to contract. Providing such a definition is crucial for moving 
discussions beyond the abstract question of whether reductions in aggregate GDP 
are desirable and feasible.   
Our analysis starts to systematically define the structural change necessary for 
the transition to a post-growth economy. The framework and evidence presented 
allows for a consistent vision of structural change to take shape. The production 
and consumption of energy-intensive goods will be reduced as much as possible. 




while industrial, efficiency-focused production will only be pursued where it 
makes sense from a social and environmental perspective. Potential losses of 
employment will be offset by increasing employment in labour-intensive services 
with high social value, while making sure that the new and existing jobs in these 
sectors are of high quality. Finally, the remaining services will have to be 
scrutinised in how far they can contribute real value to a post-growth economy.  
More research is needed to fully utilise the framework and develop sectoral 
strategies at a more detailed level. Especially information on the potential and 
desirability of labour productivity growth in different sectors, and its implications 
for energy use, is currently lacking in the post-growth literature. More 
information on such sector characteristics is needed to inform discussions on 
important normative questions: What production is necessary and desirable? 
Where could production and demand be reduced? Where exactly would 
reductions in labour productivity be desirable and where is further pursuit of 
labour productivity sensible? These questions tie into current debates about the 
future of automation. Research from a post-growth perspective can offer 
something to such debates by investigating the desirability of automation and by 
putting automation into the context of environmental challenges.  
Even if we cannot determine all sector characteristics and structural change goals 
with certainty yet, the preliminary outline we present already highlights some 
important challenges for achieving the necessary structural change. The 
production, employment and consumption of different sectors is not distributed 
equally across countries and across income groups. Strategies for achieving 
structural change need to be just and equitable. Some of the sector goals we 
identify also go against the grain of our current economic system. Business is 
currently dominated by pressures to reduce costs and grow markets and output. 
Many of our sector goals would require resistance to such pressures. Achieving 
the goals might entail increasing costs, reductions in output and the shrinking of 
markets and supply chains. Can markets be reformed so that they support 
achieving such objectives? If yes, how? Do we need to find alternative ways of 
providing some goods and services? The answer to the last question is almost 




alternative approaches but more needs to be done. For example Raworth (2017) 
distinguishes between four domains of provisioning, the market, government, 
commons and the household. Such a perspective could be linked with our 
framework to determine which sectors might be best suited to which of the four 
domains.  
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Chapter 5  
Discussion and conclusion  
I started my thesis by posing the research question: How can structural change 
contribute to the creation of a post-growth economy?  I can decompose the 
question into three components. Firstly, we, as societies in high-income 
countries, need to know where we want to go, what kind of structural change 
would help us achieve the overarching goals of the post-growth economy. 
Secondly, once we know where we want to go, we need to assess whether current 
structural change is taking us in the right direction. Thirdly, we need to know 
what is driving structural change in order to develop effective strategies for 
steering it in the desired direction.  
The articles presented in Chapters 2-4 provide important new insights for all 
three components because they address my three research objectives:  
A. To provide evidence on the role of international trade in shaping 
structural change and energy use in high-income countries. 
B. To provide empirical evidence on sectoral characteristics for the 
identification of labour-intensive services, focusing on an embodied 
perspective.   
C. To develop a systematic approach for determining desirable structural 
change and sector-specific strategies for a post-growth economy.  
In the following I combine the insights from the three articles with the results of 
the wider literature to outline an answer to the research question, taking each of 
the three components in turn.  
5.1 Where do we want to go?  
The transition to a post-growth economy will require structural change in the 
composition of output, final demand and employment. Such structural change 
entails the need for different trajectories and strategies for different sectors, for 
example we might want to reduce output in the cement sector but increase it in 




acknowledged in the post-growth literature, the analysis of structural change has 
remained at the beginning. There are some references to sectors that are 
desirable or not, but the literature does not offer a systematic analysis. The need 
to shift to labour-intensive services, proposed by Jackson and co-authors (Jackson 
and Victor, 2011; Jackson, 2015; Jackson, 2017, p.148), has received the most 
comprehensive treatment in the literature. Still, there is little empirical analysis 
identifying labour-intensive services, both from a direct and embodied 
perspective, and little discussion of how shifts to such services can be achieved. 
In my research I have built on the beginnings provided in the literature to 
provide a more systematic vision of the structural change required for a post-
growth economy.  
In Chapter 1 I identify two overarching structural change goals for the post-
growth transition, drawing on the references to desired sectors and the 
discussion of labour-intensive services. The first goal is the reduction of 
environmental impacts by shifting output and demand to less environmentally-
damaging sectors. For the purpose of my research I focus on final energy use, 
because we need to reduce both direct and embodied energy demand to achieve 
rapid reductions in emissions. The second goal is the creation of meaningful 
employment in sectors of high social value by shifting output, demand and 
employment towards labour-intensive sectors. A shift towards such labour-
intensive sectors would not only directly create jobs, it would also slow the rate of 
aggregate labour productivity growth in the economy and prevent 
unemployment in a non-growing economy.   
Labour-intensive services play a crucial role for the transition to a post-growth 
economy because expanding the share of such sectors in output, demand and 
employment contributes to both overarching structural change goals. In Chapter 
3 I provide an empirical analysis to identify labour-intensive service demand 
sectors in the UK and Germany. I define labour-intensive services as those 
demand sectors with a low embodied energy intensity and low rates of growth in 
embodied labour productivity.  
Based on my analysis, five demand sectors show the two characteristics of labour-




Administration, Health, Education and Other Services. The group of five demand 
sectors captures most of the activities that are mentioned as desirable in the post-
growth literature, such as education, care or culture (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013, 
p.137; Jackson, 2017, p.220) or “relational” goods and services (Kallis, 2017, p.8). 
My research confirms the intuitive notion in the post-growth literature that a 
shift in final demand towards the five demand sectors would reduce aggregate 
embodied energy intensity and aggregate embodied labour productivity growth. 
But, at the same time, the reductions in embodied energy that can be achieved 
solely from shifts in final demand have limits. My modelling in Chapter 3 
suggests that shifting 50% of demand in energy-intensive demand sectors to 
energy-light demand sectors would reduce the total embodied energy covered in 
the study, which excludes energy use for residential and private transportation 
purposes, by only 22% in both Germany and the UK.  
Chapter 4 goes beyond the focus on labour-intensive services to provide a 
systematic analysis of structural change goals for the economy as a whole. I 
introduce a novel framework that translates the two overarching structural 
change goals into sector-specific goals. I identify sector-specific goals regarding 
the sector’s share in GVA, final demand and employment as well as regarding 
sectoral energy intensity and labour productivity. My analysis provides a first 
comprehensive vision of structural change for a post-growth economy founded 
on empirical data. The vision is built around four sector groups with similar 
characteristics and similar structural change goals.  
Group 1 includes energy-intensive sectors with high potential for direct and 
embodied labour productivity growth. My analysis suggests that the group 
includes the manufacturing sectors as the well as the transport and agricultural 
sectors (Table 5-1). The high energy intensity of Group 1 sectors demands that we 
reduce the sectors’ shares in final demand and GVA. In the remaining production 
we should strive to increase labour productivity where this can eliminate 
undesirable jobs. My results in Chapter 4 show that such increases in direct and 
embodied labour productivity are compatible with reductions in direct and 
embodied energy intensity. Increases in direct labour productivity might increase 




Table 5-1: Sector groups identified in Chapter 4 
Sectors NACE Codes (Rev. 1.1) 
Group 1  
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 01, 02, 05 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15, 16 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 17, 18, 19 
Paper, Printing, Publishing 21, 22 
Chemicals 24 
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 27, 28 
Machinery, Electrical Equipment, Computers 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 
Transport Equipment 34, 35 
Other Manufacturing 20, 25, 36, 37 
Transport 60, 61, 62, 63 
Group 2  
Mineral Products 13, 14, 26 
Construction 45 
Group 3  
Hotels and Restaurants 55 
Public Administration 75 
Health 85 
Education 80 
Other Services 41, 90, 91, 92, 93 
Group 4  
Wholesale and Retail Trade 50, 51, 52 
Finance and Insurance 65, 66, 67 
Real Estate Activities 70 
IT and Communication 64, 72 
Business Services 71, 73, 74 
Other (not analysed)  
Fuel Producers 10, 11, 23 
Production and Distribution of Electricity, Gas, 
Steam, Hot Water 
40 
Private Households with Employed Persons 95 
labour force. However, the post-growth literature suggests that there might be 
energy-intensive sectors in Group 1 where it is desirable to adopt more labour-
intensive production methods in order to create meaningful work, even if further 
increases in labour productivity would be possible (Nørgård, 2013; Mair et al., 
2020). I do not specifically identify such sectors in my thesis. But in such cases 
the reductions in labour productivity in order to create more meaningful work 
might have to be balanced against energy concerns, if such reductions lead to 




Group 2 includes energy-intensive sectors with a low potential for labour 
productivity growth. The group appears to be a relatively small part of the 
economy. I identify only the Mineral Products sector and the Construction 
sector, and the latter could potentially also be allocated to Group 3 (Table 5-1). 
Given the high energy intensity of Group 2 sectors, the highest priority should be 
the reduction of the sectors’ share in final demand and GVA. Whether, where and 
how labour productivity should be reduced in the remaining production is an 
open question. The answer will depend on the context of different sectors, 
because the creation of meaningful jobs needs to be balanced with the potential 
energy requirements of more labour-intensive production methods.  
Group 3 includes energy-light sectors with a low potential for labour productivity 
growth. The group includes the five labour-intensive service demand sectors 
identified in Chapter 3 and their corresponding direct sectors (Table 5-1). In 
order to create meaningful employment and reduce aggregate labour 
productivity growth we should increase the employment share of Group 3. 
Increases in the group’s share in employment will likely be associated with 
increases in the group’s share of final demand and GVA. It could also be 
associated with reductions in direct and embodied labour productivity depending 
on how final demand and GVA are measured. My analysis suggests that there are 
few trade-offs between the goal to increase employment and the goal to reduce 
energy intensity. Sectors in Group 3 have shown reductions in the direct and 
embodied energy intensity and the direct and embodied energy-labour ratio 
independent of whether GVA, final demand or labour productivity have been 
growing or declining.  
Finally, Group 4 includes energy-light sectors with high potential for labour 
productivity growth. The group is the most difficult for identifying structural 
change goals, because the sectors cannot contribute strongly to any of the three 
overarching structural change goals. The group is also very heterogeneous, 
including sectors such as Wholesale and Retail Trade, IT and Communication, 
Finance and Insurance, as well as a wide range of Business Services, such as 




groups’ sectors therefore requires a more specific assessment of how the sectors 
can add value to a post-growth economy.   
5.2 Are we moving in the right direction?  
Based on the vision of structural change, we can assess how far historical 
structural change has taken us in the direction of a post-growth economy. My 
research suggests that structural change over the past decades has been partially 
in the right direction, but not consistently so. Where desired structural change 
has occurred, its magnitude has been small. 
5.2.1 Energy use  
Reducing the share of energy-intensive sectors in both GVA and final demand is a 
key overarching structural change goal I identify in Chapter 4. Such a structural 
change would reduce the energy intensity of the economy and, in the absence of 
further growth, also direct and embodied energy use.  
As I have discussed in Section 1.3.3, the literature suggests that structural change 
from industry to service sectors has not been a strong driver of direct energy 
intensity reductions when looking across high-income countries and time periods 
(Henriques and Kander, 2010; Mulder and de Groot, 2013; Marrero and Ramos-
Real, 2013; Fernández González et al., 2013). While structural change in GVA has 
reduced the direct energy intensity of many high-income countries, it has also 
increased direct energy intensity in some. In those countries where structural 
change has contributed to direct energy intensity reductions, the contributions 
were small. For example Henriques and Kander (2010) estimate that structural 
change did not reduce the direct energy intensity by more than 9% between 1971 
and 2005 in any of the high-income countries they studied.   
The decomposition analysis in Chapter 2 adds some important insights to this 
literature by presenting a detailed analysis of how structural change has impacted 
direct final energy use in the UK between 1997 and 2013. The results confirm the 
patterns observed in the literature. Structural change did make an important 
contribution to reducing direct energy use in the in the UK. But the reductions in 
direct energy use from structural change were much smaller than the reductions 




savings from structural change are largely associated with structural change 
within the industry sectors, rather than with structural change in output from 
industry to service sectors.  The importance of within-industry structural change 
might explain why my analysis suggests a larger contribution from structural 
change than many studies in the literature, which focus on structural change 
from industry to services only.  
In the framework presented in Chapter 4, energy-intensive sectors are allocated 
to sector Groups 1 and 2. The data produced in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 allow for 
an assessment of whether the UK and Germany have achieved any structural 
change in GVA and final demand away from the sectors in Group 1 and Group 2 
between 1995 and 2011. 
Germany does not show any noteworthy structural change in GVA and final 
demand away from the sectors in Group 1 and Group 2 (Figure 5-1). As a result 
the share of the two groups in direct energy use is increasing and the share in 
embodied energy use is stable. The UK shows a somewhat stronger reduction in 
the share of Group 1 and 2 in GVA (Figure 5-2). The reduction in Group 1 and 2 
shares reduces direct energy use in absolute terms. But it does not translate into a 
falling share of Group 1 and Group 2 sectors in direct energy use, because the 
direct energy intensity in Group 3 and 4 is falling faster than in Group 1 and 
Group 2 sectors. The shares of Group 1 and Group 2 in final demand and 
embodied energy use are stable until the financial crisis, after which both fall.  
My results mirror the inconsistent results in the literature, which largely adopts a 
direct perspective. Structural change in GVA away from energy-intensive sectors 
has reduced direct energy intensity and direct energy use in the UK, but not in 
Germany. From an embodied perspective, the move in final demand away from 
energy-intensive sectors has been negligible in both countries, except during the 
financial crisis in the UK. If we want to achieve meaningful reductions in energy 
intensity through structural change, we need  to achieve faster structural change  





Figure 5-1: Structural Change in Germany between 1995 and 2011. Total direct and embodied energy use excludes energy use for residential 





Figure 5-2: Structural Change in the UK between 1995 and 2011. Total direct and embodied energy use excludes energy use for residential 





The second overarching structural change goal for a post-growth economy is to 
create meaningful jobs, by shifting employment towards labour-intensive sectors 
with low rates of labour productivity growth. In Chapter 3 I identify five labour-
intensive service sectors. The five sectors constitute Group 3 in the framework 
presented in Chapter 4. The literature on structural change identifies the stylised 
fact that the share of service sectors in direct employment has been rising 
consistently with rising income over the past century in high-income countries 
(Fuchs, 1980; Kongsamut et al., 1997; Schettkat and Yocarini, 2006). But the 
rising share of direct service sector employment includes all service sectors and 
not only labour-intensive ones. It is therefore not clear in how far the rising share 
of service sector employment is in line with the goals of the post-growth 
economy.  
The literature on Baumol’s cost disease provides more useful insights because it is 
specifically concerned with the employment share of labour-intensive sectors. 
The literature confirms Baumol’s hypothesis that the employment share of 
labour-intensive sectors grows with respect to labour-light sectors, which can 
slow down aggregate labour productivity growth in the economy (Nordhaus, 
2006; Hartwig, 2011; Fernandez and Palazuelos, 2012). The strength of this effect 
can be mediated by other factors. For example, increases in exports of labour-
light sectors can counteract reductions in their employment share and mitigate 
the reductions in aggregate labour productivity growth (Oh and Kim, 2015).  
I can use the data produced in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 to assess whether 
structural change in the UK and Germany has been in line with the goals of a 
post-growth economy. In both countries, the share of Group 3 sectors in direct 
employment increased between 1995 and 2011, although the increase in Germany 
is small (Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2). Despite the increased employment share, the 
group’s share in real GVA is falling or stagnating, reflecting the relatively lower 
rate of direct labour productivity growth. The pattern for embodied labour shares 
is less consistent. In Germany the share of Group 3 sectors in embodied labour is 




From a direct perspective, structural change in employment has therefore been in 
line with the predictions of Baumol’s cost disease and the post-growth goal of 
increasing the employment share of labour-intensive services. But from an 
embodied perspective, the picture is less consistent. The discrepancy raises 
questions about how far changes in the employment structure within the UK and 
Germany have been driven by the offshoring of jobs in Group 1 and Group 2 
sectors (see Section 5.3.2).  
5.3 What are the drivers of structural change and how could we change 
them?  
Historical trends in structural change in high-income countries, specifically the 
UK and Germany, have partially been in line with the post-growth goals 
identified in Chapter 4. I examine whether the drivers that have produced 
desirable structural change in the past are in line with post-growth principles and 
can be scaled up for the transition to a post-growth economy. As I discuss in 
Section 1.3.2, there are three important drivers of structural change, namely 
differential rates of labour productivity growth, international trade and changes 
in the composition of final demand.   
I will argue that we cannot rely on historical drivers of structural change to move 
towards a post-growth economy. The drivers are not in line with post-growth 
principles, because they are tightly linked to growth in labour productivity, 
income and offshoring. In the following I discuss how the different drivers have 
shaped structural change and contemplate how they could be changed to achieve 
the structural change desired for a post-growth economy.  
5.3.1 Differential labour productivity growth  
5.3.1.1 Historical drivers  
A key driver of structural change is different rates of labour productivity growth 
in different sectors. According to Baumol’s Cost disease, those sectors with low 
labour productivity growth continuously increase their share in employment 
which can slow down aggregate GDP growth (Baumol, 1967; Baumol et al., 1985; 




economy. But despite such outcomes, the structural change produced by 
differential rates of labour productivity growth will be of limited use.  
Firstly, differential rates of labour productivity growth do not improve the 
environmental performance of the economy. They increase the relative prices and 
employment share of labour-intensive sectors, but have only a limited effect on 
the composition of real output and final demand. As real output is more closely 
aligned with environmental impacts than employment, the effect on 
environmental impacts is limited. Such an effect is illustrated by the small impact 
of structural change on energy use in my results and the wider literature. 
Secondly, in order to have differential growth rates in labour productivity, some 
sectors need to have high rates of labour productivity growth. Without high rates 
of labour productivity growth in the labour-light sectors, there would be no cost 
disease. But the high labour productivity growth in the labour-light sectors is also 
a key driver of economic growth in aggregate. Baumol’s cost disease should 
therefore be considered as a side effect of economic growth rather than an 
obstacle to it. Baumol (2012, pp.50–51) himself describes the future relationship 
between labour-intensive and labour-light goods as the following: “In that future 
world, we can have much more of all of these goods. (…) The only thing that will 
change, in terms of the cost to us, is how we will have to divide our money 
between these items” (emphasis original). Such a future world with more of all 
goods would be environmentally disastrous. 
The high rates of labour productivity growth in the labour-light sectors are not 
only a key driver of aggregate economic growth, they have also come at an 
environmental cost. The results I present in Chapter 4 show that such labour 
productivity growth in the labour-light sectors has been associated with increases 
in the energy-labour ratio, at least from a direct perspective. My results support 
evidence from the literature that direct labour productivity growth in the 
manufacturing and transport sectors is reliant on harnessing increasing amounts 
of energy per worker (Mulder and de Groot, 2004; Witt and Gross, 2019).  In 
Chapter 4 I suggest that such increases in the energy-labour ratio in labour-light 
sectors might be acceptable, but only if it is combined with falling production 




light sectors stimulates economic growth while simultaneously increasing the 
energy-labour ratio, it would seriously jeopardise climate change mitigation 
(Semieniuk, 2016).  
Lastly, the relative price changes that result from differential rates in labour 
productivity growth might induce changes in the composition of demand that are 
contrary to the goals of the post-growth economy. Baumol (2012, pp.70–71) 
suggests that those sectors with high labour productivity growth are also more 
environmentally harmful. As the products of such sectors are becoming relatively 
cheaper, he is worried that the falling relative prices might stimulate demand for 
such sectors and increase environmental impacts. In Chapter 3 I present some 
novel empirical evidence to test Baumol’s suggestion. For the UK I find some 
evidence that sectors with a higher embodied energy-labour ratio are becoming 
relatively cheaper. Although there exist both energy-intensive sectors with high 
price inflation, such as the Mineral Products sectors, as well as energy-light 
sectors with strongly falling prices, such as the IT & Communications sector. For 
Germany, no relationship between the embodied energy-labour ratio and price 
inflation is apparent. I can therefore not find unambiguous evidence for Baumol’s 
suggestion that labour-light sectors are more environmentally harmful. Gazheli 
et al. (2016) reach a similar conclusion when studying the relationship between 
carbon intensity and labour productivity across sectors.  
The flipside of falling relative prices in labour-light sectors are increasing relative 
prices in labour-intensive sectors. Such increasing relative prices are potentially 
problematic from a post-growth perspective, if they reduce the demand for the 
labour-intensive services in Group 3. My analysis in Chapter 3 provides some 
indication that labour-intensive service sectors face increasing relative prices 
compared to other sectors. Such relative price changes are only problematic if 
they actually influence the composition of final demand in real terms. I discuss 
the evidence for such impacts in Section 5.3.3. 
5.3.1.2 Implications for the post-growth transition 
Structural change produced by different rates of labour productivity growth has 




not helpful for the post-growth transition. But, as I have argued in Chapter 4, the 
post-growth vision also features different labour productivity growth rates in 
different sectors, albeit for different reasons. In the current economic system, 
labour productivity growth is driven by competition pressures on businesses and 
other organisations to reduce costs and increase profits (Jackson and Victor, 2011; 
Shaikh, 2016). The different rates of labour productivity growth arise from the 
fact that it is much easier to increase labour productivity in some sectors than in 
others.  
In contrast, the goal of the post-growth economy is to manage labour 
productivity in different sectors to reduce unfulfilling jobs, create meaningful 
ones and ensure the wellbeing of workers. Achieving such goals will require 
breaking with current sectoral patterns of labour productivity growth and 
presents different challenges in different sectors. The sector group classification I 
develop in Chapter 4 is useful for characterising such challenges.  
In Group 1 and Group 4 sectors continued labour productivity growth is possible 
and, in the past, labour productivity growth has successfully been achieved in 
many of the sectors in the group. In many of those sectors continued labour 
productivity growth will be desirable to eliminate unwanted jobs. But such labour 
productivity growth in the past has happened in an environment of growing 
output. Growing labour productivity might even have been a key driver of output 
growth in such sectors (Nordhaus, 2005; Tregenna, 2009). The challenge for the 
post-growth transition will be to continue labour productivity growth in those 
sectors of Group 1 and Group 4 where it is desirable, while simultaneously 
reducing production and demand. Examples of such sectors are the industrial 
production of steel, chemicals or machines that will still be needed in a post-
growth economy, but also necessary office-based services that offer unfulfilling 
jobs. 
While labour productivity growth is possible in Group 1 and Group 4 sectors, it 
might not be desirable. Post-growth economists suggest that there might be 
sectors in which more labour-intensive, artisan and local production are 
desirable. It has been argued that the adoption of such methods allows for greater 




products (Nørgård, 2013; Mair et al., 2020). Examples could be clothes and 
furniture made and repaired by local craftsmen or high quality organic food 
produced on local farms. The challenge for those sectors is to foster the uptake of 
labour-intensive production methods and ensure good working conditions 
against the cost pressures currently faced by many organisations.  
Group 2 and Group 3 include sectors in which labour productivity growth is not 
possible, at least not at high rates. Such low rates of labour productivity growth 
pose a particular challenge for the labour-intensive services in Group 3, for which 
an expansion in employment, output and demand is desired. As long as labour 
productivity is growing in Group 1 and Group 4 sectors, Baumol’s cost disease 
suggests that Group 3 sectors will continue to become relatively more expensive. 
The challenge for Group 3 sectors is therefore to expand demand and 
employment despite such relative price changes (see Section 5.3.3). 
While the need for such a differentiated treatment of labour productivity is often 
implied in the post-growth literature, there is no in-depth discussion in which 
sectors further labour productivity growth is possible and desired. The 
framework I develop in Chapter 4 makes a start in defining labour productivity 
goals in different sectors in a systematic manner. But there remain many 
important questions.  
We are so far lacking a detailed assessment of which sectors we want to increase, 
maintain or reduce labour productivity. In my analysis in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4 I investigate the potential for labour productivity growth but not its 
desirability. More research is needed to increase our understanding of where 
labour productivity growth might be desirable from the perspective of workers, 
identifying jobs we want to eliminate because they are not meaningful. Similarly, 
we need to identify those areas of production which could benefit from the 
adoption of more labour-intensive production methods to provide a better work 
experience.  
But, for the post-growth transition, the desirability of labour productivity growth 
is not only determined by the quality of the work. The system-wide 
environmental impacts also need to be taken into account.  In the context of my 




What would be the impacts if the desired changes to labour productivity would 
be implemented at scale? Would they be consistent with the overarching 
necessity to reduce energy use? Would we have enough workers to produce all 
our essential needs if we move to more labour-intensive production? Any 
attempts at answering such questions also have to consider the emerging 
technologies that will be involved in future labour productivity growth, such as 
digital and robotic technologies (Frey and Osborne, 2017; Spencer, 2018). Will 
such technologies replace jobs that are desired or undesired in a post-growth 
economy and what are the energy and wider environmental implications of such 
replacements? 
Once we have a better idea of how we want to transform production processes in 
different sectors, whether that means increasing or reducing labour productivity, 
the next big challenge is to devise ways to achieve such transformations. The 
post-growth transition will be characterised by strong restrictions on energy and 
resource use, for example through high taxes or rationing. Such restrictions 
might incentivise some businesses to focus more strongly on increasing energy 
and resource efficiency and less strongly on reducing labour costs. Proposals for 
ecological tax reform combine tax rises on energy and resources with tax 
reductions on labour income to explicitly foster such a change in focus (Daly, 
2008; Cosme et al., 2017; Kallis, 2018, p.128).  
While such measures might be helpful to reduce energy and resource use, on 
their own they are unlikely to achieve the differentiated changes in labour 
productivity desired for a post-growth economy. Those sectors with high energy 
intensity, which have the strongest incentives to switch to more labour-intensive 
production under ecological tax reforms, are not necessarily the same as the 
sectors in which we want to increase labour-intensive production. For example 
there might some energy-intensive sectors in which it is desirable to increase 
labour productivity. Even where ecological tax reforms achieve the uptake of 
more labour-intensive methods, they are not likely to create the high-quality, 
artisan jobs envisaged in the post-growth literature. Ecological tax reforms 
achieve relative shifts in the costs faced by businesses but they do not address the 




intensive production methods are more likely to take the shape of sweatshops 
rather than artisan craftsmen. 
The challenge of the post-growth transition is to create a system that 
simultaneously fosters labour productivity growth where it is desirable and more 
labour-intensive production methods where they can create good jobs. The key 
to achieving such outcomes is a system that, within environmental constraints, 
puts the well-being of workers first. Organisations need to be put in a position 
where they can and want to make the quality of employment a key priority, 
whether that means increasing or decreasing labour productivity. Labour-
intensive production methods of the kind envisioned in the post-growth 
literature are currently only viable in niche markets, often serving affluent 
consumers, and unable to compete with goods mass-produced in factories and by 
cheap labour abroad. In the public sector, organisations should not be pressured 
into increasing “efficiency” if this comes at the cost of deteriorating working 
condition. 
How can we create such a system? The post-growth literature suggests that a 
proliferation of alternative business models is a key ingredient. Such alternative 
business models feature two important characteristics. They are not-for-profit 
and they have greater democratic control by their employees, for example 
through employee ownership (Johanisova and Wolf, 2012; Johanisova et al., 2013; 
Hinton, 2020). Such businesses can prioritise environmental and social 
objectives over profits. They would be more able to put in place measures to 
reduce labour productivity if it improves working conditions, because they can 
keep prices low by reducing profits and dividend payments to shareholders 
(Trebeck and Williams, 2019, p.127). But alternative business models alone will 
not be enough to achieve the differentiated labour productivity goals for a post-
growth economy, especially the vision of more labour-intensive, artisan 
production. In order to thrive, such business models will still require wider 
changes in the economy, including support from government regulation and a 
reformed financial system. The proliferation of alternative business models will 




expensive, and higher quality products. Such a shift is difficult to imagine in the 
current market environment of price-based competition and consumption.   
5.3.2  International trade 
5.3.2.1 Historical drivers  
My research shows that structural change within high-income countries is closely 
linked to global trade. International trade has not been the most important driver 
of structural change in output, employment and energy use, but it has still played 
an important role (Saeger, 1997; Alderson, 1999; Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004; 
Kollmeyer, 2009).  
While the literature provides indirect evidence on the role of offshoring in 
reducing energy use in high-income countries, there is little analysis that 
explicitly links the two. In Chapter 2 I use a novel decomposition analysis that 
explicitly links the structural change and related energy savings within the UK to 
international trade. I find that most of the energy savings from structural change 
within the UK are the result of offshoring rather than of changes in the 
composition of demand or international trade structures. As a result of such 
offshoring, the UK, Germany and most other high-income countries are now net-
importers of energy use, with their energy footprints being larger than their 
domestic energy use (Simas et al., 2015; Sakai et al., 2017; Owen et al., 2017).  
The literature on deindustrialisation describes a similar effect for structural 
change in employment over the past decades. Production of labour-intensive 
industry sectors moved from high-income to low-income countries leading to 
losses in employment in the former (Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004). Similar to the 
case of energy use, the demand in most high-income countries is now strongly 
dependent on labour performed abroad, especially in industrial sectors (Simas et 
al., 2015; Sakai et al., 2017). The results of my analysis support the results in the 
literature. In Chapter 3 I show that the fraction of the embodied labour employed 
domestically is less than 35% for all Group 1 sectors, whether in the UK or 
Germany. In many of the sectors, the fraction is considerably lower, reaching 
below 10% in some cases (Tables A2 and A3, Appendix B). Similarly, the reliance 




employment share of Group 1 sectors in direct employment and in embodied 
employment (Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2).  
When only considering a direct perspective, the structural change resulting from 
international trade supports some of the post-growth goals. It has contributed to 
reductions in energy use, at least to a limited extent. In all likelihood it has also 
contributed to an increasing share of labour-intensive services in direct 
employment. It has certainly contributed to an increasing employment share of 
the service sector in general. But the goals of the post-growth economy are 
fundamentally global in nature. Structural change that only shifts energy use 
between countries does not contribute to efforts of moving environmental 
impacts back within planetary boundaries. Such shifts could be environmentally 
beneficial in some circumstances, for example if energy-intensive production is 
shifted to countries with better access to renewable energy sources. But the 
offshoring of energy-intensive industries has generally not been driven by such 
concerns (Jiborn et al., 2018). Similarly, there is no legitimacy in a post-growth 
transition that does not deliver basic needs and well-being to the whole global 
population. Any structural change that relies on the increasing appropriation of 
labour in low-income countries to satisfy demand in high-income countries raises 
serious questions about global inequality (Alsamawi et al., 2014; Simas et al., 
2014).  
5.3.2.2 Implications for the post-growth transition 
We cannot develop strategies for achieving desired structural change without 
considering the interconnected nature of the global economy. Building a post-
growth economy will not only require the prevention of future offshoring but also 
the partial reversal of historical offshoring. Global trade and complex domestic 
supply chains are an important source of transport energy use and carbon 
emissions (Sorrell et al., 2009; Cristea et al., 2013). The transport sector itself is 
part of Group 1, for which demand should be reduced. Reducing the share of the 
transport sector in the economy will not be possible without the shortening of 
supply chains. Shorter and more local supply chains also help to achieve other 
post-growth goals discussed in Section 5.3.1. Shorter supply chains allow for more 




between producers and consumers (Fournier, 2008; Kallis, 2011).  Workers can 
more easily organise across shorter supply chains to obtain better working 
conditions. Consumers might be more inclined to accept higher prices caused by 
more labour-intensive production methods, if they know the people who benefit 
from the higher prices. Lastly, with shorter supply chains and less international 
trade, a larger part of production falls under the jurisdiction of domestic 
governments which will make it easier to achieve post-growth goals in the 
absence of global agreements (Daly, 2008).  
Successful efforts for shortening supply chains would not affect all sectors 
equally. The offshoring of labour and energy use is most prominent in Group 1 
and Group 2 sectors, with the exception of the construction sector. Bringing 
larger parts of the supply chains for Group 1 and Group 2 sectors back into high-
income countries would considerably increase the direct employment in those 
sectors, possibly at the expense of employment in other sectors. Such an effect 
would be in addition to the increased labour requirements from the adoption of 
more labour-intensive production methods discussed in Section 5.3.1. It is 
unlikely that the increased labour requirements from the two effects could be 
met in high-income countries, unless there is a considerable reduction in 
demand for the products of Group 1 and Group 2 sectors. The sector goals 
identified in Chapter 4 therefore reinforce each other.   
Despite the strong calls for shorter supply chains and localised production in the 
post-growth literature, the literature features no detailed assessment in which 
sectors it would make sense to produce locally and where it would not. There 
might well be sectors where local, or national, production is impossible or where 
it would be beneficial to produce in other countries. For example it might make 
sense to locate energy-intensive production to places with good access to 
renewable energy sources. 
The post-growth literature also features only limited discussion on how we can 
design effective strategies for achieving shorter supply chains and more local  
production. Similar to labour productivity growth, an important driver of 
offshoring has been the pressure to reduce costs, both with regard to costs 




Fox, 2012; Tregenna, 2014), with labour cost likely to be the more important of 
the two (Barker et al., 2007). Producing Group 1 and Group 2 products more 
locally would likely make them more expensive. But many of the cost differentials 
are derived from weaker environmental regulations in other countries as well as 
global wage and income inequalities. The elimination of such environmental and 
income inequalities is an important goal of the post-growth economy in its own 
right (Demaria et al., 2013).  
Global agreements on standards for environmental protection, workers’ rights 
and acceptable business models could go a long way in reducing cost differences 
and encouraging more local production. But unravelling and reforming global 
rules of trade is not an easy task and needs to be handled with care. Most 
importantly, it must not exacerbate existing global inequalities. Without changes 
to the wider system of international power relations, capital flows and debt, 
reductions in global trade and shorter supply chains could have a detrimental 
impact on the livelihoods in many low-income countries (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013, 
p.189). In short, a successful post-growth transition, including the achievement of 
the necessary structural change, requires a complete overhaul of the governance 
of global trade and finance. There is an urgent need for the post-growth 
community to come up with concrete proposals on how international trade can 
be reduced equitably and what a fair trade and financial architecture in a global 
post-growth economy would look like. 
Still, global agreements in line with post-growth goals are unlikely to come to 
pass anytime soon. It is more likely that post-growth strategies will be pursued by 
individual countries first. Countries will need to introduce restrictions on 
international trade in order to prevent offshoring effects undermining the 
structural change envisioned for a post-growth economy. Such restrictions can 
include traditional measures, such as tariffs, quotas and capital controls  
(Pettifor, 2019). In addition the climate change mitigation literature proposes a 
number of novel policies that can be used to counteract “carbon leakage”, which 
describes the shifting of carbon intensive production abroad (Peters, 2010). For 
example such policies include border carbon adjustments, which levy prices on 




2012). While such adjustment policies look promising on paper, they face 
considerable challenges in implementation, for example with regard to 
determining the carbon content of imports, the interaction with domestic carbon 
trading schemes and the equity implications of levying tariffs on imports from 
low-income countries (Barrett, 2020).  
5.3.3 Changes in final demand 
5.3.3.1 Historical drivers  
The third important driver of structural change is change in the composition of 
final demand. Baumol’s cost disease suggests that sectors with higher rates of 
labour productivity growth, such as manufacturing, will reduce their share in 
nominal final demand, because they become relatively cheaper compared to 
labour-intensive sectors (Baumol, 1967; Nordhaus, 2006). I find some evidence 
for such price trends in Chapter 3. Such changes in nominal final demand are not 
helpful for the post-growth transition, because they are not matched by similar 
changes in real final demand. The relative price changes could even be a barrier, 
if they reduce the real demand share of labour-intensive services and increase the 
real demand share of energy-intensive industry sectors. But there is little 
evidence for such effects. 
It is a key assumption of Baumol’s cost disease that the demand for most labour-
intensive sectors is inelastic to price changes because they are socially important, 
for example the demand for health care or education. It is the stable demand 
share of these sectors that causes the shift in employment towards such sectors in 
Baumol’s theory. But Baumol also suggests that there are some labour-intensive 
sectors that have been pushed to the margins of the economy because they have 
become relatively more expensive, such as repair services or the performing arts 
(Baumol, 2012, pp.26–28). Such sectors might not be large enough to strongly 
influence the demand share of labour-intensive sectors as a whole, but they are 
important for a post-growth economy (Jackson, 2017, p.172).  
The literature provides evidence that the composition of real final demand has 
shifted away from agriculture and manufacturing and towards service sectors 




2006; Comin et al., 2015; Peneder and Streicher, 2018). Increasing relative 
demand for energy-intensive sectors stimulated by falling relative prices 
therefore does not seem to pose an important problem. The results of my analysis 
are only partially in line with the findings from the literature. The UK shows a 
small shift in final demand away from Group 1 and Group 2 sectors (Figure 5-2), 
but in Germany the composition of final demand remains largely unchanged 
(Figure 5-1). The small shifts I observe highlight the slow nature of structural 
change. Such slow change poses a challenge for the post-growth transition 
because it needs to achieve drastic reductions in environmental impacts over just 
a few decades.  
For the post-growth transition it is not only the overall shift towards service 
sectors that is of interest, but it matters what kind of service sectors benefit from 
the shift. I identify a shift in demand to labour-intensive services in Group 3 
sectors as desirable, but the literature often does not separate labour-intensive 
services from other services. In my results, the shift in final demand towards 
service sectors in the UK has been driven by a rise in the share of Group 4 sectors, 
with the share of Group 3 sectors declining (Figure 5-2).  
In many ways the shift in real final demand towards service sectors is welcome 
from a post-growth perspective, but it is not clear in how far the specific service 
sectors that are desirable from a post-growth perspective have benefitted. The 
literature suggests, however, that the shift towards service sectors has mostly 
been driven by increasing income, because the demand for services has a higher 
income elasticity (Schettkat and Yocarini, 2006; van Neuss, 2019). The demand 
for services has not replaced the demand for agricultural and manufactured 
products, but has simply grown faster with rising incomes. Continuing such a 
trend is not an option for a post-growth economy.   
5.3.3.2 Implications for the post-growth economy  
In the transition to a post-growth economy, final demand will need to shift from 
Group 1 and Group 2 sectors towards Group 3 sectors. Such shifts in final demand 
will likely have to be achieved in an environment where overall income and 




measures. We can therefore not rely on the higher income elasticity of service 
sector demand to achieve the shifts.  
The final demand for the different sector groups is not distributed equally 
between different actors (Figure 5-3). In both Germany and the UK, the majority 
of the final demand for the sectors in Group 3 comes from the government or 
from non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH). A straightforward way 
of increasing demand and employment in Group 3 sectors is therefore to increase 
public spending in those sectors, which is directly under the government’s 
control.  Such proposals of expanding the provision of public services are already 
a key pillar of post-growth policy packages because many of these services are 
directly important for human well-being (Cosme et al., 2017; Gough, 2019). The 
creation of jobs in such sectors could also help to reduce unemployment and 
could be delivered as part of a job guarantee (Hartley et al., 2020).  
On its own, however, increasing public expenditure in Group 3 sectors will not 
create the structural change envisaged for a post-growth economy, in part 
because of second-round effects. The expansion of public expenditure would 
increase the income of the workers employed directly in such sectors and further  
 
 
Figure 5-3: Composition of final demand in 2011 for the UK and Germany. The 




down the supply chain. Without further policy intervention a large part of such 
an increase in incomes will be spent on demand sectors in Group 1 and Group 2, 
leading to increased energy use and other environmental impacts (Horen 
Greenford et al., 2020). In order to prevent such second-round effects,  policies 
to increase public expenditure on Group 3 demand sectors will therefore need to 
be accompanied by explicit measures to reduce demand in Group 1 and Group 2 
sectors and to curb environmental impacts in general. The framework presented 
in my thesis is fundamentally static in nature and can therefore not analyse such 
effects, which presents an important limitation. An important topic for future 
research would be the investigation of how the necessary structural change can 
be achieved without threatening the stability of the economy, for example using 
ecological macroeconomic models (Hardt and O’Neill, 2017; Jackson and Victor, 
2020)  
While it is often stated in the post-growth literature that overall demand and 
consumption is too high in high-income countries (e.g. Sekulova et al., 2013; 
Kallis, 2017; O’Neill et al., 2018), there is very little discussion about the specific 
sectors where demand should be reduced. My analysis in Chapter 4 presents a 
first indication. But we need more detailed research on the question in which 
sectors there actually is too much demand for goods (e.g. fashion), in which 
sectors we can maintain the user services while reducing the demand for goods 
(e.g. mobility rather than cars), and in which sectors we have to reduce the user 
services (e.g. air travel).  
The transition to a post-growth economy will be characterised by strict policies 
for reducing environmental impacts, such as taxes, cap & trade schemes or  
rationing (Cosme et al., 2017; Baranzini et al., 2017). While such policies are not 
explicitly aimed at changing the composition of final demand, they will likely 
lead to relative reductions in the final demand for Group 1 and Group 2 sectors as 
these become relatively more expensive or even directly limited.  
The big challenge for such blanket policies targeting environmentally-harmful 
consumption is their inequitable impact. Most of Group 1 and Group 2 sectors 
produce many goods and services that are crucial for human well-being, such as 




(Oswald et al., 2020). While even in high-income countries some people are 
genuinely lacking goods and services from such sectors, others consume way 
above their need. Policies therefore need to be constructed in a way that 
simultaneously reduces demand from those people who consume too much, 
increases demand from those people who need more, and still reduces demand in 
aggregate (Owen and Barrett, 2020).  
Stronger progressive taxation reducing the income of the affluent, for example by 
targeting income from wealth and rents, could go some way in reducing 
unnecessary consumption from Group 1 and Group 2 sectors. But such general 
taxation would not guarantee a proportionate reduction in demand for sectors in 
Group 1 and Group 2, because affluent people spend smaller parts of their income 
on consumption than less-affluent people (Dafermos and Papatheodorou, 2015). 
It might therefore be more effective to complement general progressive taxation 
with taxes and restrictions specifically targeted at the luxury consumption of 
energy-intensive goods and services. Examples of such taxes would be a frequent 
flyer levy (Devlin and Bernick, 2015) or higher rates of consumption taxes on 
luxury products (Werner, 2008, pp.212–216).  
While reductions in demand for Group 1 and Group 2 sectors are vital for staying 
within planetary boundaries, they have potential implications for the stability of 
the financial system. Such reductions in demand will have severe impacts on the 
financial position of companies heavily involved in the supply chains of these 
sectors, leading to potential knock-on effects on the banking and finance sector. 
Such a negative impact on the finance sector could then jeopardise the 
availability of loans to those sectors of the economy that are expected to expand, 
presenting another potential challenge for the post-growth transition. This 
challenge cannot be analysed in the static framework I use for my analysis. 
Further research is required to investigate how financial stability can be ensured 
in the face of the structural change required for the post-growth transition. For 
example such research could draw on dynamic ecological macroeconomic models 
that incorporate a realistic representation of the financial system (e.g. Dafermos 




Shifting final demand by expanding the public provision of Group 3 sectors and 
taxing luxury consumption of Group 1 and 2 sectors effectively constitutes a shift 
from private to public consumption. Such an approach would be able to make a 
good contribution to achieving the structural change goals of the post-growth 
economy. But it might not be sufficient, unless it is accompanied by a wider 
change in social norms, expectations and behaviours around consumption. There 
are important sectors in Group 3 that are not publicly provided but are expected 
to play a bigger role in the post-growth economy, such as restaurants, cafes, 
cultural and recreational services and other personal services. Such activities have 
been referred to as the “Cinderella economy” by Jackson (2017, p.143). Any 
increase in demand for such sectors will have to come mostly from households. 
In addition, as I have highlighted in Chapter 3, the structural change required for 
the post-growth transition would have to be large by historical standards. The 
necessary scale of changes in taxation and public spending needed to achieve 
such changes will likely meet with political resistance unless there is an 
accompanying shift in consumption culture. 
The need for a shift in consumption is a key theme that has emerged from the 
previous discussions. In the transition to a post-growth economy consumption 
will have to shift from cheap, mass-produced, material products produced 
abroad, towards more expensive, high-quality, locally-delivered services. The 
post-growth literature has strongly focused on the role of advertisement in 
driving unnecessary consumption, proposing restrictions on advertisement to 
achieve reductions and shifts in consumption (Jackson, 2017, pp.203–204; 
Gunderson, 2018). Other proposed policies include measures to encourage 
businesses providing durable goods to shift from the sale of individual products, 
e.g. washing machines, to provide the user services provided by these products, 
e.g. clean clothes (Jackson, 2017, pp.141–144). In addition to these policy 
proposals, there exist a wide literature on the drivers of consumption that can 
help inform other strategies to shift consumption in the direction required for a 





5.4 Contributions to knowledge 
Overall my thesis has made two overarching contributions to knowledge, with 
regard to structural change and energy use in the context of post-growth 
economics.  
The first overarching contribution is the development of a systematic approach to 
identify structural change goals for a post-growth economy. The post-growth 
literature recognises that structural change in the sectoral composition of the 
economy will be an important part of the transition to a post-growth economy. 
Kallis (2011, p.875) refers to “selective degrowth” and Jackson and co-authors 
promote a shift to labour-intensive service sectors with low rates of labour 
productivity growth (Jackson and Victor, 2011), such as  “care, craft and culture” 
(Jackson, 2017, p.149). In my thesis I develop these ideas in a more systematic 
manner, by providing new empirical evidence of sector characteristics and 
linking the ideas from the post-growth literature to sectors in terms of the 
sectoral classification used in the national accounts. In this way my thesis makes 
the structural change proposed in the post-growth literature more clearly defined 
and more tangible.  
In Chapter 3 I provide novel empirical estimates of the embodied energy intensity 
and embodied labour productivity growth of different demand sectors in the UK 
and Germany. The empirical analysis allows me to identify five demand sectors 
that show the characteristics of labour-intensive services proposed by Jackson 
and co-authors (Jackson and Victor, 2011; Jackson, 2015; Jackson, 2017, p.148). 
The five demand sectors correspond closely to the kind of activities that have 
been intuitively identified as labour-intensive in the post-growth literature. My 
analysis confirms that a shift in demand to such sectors would reduce the level of 
aggregate embodied energy intensity and the growth rate of aggregate embodied 
labour productivity in the UK and Germany. But my analysis also cautions that 
the reductions in aggregate embodied energy intensity that such a shift can bring 
on its own are unlikely to achieve the energy reductions required for a post-
growth economy.  
In Chapter 4 I take the analysis one step further and propose a framework for 




based on empirical evidence. The framework determines in which sectors we 
would expect a falling or increasing share in GVA, demand and employment, and 
how such goals are related to goals for labour productivity and energy intensity 
within sectors. I identify four sector groups with similar characteristics and 
similar structural change goals. As part of the analysis I also provide new 
evidence on the relationship between labour productivity and the energy-labour 
ratio at a sectoral level, an important factor in determining the trade-offs 
between labour productivity and energy intensity goals. Although I do not 
perform a statistical analysis, my results indicate support for the findings in the 
literature that direct labour productivity is more strongly related to the direct 
energy-labour ratio in the industrial and transport sectors than in other sectors 
(Mulder and de Groot, 2004; Witt and Gross, 2019).  
My analysis only provides a very first step in defining structural change goals for 
a post-growth economy and it poses as many questions as it answers. But it opens 
up the discussion on the important question of what structural change for a post-
growth economy would look like in concrete terms.  
The second overarching contribution consists of bringing the insights of the 
literature on structural change to the literature on post-growth economics. The 
literature on structural change can bring important insights about the drivers of 
structural change and how they have been related to energy use. Such insights 
inform the discussion in my thesis of how we can achieve the structural change 
goals I have identified. In Chapter 1 I identify three important drivers of 
structural change in the literature, namely differential rates of labour 
productivity growth, international trade and changes in the composition of final 
demand. My thesis provides new insights into how these relate to post-growth 
goals.  
According to the theory of Baumol’s cost disease, differential rates of labour 
productivity growth in different sectors are an important factors shifting 
employment as well as nominal output and demand towards sectors with low 
rates of labour productivity growth, as such sectors become relatively more 
expensive (Baumol, 1967; Baumol et al., 1985; Baumol, 2012). My results in 




five labour-intensive demand sectors I identify show higher price inflation than 
other sectors. Baumol’s cost disease might therefore constitute a barrier to the 
post-growth transition, as it might make it more difficult to achieve shifts in 
demand and output towards labour-intensive sectors in real terms, if they 
become relatively more expensive.  
International trade has been an important factor shaping the sectoral 
composition of direct nominal output, employment and energy use within 
countries (Saeger, 1997; Simas et al., 2015; Peneder and Streicher, 2018). The 
complementary insights that my thesis has provided from an embodied 
perspective are therefore important to assess in how far such structural change 
has been in line with post-growth goals. In Chapter 2 I provide new empirical 
evidence on the relationship between energy use and structural change in the 
UK. My results support findings from the literature that structural change in real 
output has been less important than energy intensity reductions for reducing 
direct energy demand in the UK (Henriques and Kander, 2010; Marrero and 
Ramos-Real, 2013; Mulder and de Groot, 2013). But I also show that the 
contribution from structural change in real output to energy demand reductions 
in the UK has been non-negligible and that it has been driven almost completely 
by offshoring. Hence, structural change driven by international trade has also not 
been in line with post-growth goals. Re-writing the rules of international trade is 
therefore an important challenge for achieving the structural change goals of a 
post-growth economy.  
Changes in the composition of demand have been an important driver of 
structural change in direct output and employment in the economy (Schettkat 
and Yocarini, 2006; Kollmeyer, 2009; Comin et al., 2015). In my thesis I propose 
that a post-growth economy will require a shift in real demand towards labour-
intensive and energy-light demand sectors. However, structural change in 
demand in the past has only been partially in the right direction and it is 
generally considered to be driven by rising aggregate incomes. The post-growth 
transition will therefore require new strategies for achieving the desired shifts in 




Overall, combining the insights from the structural change literature and the 
results of my own analysis, provides the important insight that none of the 
drivers of structural change in the past are in line with post-growth goals.   
Together the two overarching contributions to knowledge my thesis provides 
constitute the first substantive discussion of the structural change that is 
required for a post-growth economy and of the potential challenges for achieving 
it. 
5.5 Research limitations  
Structural change is a complex phenomenon and interconnected with many 
other economic processes, such as innovation, demographic changes, the 
development of social norms around consumption, the competition within and 
between countries and changes in economic policy. In my thesis I have presented 
novel research that develops a vision of structural change for a post-growth 
economy and provides new evidence on the drivers of structural change and their 
relationship to energy use. Given the complexity of the topic, my research 
presents only a small step in the endeavour of understanding structural change 
for the transition to a post-growth economy. In many ways my research raises 
more question than it answers. In the following I discuss five specific limitations 
of my analysis.  
Firstly, most of my analysis relies on empirical estimates of embodied output, 
energy and labour in different sector supply chains. Such estimates, which I 
derive from MRIO databases, come with significant uncertainties. Uncertainties 
arise from the incomplete availability of economic data used in the construction 
of MRIO databases, the construction method of the MRIO database as well as the 
collation and construction of the labour and energy extensions (Peters et al., 
2012; Inomata and Owen, 2014; Owen et al., 2014). As such uncertainties are 
difficult to quantify, they are not commonly reported (Owen et al., 2014). Most 
importantly for my thesis, uncertainties of embodied measures are larger for 
individual sectors than for estimates of the economy as a whole (Lenzen et al., 
2010). In order to limit the uncertainty of the embodied measures I have 




introduces another set of limitations, as discussed in the second point. In order to 
assess the uncertainty of my estimates it would be useful to complement my 
analysis with research investigating sector characteristics and structural change 
using alternative MRIO databases and extension vectors.  
Secondly, my analysis of structural change is limited by adopting a high level of 
sector aggregation, which does not go beyond the 2-digit NACE classification. I 
have adopted this approach in order to limit the uncertainty from the MRIO 
databases and in order to reflect the limited resolution of the data available on 
energy use.  But using such aggregated sectors comes at the cost of limiting my 
analysis, because many of these aggregate sectors contain a number of very 
heterogeneous sub-sectors. My analysis does not capture the structural change, 
or other transformations, happening at the level of such sub-sectors. For example 
an increasing share of pharmaceuticals within the chemicals sector would register 
as a reduction in energy intensity rather than structural change. Weber (2009) 
demonstrates that the inclusion of a more detailed sectoral resolution in 
structural and index decomposition analysis can have a considerable impact on 
the strength of the structural change effect reported. Many important aspects of 
structural change for a post-growth economy will play out at a more granular 
level of sectoral resolution. For example an important part of the transition to a 
post-growth economy and of climate mitigation will be a shift in food production 
towards more plant-based foods (Creutzig et al., 2016; Gomiero, 2018). But the 
level of my analysis only captures the agriculture and food production sectors in 
aggregate and could not depict such changes. Future research on structural 
change for a post-growth economy would therefore benefit from considering a 
more detailed sectoral classification, such as the 4-digit NACE classification. Such 
research could draw on existing work that has classified economic sectors 
according to their relevance for climate change mitigation in order to assess risks 
to the financial system (Battiston et al., 2017; EU Technical Expert Group on 
Sustainable Finance, 2020).  
Thirdly, structural change is a long-term phenomenon that unfolds over decades 
(Kuznets, 1966; Kongsamut et al., 1997). Structural change is also closely linked to 




focus on examining the international supply chains of different sectors by using 
MRIO models. MRIO databases cover only recent and relatively short time 
periods. The use of MRIO models has therefore come at the cost of investigating 
longer-term trends. Where possible, I have put my results into the context of the 
literature spanning longer time periods. The reliance on short time periods 
makes it difficult to determine whether the trends in sectoral characteristics and 
structural change I observe are representative of long-term patterns or are 
specific to the time period in question. One example are the low rates of 
structural change and embodied labour productivity growth that I observe in 
German manufacturing sectors between 1995 and 2011.  Are such low rates a 
historical aberration owing to circumstances in Germany at the time? Or are they 
part of a longer-term slowing of growth and structural change? I use the 
estimated rates of change in order to classify sectors into different groups with 
different structural change goals. In order to make sure that such a classification 
serves its purpose, more research is needed to investigate how far my results 
represent general trends or are particular to a specific time period. 
Fourthly, and related to the previous point, the sectoral classification is reliant on 
the estimation of sector characteristics from historical data. Technical progress 
might change these characteristics in the future and hence change the sectoral 
classification I have presented in my thesis. For example the estimation of 
embodied energy, labour and output throughout the thesis, and the demand-shift 
scenario in Chapter 3, rely on technical coefficients that are fixed for each year, 
representing the trade flows between different sectors. Such coefficients are 
constantly evolving and will change the characteristics of embodied sectors in the 
future (Barrett and Scott, 2012). Similarly, technological change will impact the 
characteristics of direct sectors. My results show that direct energy intensity is 
continuously decreasing in many sectors. The increased possibilities offered by 
automation and artificial intelligence have the potential to drastically reshape the 
labour requirements in many sectors, although it is debated in how far they will 
translate into job losses (Frey and Osborne, 2017; Spencer, 2018). Such 
technologies could break the stable pattern of relative sectoral growth rates in 




increases in labour productivity in sectors that have so far resisted such increases, 
for example the health care sector or other labour-intensive service sectors. Any 
research on structural change for a post-growth transition is motivated by the 
desire to understand and shape structural change in the future. Future research 
on structural change for a post-growth economy therefore needs to take into 
account such trends in technological change as best as possible in order to 
provide a realistic vision for a post-growth economy.  
Fifth, my research focuses on two specific countries, the UK and Germany. I 
restrict my analysis to two countries to allow for the preparation of detailed data 
on energy use, especially in the service sectors. The literature shows that different 
high-income countries can show very different patterns regarding the 
relationship between structural change, energy use and labour productivity 
growth (Henriques and Kander, 2010). The differences between countries 
highlight that structural change in the post-growth transition will take somewhat 
different shapes in different countries. Further research is needed to expand the 
study of structural change from an embodied and post-growth perspective to 
other countries.  
Sixth, while the use of the sector classification from the national accounts has 
many advantages, it also has limits for capturing the effect of newly emerging 
sectors. New products are usually assigned to existing sectors. The issue is 
important when considering structural change for a post-growth economy, 
because the pursuit of novelty is an important driver of consumption and the 
innovation of new products is an important objective for businesses (Saviotti and 
Pyka, 2017; Jackson, 2017, p.113). Future research on structural change for a post-
growth transition should investigate more explicitly the interlinkages between 
innovation and novelty and structural change.  
Finally, while using the sectoral classifications from the national accounts has 
many advantages it also imposes important limitations on analysing structural 
change for a post-growth economy. The national accounts do not capture 
activities that are not part of market transactions but are important for the post-
growth economy; unpaid care and other household work; volunteer work in the 




activities are crucial for social functioning and well-being and will be expanded in 
the transition to the post-growth economy. By restricting my analysis to the 
economic sectors in the national accounts I do not capture structural change 
towards such activities. A key task for future research on structural change for a 
post-growth economy will be to develop novel approaches for taking into account 
market and non-market activities. In addition the current sectoral classification is 
not well suited to capture other, more transformative, aspects of structural 
change that go beyond shifts between different kinds of sectors. The transition to 
a post-growth economy will likely see a transformation of the way that different 
products and services are delivered and used, for example shifts from product to 
service delivery and the adoption of alternative business models, such as 
cooperatives and not-for-profit enterprises. While such transformations were not 
the topic of this thesis, they will interact with and shape the structural change in 
terms of shifts between sectors. Such interactions therefore constitute a fruitful 
topic for future research on structural change for a post-growth economy.  
5.6 Concluding remarks  
Building a post-growth economy that can deliver wellbeing within planetary 
boundaries requires an urgent transformation of our economic system. Such a 
transformation will inevitably change the composition of goods and services that 
we, in high-income countries, produce and consume. Strategies for the transition 
to a post-growth economy need to account for such structural change and need 
to be tailored to the challenges in specific sectors.  
In my thesis I have set out a systematic approach to identifying the structural 
change needed for a post-growth economy and the associated implications for 
sector-specific strategies. A broad vision emerges. We should aim to reduce 
demand and production in energy-intensive industries, such as agriculture, 
manufacturing and transport as much as possible. For the remaining production 
in such sectors we should encourage local, small-scale and labour-intensive 
production methods as long as it is consistent with environmental limits. 
Demand for labour-intensive services can be increased in order to create 
meaningful employment in areas of care, education, culture or restaurants. For 




we need to develop strategies to make sure that they deliver for the common 
good.  
Much more research is needed to work out the details of such a vision. Where 
exactly should demand be reduced and how can it be done fairly? Where exactly 
are more labour-intensive production methods desirable and feasible? Where 
would it make sense to reverse historical offshoring and where would it not? 
What are the implications for employment and energy use if such changes are 
adopted at scale? The post-growth community needs to answer such questions in 
order to build a coherent strategy for the post-growth transition.  
Structural change in high-income countries has already taken us towards the 
vision, but only part of the way. Shifts in output have made a small contribution 
to reductions in direct energy intensity in many countries, but not so much in 
embodied energy intensity. Direct employment has shifted towards service 
sectors, including some labour-intensive services, but the majority of embodied 
employment remains in the supply chains of energy-intensive goods. Such 
structural change has been intertwined with economic growth. It has been driven 
by strong labour productivity growth in the manufacturing sectors, the offshoring 
of energy- and labour-intensive production abroad and continuously rising 
incomes. A post-growth economy will work on different principles and we cannot 
rely on any of those drivers to produce the desired structural change.  
Discussing structural change makes the vision of a post-growth economy more 
concrete because it helps us to imagine what kind of things we will produce and 
consume. Thinking about strategies to achieve structural change also helps us to 
integrate different policy proposals for a post-growth economy into a bigger 
picture and to tease out fundamental challenges. Reducing demand in energy-
intensive sectors cannot be done fairly without tackling inequality and 
redistributing income and wealth. Reversing offshoring of energy- and labour-
intensive sectors forces us to confront the injustice of the global system of trade 
and finance. Simultaneously achieving labour productivity growth in some 
sectors, and the adoption of labour-intensive methods in others, requires a 




work. Creating more employment in labour-intensive services needs a strong 
government and other collective institutions to deliver public goods.  
Many undesired aspects of structural change in the current system are driven by 
fundamental features of our market economy, such as competition, profit and the 
need to cut costs. In order to develop effective strategies to achieve the desired 
structural change for a post-growth economy we need to re-evaluate where 
markets in their current form are useful, where they need to be more strongly 
regulated and where they have to be replaced by other systems of provision.  
Confronting all these challenges to achieve a post-growth economy presents an 
immense task that will meet political resistance from powerful vested interests. 
The sector-based vision of structural change illuminates the struggles lying 
ahead. Most of the biggest and most powerful companies operate in sectors that 
will need to be fundamentally transformed. Giant fossil fuel companies will have 
to disappear within years. Retail chains built around continuously increasing 
sales of cheap, manufactured products will not be sustainable. Tech companies 
relying on advertising revenues will be hard hit by any regulations that restrict 
advertising and consumption. Post-growth research can therefore not stop at the 
development of policies but also needs to analyse realistic pathways of change 
that can actually lead to the implementation of such policies. Such an analysis 
will need to take a systemic perspective and consider power relations, historical 
trajectories of change and the reform of our democratic systems (Pirgmaier and 
Steinberger, 2019).  
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Appendix A: Additional results for Chapter 2 
Table A 1: Change in final energy consumption between 1997 and 2013 attributed 
to the different decomposition factors for each sector. The results are obtained by 
first applying equation 2-4 to each effect, sector and year and then summing the 
results for each sector across the whole time period. 
















     
Iron & Steel -163 -1767 -1727 -64 702 175 -2844 
Non-ferrous 
Metals 
-329 -13 -671 55 309 88 -561 
Mineral 
Products 
-163 -25 -554 -201 760 285 102 








-95 -26 -428 78 258 86 -127 
Vehicles -270 -542 24 -243 440 122 -469 
Food, Beverages 
& Tobacco 





-83 532 -836 -279 301 92 -273 
Paper, Printing 
and Publishing 
-501 -20 -555 -485 677 212 -674 
Other Industries -761 -152 -1159 -1039 2168 753 -189 
Construction 13 -397 20 -90 209 65 -181 
Total 
industrial 
-5007 -5501 -8385 -3817 9172 2821 -10717 





     
Agriculture -475 404 -286 -384 315 95 -332 
Commercial 
Services 
-1404 -4130 11 2896 3245 1190 1808 
Public 
Administration 
-911 -5509 78 1496 2042 647 -2156 
Total non-
industrial  
-2790 -14737 -197 4008 5602 1932 -681 
        





Appendix B: Additional results for Chapter 3  
Table A 2: Distribution of UK sectoral embodied labour by source region (%)  












Agriculture        
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing 
4.8 4.9 0.4 6.6 2.4 30.2 50.7 
Production & Construction 
Mineral Products 19.1 6.4 1.3 2.2 4.5 53.5 13.0 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
14.2 12.8 1.1 4.1 6.7 46.1 15.0 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 3.7 6.2 0.6 1.5 36.9 45.4 5.6 
Paper, printing, 
Publishing 
34.1 9.5 1.6 1.9 7.0 40.5 5.4 
Chemicals 6.7 12.7 4.2 4.1 17.9 44.0 10.4 
Metals and Fabricated 
Metal Products 
21.2 13.2 3.0 2.3 8.8 45.1 6.4 
Machinery, Electrical, 
Equipment, Computers 
8.5 14.1 3.5 1.8 27.5 39.2 5.4 
Transport Equipment 11.4 22.1 3.1 2.3 8.3 45.8 7.0 
Other Manufacturing 9.4 12.8 4.5 2.2 21.4 43.4 6.3 
Construction 73.0 4.1 0.8 0.8 3.3 14.5 3.5 
Labour-light Services        
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
85.1 5.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 5.9 2.4 
Transport 32.6 11.6 2.5 2.2 4.9 33.8 12.4 
Finance and Insurance 62.9 4.5 1.9 1.7 2.9 20.3 5.8 
Real Estate Activities 59.1 4.8 2.3 1.0 2.9 25.0 4.9 
IT and Communication 76.9 4.3 1.0 0.5 1.7 11.7 3.8 
Business Services 61.9 6.1 3.1 1.0 2.9 20.8 4.3 
Labour-intensive Services 
Hotels and Restaurants 28.6 7.8 3.2 1.3 14.3 22.6 22.3 
Public Administration 70.0 4.0 1.4 0.8 3.0 17.0 3.7 
Health 72.7 2.2 0.6 0.5 1.7 20.0 2.3 
Education 62.7 3.2 1.1 0.9 3.4 25.0 3.6 






















Agriculture        
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing 
4.5 7.5 0.4 7.8 2.9 38.4 38.6 
Production & Construction 
Mineral Products 12.6 10.5 1.6 3.3 5.8 53.3 13.0 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
19.8 14.1 0.8 5.8 8.1 32.4 19.0 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 2.8 11.9 0.7 2.0 34.0 41.8 6.8 
Paper, printing, 
Publishing  
27.5 22.0 2.0 1.5 6.7 33.8 6.5 
Chemicals 12.4 14.3 4.8 3.3 17.0 38.6 9.6 
Metals and Fabricated 
Metal Products 
20.9 24.1 1.6 2.3 7.0 37.2 6.9 
Machinery, Electrical, 
Equipment, Computers 
12.7 17.0 2.6 1.9 23.9 36.4 5.6 
Transport Equipment 14.8 24.8 4.2 4.0 10.2 33.7 8.2 
Other Manufacturing 22.0 23.5 1.6 2.0 13.5 30.9 6.5 
Construction 53.2 10.5 1.2 1.0 6.3 22.6 5.2 
Labour-light Services        
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
69.9 15.5 0.5 0.8 1.2 7.7 4.4 
Transport 19.9 13.3 3.0 1.6 5.2 42.9 14.2 
Finance and Insurance 59.2 5.0 2.4 1.9 4.0 21.3 6.3 
Real Estate Activities 61.5 6.2 2.0 0.9 3.8 20.6 4.9 
IT and Communication 58.8 7.7 2.1 0.6 2.9 19.9 8.0 
Business Services 72.8 4.5 4.3 0.7 2.2 12.8 2.8 
Labour-intensive Services 
Hotels and Restaurants 40.6 7.0 4.9 1.8 11.7 17.2 16.8 
Public Administration 67.2 5.4 2.9 1.1 3.4 14.6 5.3 
Health 80.9 3.3 1.5 0.5 1.8 9.1 2.8 
Education 66.1 5.8 1.4 1.7 4.3 15.3 5.4 





Table A 4: Rates of change in embodied energy intensity and embodied labour 
productivity as well as in the embodied energy-labour ratio for domestic demand 
sectors between 1995 and 2006. Intensities represent embodied energy and 
labour inputs per unit real demand (const. 2010 EUR). 
 Cumulative Annual Growth Rate between 1995 and 2006 (%)  














Agriculture       
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing 
−6.1 4.7 −2.2 −2.8 3.1 −1.1 
Production & Construction 
Mineral Products 3.7 −2.6 3.1 0.5 −0.5 −0.5 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
0.0 −1.0 2.7 −0.3 −1.0 0.9 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 1.1 3.4 0.3 −2.0 −0.5 −0.2 
Paper, printing, Publishing 1.5 0.5 3.3 0.5 1.3 −0.8 
Chemicals −4.1 3.3 −0.8 −1.6 0.8 −0.8 
Metals and Fabricated 
Metal Products 
−4.8 3.0 0.1 −2.7 0.7 0.5 
Machinery, Electrical, 
Equipment, Computers 
−4.0 3.2 −0.5 −1.7 0.3 −1.6 
Transport Equipment −3.4 2.3 0.9 −0.5 −2.0 1.3 
Other Manufacturing 1.0 −0.3 3.5 0.3 −0.1 0.8 
Construction −0.4 −0.8 6.2 0.0 −0.2 −0.2 
Labour-light Services       
Wholesale and Retail Trade −2.6 3.3 3.6 −1.0 1.8 −0.6 
Transport −2.0 1.3 1.9 0.5 −0.1 0.9 
Finance and Insurance −5.9 5.1 2.1 8.9 −6.5 12.0 
Real Estate Activities −2.9 1.2 1.9 −0.9 1.3 −0.6 
IT and Communication −7.7 8.4 −3.0 −0.7 3.1 −3.3 
Business Services −3.6 2.4 3.2 2.1 −1.4 0.6 
Labour-intensive Services 
Hotels and Restaurants −1.0 0.0 5.1 1.0 0.3 2.4 
Public Administration −1.4 −0.9 4.8 −1.5 0.2 0.7 
Health −0.9 −2.5 7.3 −1.5 −0.8 1.9 
Education 0.7 −0.3 4.6 −1.2 0.1 0.2 
Other Services 0.0 −0.6 6.3 0.3 −0.8 1.6 





Figure A 1: Relationship between change in embodied labour productivity and 
the average embodied energy intensity for domestic demand sectors between 




Figure A 2: Relationship between change in sector price indices and the average 






Table A 5: Sectoral rates of change in direct labour productivity in the UK and 
Germany between 1995 and 2011. 
Sectors 
Cumulative rate of change in 
direct labour productivity * (%) 
 UK DE 
Agriculture   
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 4.1 4.3 
Production & Construction   
Mineral Products −1.2 3.3 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 3.7 −1.3 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 4.8 3.7 
Paper, printing, Publishing 3.0 6.4 
Chemicals 6.4 2.1 
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 3.1 2.0 
Machinery, Electrical, Equipment, 
Computers 
5.6 4.2 
Transport Equipment 5.4 3.3 
Other Manufacturing 3.2 2.5 
Construction −0.2 0.1 
Labour-light Services   
Wholesale and Retail Trade 2.6 2.0 
Transport 3.0 4.6 
Finance and Insurance 6.6 −0.6 
Real Estate Activities - - 
IT and Communication 7.9 4.2 
Business Services 3.8 −2.2 
Labour-intensive Services   
Hotels and Restaurants 1.0 1.9 
Public Administration −0.6 1.7 
Health −2.8 −1.7 
Education 1.1 1.0 
Other Services 0.8 0.2 
Total 2.4 1.7 
*: Direct labour productivity is calculated as sectoral GVA (in constant 2010 prices) per hour of 






Appendix C: Supplementary information on the energy extension vector  
C.1 Introduction 
For our study we construct a global extension vector for EXIOBOASE specifying 
direct final energy consumption across sectors and regions. We construct this 
vector in two steps. In the first step we use data on final energy consumption 
provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in combination with 
information on monetary output and expenditure from EXIOBASE to construct a 
complete vector for all countries and regions outside Germany and the UK 
(described in Secion C.2). In a second step we use national data sources to 
construct more detailed vectors of direct energy inputs for the UK and Germany 
respectively (described in Sections C.3 and C.4). 
C.2 Global energy extension vector  
C.2.1 Data sources  
We construct the vector of direct energy inputs to match the data on monetary 
flows from the EXIOBASE database. We use the symmetric input-output tables of 
EXIOBASE version 3.4. The EXIOBASE 3.4 database is available at 
http://exiobase.eu/index.php/data- download/exiobase3mon. The database 
covers the period from 1995 to 2011 and represents the global economy in 44 
countries and 5 rest-of-the-world regions. Each national/regional economy is 
disaggregated  into 163 sectors based on NACE rev.1.1 classification. However, for 
our purposes we aggregate the database to a level of 70 sectors, largely by 
removing detailed sub-classifications in the sectors of agriculture, food 
production, metal mining and processing and recycling. We perform this 
aggregation to 70 sectors because our energy data do not provide a similar level 
of detail and it simplifies computation and analysis (Table A6). The term 
“EXIOBASE sectors” will be used from hereafter to describe the 70 aggregated 
sectors and sector numbers will refer to the numbers in Table A6, ranging from 1 





Table A 6: Sector classification used in the MRIO analysis  
No Sector NACE 1.1   
1 Agriculture 01 
2 Forestry 02 
3 Fishing 05 
4 Mining of coal and lignite 10 
5 Extraction of crude petroleum and nat. gas 11 
6 Other mining and quarrying 12-14 
7 Manufacture of food products 15.1-8 
8 Manufacture of beverages 15.9 
9 Manufacture of tobacco products 16 
10 Manufacture of textiles 17 
11 Manufacture of clothes 18 
12 Manufacture of leather products 19 
13 Manufacture of wood products 20 
14 Manufacture of paper and paper products 21 
15 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 22 
16 Manufacture of coke oven products 23.1 
17 Petroleum refinery 23.2 
18 Processing of nuclear fuel 23.3 
19 Manufacture of chemicals  24 
20 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 25 
21 Manufacture of non-metallic minerals 26 
22 Manufacture of basic iron and steel   
27.1-3, 
27.5 
23 Manufacture of non-ferrous metals 27.4 
24 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 28 
25 Manufacture of machinery and equipment nec  29 
26 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 30 
27 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus nec  31 
28 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus  32 
29 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks  33 
30 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 
31 Manufacture of other transport equipment 35 
32 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing nec  36 
33 Recycling 37 
34 Production of electricity from coal 40.11 
35 Production of electricity from gas 40.11 
36 Production of electricity from nuclear power  40.11 
37 Production of electricity from renewables and other sources  40.11 
38 Transmission and distribution of electricity 
40.12,40.1
3 




No Sector NACE 1.1   
40 Steam and hot water supply 40.3 
41 Water collection, purification and distribution  41 
42 Construction 45 
43 Sale, maintenance, repair of motor vehicles 50 
44 Wholesale and commission trade 51 
45 Retail trade 52 
46 Hotels and restaurants 55 
47 Transport via railways 60.1 
48 Other land transport 60.2 
49 Transport via pipelines 60.3 
50 Water transport 61 
51 Air transport 62 
52 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities 63 
53 Post and telecommunications 64 
54 Financial intermediation except insurance 65 
55 Insurance and pension funding 66 
56 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 67 
57 Real estate activities 70 
58 Renting of machinery and equipment 71 
59 Computer and related activities 72 
60 Research and development 73 
61 Other business activities 74 
62 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security  75 
63 Education 80 
64 Health and social work 85 
65 Sewage and refuse disposal 90 
66 Activities of membership organisation nec  91 
67 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 92 
68 Other service activities 93 
69 Private households with employed persons 95 
70 Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 99 
For the construction of the energy extension vector we draw on data from the 
Extended World Energy Balances provided by the International Energy Agency 
(IEA, 2018) to produce information on the direct final energy inputs for each 
sector and each country/region in EXIOBASE. However, the direct energy inputs 
for the UK and Germany are later replaced by more detailed information from 
domestic sources. The energy balances provide details on the energy production, 




Given that we are only interested in final energy data, we only use the 
information on Total Final Consumption (TFC) in the energy balances, which is 
subdivided into 27 energy flows (Table A7). We download the data for the 27 
flows for all countries available in the energy balances and aggregate the data of 
individual countries to the 49 countries/regions used in EXIOBASE. We then 
exclude the two flows of non-energy use and residential energy consumption, 
because our study focuses on energy inputs into economic production. This 
leaves us with the relevant final energy consumption in each EXIOBASE 
country/region disaggregated into 25 IEA flows.  
In the following we describe how we map the 25 IEA flows onto the 70 
EXIOBASE sectors.  
C.2.2 Industry 
Table A7 describes how the 13 industry-related direct energy flows were mapped 
onto the relevant 25 industry and construction sectors in EXIOBASE (6-15,19-
33,41-42 in Table A6). IEA flows that only correspond to one EXIOBASE sector 
are directly assigned to that sector. IEA flows that correspond to multiple 
EXIOBASE sectors are split in proportion with the total monetary expenditure on 
energy in each sector. The expenditure on energy of each sector was obtained by 
summing the intermediate expenditures on the energy-producing sectors (4-5,16-
18,34-40 in Table A6) from the EXIOBASE tables. 
We used expenditure on energy rather than total sectoral output for splitting the 
IEA flows, because a comparison of the results of both methods for the UK 
revealed that the energy expenditure approach produced results that better 
matched the more detailed information available from domestic data UK sources.   
The IEA flow of “non-specified industry” includes both the energy use in industry 
sectors that are not covered by the other industry flows, as well as any energy use 
that cannot be allocated to a specific industry due to lack of information. We 
allocate this flow only to the EXIOBASE industry sectors that are not covered by 
the other IEA flows (i.e. sectors 25, 32,33,41 in Table A6) in proportion to the 




Table A 7: IEA energy flows from TFC and corresponding EXIOBASE sectors 
(sector numbers refer to Table A6).  
IEA TFC flow EXIOBASE sectors  Method for allocation 
Industry   
Iron and steel 22,24 EXIOBASE energy expenditure 
Chemical and petrochemical 19 Direct 
Non-ferrous metals 23 Direct 
Non-metallic minerals 21 Direct 
Transport equipment 30-31 EXIOBASE energy expenditure 
Machinery 25-29 EXIOBASE energy expenditure 
Mining and quarrying 6 Direct 
Food and tobacco 7-9 EXIOBASE energy expenditure 
Paper, pulp and print 14,15 EXIOBASE energy expenditure 
Wood and wood products 13 Direct 
Construction 42 Direct 
Textile and leather 10-12 EXIOBASE energy expenditure 
Non-specified (industry) 25,32-33,41 EXIOBASE energy expenditure 
Transport   
Domestic aviation 51 See details in text 
Road 48 See details in text 
Rail 47 Direct 
Pipeline transport 49 Direct 
Domestic navigation 50 See details in text 
Non-specified (transport) 47-51 See details in text 
World aviation bunkers 51 See details in text 
World marine bunkers 50 See details in text 
Other   
Commercial and public services 43-46, 52-68 EXIOBASE output 
Agriculture/forestry 1-2 EXIOBASE output 
Fishing 3 Direct 
Non-specified (other) 1-3,6-15,19-33, 41-68 See details in text  
Excluded flows   
Residential  - - 





C.2.3 Transport  
C.2.3.1 Rail, pipeline and non-specified transport 
The IEA energy flows for rail and pipeline transport are directly assigned to the 
respective EXIOBASE sectors. The IEA flow of “non-specified (transport)” is 
allocated across all transport sectors in proportion to economic output in the 
sectors.  
C.2.3.2 Road transport 
The treatment of the IEA energy flow for road transport is more difficult and 
poses several challenges. Firstly, it includes the energy used by private 
households, which we have to exclude for our analysis, as we are only interested 
in energy used for commercial purposes. Information on the share of non-
commercial road transport energy use in total road transport energy use is not 
available in a single consistent database. 
Therefore we rely on different data sources to obtain the necessary information. 
For those countries that publish greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories under the 
UNFCCC, we use the share of CO2 emissions produced by cars in the total road 
transport CO2 emissions as a proxy for the share of non-commercial road 
transport energy use. For all remaining countries we tried to obtain estimates 
from the academic literature or from other statistical sources. Where such 
sources were not available, we used the shares obtained for different countries 
that we considered to be sufficiently similar. For the rest-of-the-world regions we 
obtained the information for a single country in the region as an estimate for the 
share of non-commercial transport in the whole region.  
Secondly, IEA energy balances are assembled based on a territorial  principle, 
while national economic accounts and EXIOBASE follow a residency principle 
(Stadler et al., 2018). This is particularly problematic for the transport sector. In 
the IEA balances, transport energy use is recorded where the fuel is used (or 
sold), no matter whether the company (or person) using the fuel is resident in 
the country. In contrast the economic activity is recorded in the country of 
residency of the company or person. This means that ideally the figures for road 




foreign vehicles in the country and the energy used by domestic vehicles outside 
the country. However, such information is not easily obtained and detailed 
modelling would be beyond the constraints of this study. We therefore do not 
perform any adjustments of this nature, essentially assuming that energy use by 
domestic vehicles abroad is similar to energy use by foreign vehicles domestically. 
This is not the case in many countries and this assumptions therefore adds to the 
uncertainty of this analysis. However, we consider it unlikely that taking into 
account such adjustments in road transport would significantly alter our 
overarching conclusions.  
Thirdly, once the total energy use for commercial road transport is estimated, 
this figure cannot simply be allocated to the direct EXIOBASE sector for road 
transport, which only captures the logistics sector. Instead the IEA data capture 
all road energy by commercial vehicles, many of which are directly operated by 
companies in direct sectors outside logistics, for example supermarket 
distribution lorries. The data on commercial road transport energy use therefore 
need to be split and allocated across a range of direct economic sectors. The only 
country for which we found information of this nature is Germany for the years 
1995 to 2001 (see Section C.3). Therefore we use the German data to estimate the 
allocation of commercial road transport energy use across the direct EXIOBASE 
sectors for all other countries/regions. We achieve this in three steps. Firstly, we 
obtain the German road transport intensity of each sector by dividing sectoral 
road transport energy use by industry sector output from EXIOBASE. As the 
intensities are relatively stable, we obtain the average German intensities over the 
seven years provided to apply them to all other countries and years. Secondly, we 
multiply the average German road transport energy intensities for each sector 
with total output in each sector and each year in the other countries. Thirdly, we 
scale these results in each country so that the sectoral road transport energy use 
adds up to the total energy use for commercial road transport in the country.    
C.2.3.3 Aviation and marine transport 
The energy use of internal aviation and marine transport (i.e. international 
marine and aviation bunkers) pose similar challenges to road transport, again 




while EXIOBASE is built on the residency principle. A detailed modelling of 
aviation and marine trade flows to allocate international bunkers to the right 
countries is, again, beyond the constraints of this study.  
For simplicity we therefore assume that the aviation sectors across all 
countries/regions have the same direct energy intensity of output set to the 
global average. The economic output of the aviation sector in EXIOBASE does 
not distinguish between domestic and international aviation, as the IEA data do. 
To obtain the global average intensity we therefore add international aviation 
bunkers and energy use for domestic aviation across all countries to obtain the 
total global energy use for aviation. We then divide the total aviation energy use 
by the sum of economic output in the aviation sectors across all 
countries/regions in EXIOBASE to obtain the global average direct energy 
intensity. The global aviation energy use is then reallocated to the direct aviation 
sectors in the individual countries based on their economic output and the 
average global intensity. For marine transport energy use we adopt the same 
process.  
Our process of allocation therefore relies on very simplified assumptions, but we 
considered that they represent the best possible solution within the constraints 
of this study. Aviation and marine transport each make up about 5% of 
commercial global final energy consumption in 2011 (i.e. excluding residential, 
private transport and non-energy use). The assumptions therefore add a degree 
of uncertainty to our results.   
C.2.4 Other flows 
Of the remaining flows, the energy use for fishing and construction are assigned 
directly to the respective direct EXIOBASE sectors. The agriculture/forestry flow 
in the IEA balances was split according to sector output as reported in 
EXIOBASE.  
The IEA extended energy balances only feature a single flow describing all  direct 
final energy consumption in the commercial and public service sectors. We split 
this flow into the relevant direct EXIOBASE sectors (43-46, 52-68 in Table A6) in 




contrast to the industry sectors, we use total output and not energy expenditure 
for the service sectors because the energy expenditure approach produces 
unrealistically low values of direct energy consumption in some service sectors.  
Finally, the energy balances include a flow labelled as “Non-specified (other)” 
which includes all energy use that is not assigned to other categories (including 
for military use). Values for this category are mostly between 0 and 2% of overall 
final energy use (excl. non-energy use) for most countries/regions but can reach 
higher values (up to 10%) in some years and some countries/regions. The 
category is therefore non-negligible but there is no information on what the 
energy is used for. In the absence of better information we distribute the flow 
across all energy-using sectors in proportion to sectoral output.  
C.2.5 Sectors without final energy consumption  
Some of the 70 EXIOBASE sectors were not assigned any direct final energy use 
from the IEA flows. This includes those sectors that produce primary energy 
carriers (e.g. coal mining) or transform them into final energy carriers (e.g. 
electricity production). By definition, these sectors (4-5,16-18,34-40 in Table A6) 
are not users of final energy and therefore do not feature a direct final energy 
consumption in the IEA balances. In addition we also did not assign any final 
energy consumption to the sectors “Private Households with Employed Persons”, 
because we consider that the sector does not have energy use separate from 
private residential use. We didn’t assign any energy consumption to the sector 
“Extraterritorial bodies and organisations” as this sector does not feature any 
monetary flows in EXIOBASE.  
C.3 Energy extension vector for the UK  
In our study we focus on the embodied energy and labour of final demand in the 
UK or Germany. To reduce some of the uncertainty associated with the IEA data, 
we construct more detailed extension vectors for these two countries drawing on 






C.3.1 Data sources  
For the UK we make extensive use of the 2018 version of the Energy 
Consumption in the UK (ECUK) dataset, published by the Department for 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (Department for Business Energy & 
Industrial Strategy, 2018). This was complemented by monetary flows from the 
EXIOBASE database if necessary.  
C.3.2 Industry  
For industry sectors, the ECUK dataset provides data on direct energy 
consumption at the 2-digit level of the SIC2003 classification. This classification 
mostly matches the industry and construction EXIOBASE sectors (6-15,19-33,41-
42 in Table A6). The only exception is the aggregated food and beverages sector 
which we split into food and beverages according to EXIOBASE energy 
expenditure. For the years 2010 and 2011 the ECUK database provides data in 
SIC2007 classification (corresponds to NACE rev. 2) which we transformed into 
NACE rev1.1 classification to match our EXIOBASE sectors.  
The industrial energy use listed as “unclassified” in ECUK provides a difficult 
choice for allocation. We decided to add it to the sector “Manufacture of 
furniture; manufacturing nec” because the sectors featured unrealistically low 
values of direct energy intensity otherwise. However, some of the unclassified 
energy is also likely to be used in other sectors. As a result our estimates of direct 
and embodied energy intensity for the sector “Manufacture of furniture; 
manufacturing nec” is an overestimate, while the direct and embodied intensities 
in the other manufacturing sectors are underestimated.  
C.3.3 Transport  
We do not recalculate direct energy use for marine transport and aviation for the 
UK but instead take it from the global extension vectors (described in Section 
C.2.3) to make sure that it is consistent with our global assumptions.  
The ECUK dataset provides separate information on road transport energy use 
for passenger and freight transport as well as for different transport modes. This 
allows an estimation of the commercial road transport energy use. However, 




used. We therefore estimate the allocation of road transport energy use to 
EXIOBASE sectors using the German data as described in Section C.2.3. 
Data on rail transport energy use are provided in the ECUK. We obtain energy 
use for pipeline transport (which is very small in the UK) from the IEA data, as no 
information is provided in ECUK.  
C.3.4 Other energy users  
The ECUK dataset provides information on the aggregate energy use for the 
sectors agriculture, forestry and fishing. We split this energy use according to 
sector proportions in EXIOBASE output to obtain the direct energy use in the 
three individual sectors.  
For the commercial and public service sectors the ECUK dataset provides the 
aggregate direct energy use for all years covered in this study as well as a more 
detailed breakdown for the years 2010 and 2011. Table A8 describes the sub-
categories for which data are provided in 2010 and 2011 and the EXIOBASE 
sectors we assigned to these sub-categories. We estimate the energy consumption 
in each sub-category for the years 1995-2009 from the data for 2010/2011 using 
the following steps. Firstly, we obtain the total economic output for each sub-
category by summing the output of the relevant sectors from EXIOBASE.  
Table A 8: ECUK energy use in service sector sub-categories and corresponding 
EXIOBASE sectors (sector numbers refer to Table A6).  
ECUK service sector sub-
category EXIOBASE sectors  Method for allocation 
Commercial offices 54-61 EXIOBASE output 
Communication and transport 52-53 EXIOBASE output 
Education 63 Direct 
Government 62 Direct 
Health 64 Direct 
Hotel and Catering 46 Direct 
Other 65-66, 68 EXIOBASE output 
Retail and warehouses 43-45 EXIOBASE output 





Secondly, we use the output figures to calculate the average direct energy 
intensity of output in each subcategory for the years 2010 to 2011.  
Thirdly, we multiply the average direct energy intensity with the economic 
output in the sub-categories for the years 1995-2009. Finally, we scale these 
results so that the sum of direct energy use in all sub-categories matches the 
aggregate direct energy use in the services sectors reported. In essence this 
process assumes that the relative direct energy intensities in the sub-categories 
stay constant at their 2010/2011 value for the whole time period.  
Once we have obtained the direct energy use in each sub-category and each year, 
the sub-categories are allocated to the relevant EXIOBASE sector in proportion to 
EXIOBASE sector output (Table A8).  
  
C.4 Energy extension vector for Germany  
C.4.1 Data sources 
To create a more detailed extension vector for Germany we draw on three 
important data sources. To obtain direct energy use in the industrial sectors as 
well as aggregate direct energy use in commercial and public services we use the 
data provided in the German energy balances (AG Energiebilanzen, 2019). In 
addition, we use statistical reports on direct energy use in the sector “Gewerbe, 
Handel, Dienstleistungen” (GHD), which provides detailed estimates of direct 
energy use in the non-industrial and non-transport sectors for the year 1994 
(Geiger et al., 1999) and the years 2001-2011 (Schlomann et al., 2004; Schlomann 
et al., 2009; Schlomann et al., 2013). In combination these reports will be 
referred to as GHD reports hereafter. Finally, the Berichtsmodul Verkehr und 
Umwelt (Adler, 2005) provides information on the transport energy use allocated 
to different sectors for the years 1995 to 2001.  
C.4.2 Industry 
We obtain information on direct energy use in industry for the years 1995 to 2011 
from the Germany energy balances. Table A9 outlines the direct energy flows 
provided in the balances and the EXIOBASE sectors to which we allocate them. 




Table A 9: Energy use in the industrial sectors from German energy balances and 
corresponding EXIOBASE sectors (numbers refer to Table A6). 
German energy balance flow 
EXIOBASE 
sectors  Method for allocation 
Gewinnung von Steinen und Erden, sonst. 
Bergbau 
6 Direct 
Ernährung und Tabak 7-9 EXIOBASE energy expenditure 
Papiergewerbe 14 Direct 
Grundstoffchemie and Sonstige chemische 
Industrie 
19 Direct 
Gummi- u. Kunststoffwaren 20 Direct 
Glas u. Keramik and Verarbeitung v. Steine u. 
Erden 
21 Direct 
Metallerzeugung 22 Direct 
NE-Metalle, -gießereien 23 Direct 
Metallbearbeitung 24 Direct 
Maschinenbau 25-29 EXIOBASE energy expenditure 
Fahrzeugbau 30-31 EXIOBASE energy expenditure 
Sonstige Wirtschaftszweige 10-12,15,32-33 EXIOBASE energy expenditure 
EXIOBASE sectors, we allocate the direct energy use to the relevant EXIOBASE 
sectors in proportion to EXIOBASE energy expenditure. Contrary to the IEA and 
UK energy data, the construction and water sectors are not treated as part of the 
industrial sectors. They are instead allocated to the GHD category treated in the 
reports mentioned above.   
C.4.3 Transport 
We do not recalculate direct energy use for marine transport and aviation for 
Germany but instead take it from the global extension vectors (described in 
Section C.2.3) to make sure that it is consistent with our global assumptions.  
The German energy balances provide information on the total road transport 
energy use in Germany. We obtained estimates of the proportion of commercial 
road transport energy for the years 1994 to 2001 from Adler (2005) and for the 
year 2016 from Statistisches Bundesamt (2018). We obtain the value of the 
proportion of commercial road transport energy use for the years 2002 – 2011 
using linear interpolation and use the values to estimate total commercial road 




Adler (2005) also gives the allocation of road transport energy use to different 
economic sectors for the years 1994 to 2001. The sector shares in transport 
energy use remain relatively stable. Therefore we assume constant sector shares 
for the years 2002 to 2011, set to the values for 2001, and use these shares to 
estimate direct sectoral transport energy use from total commercial road 
transport energy use. The resulting values are then aggregated to EXIOBASE 
sectors and the energy use added to non-transport forms of energy use in the 
sectors.  
Data on rail transport energy use is provided in the German energy balances. We 
obtain energy use for pipeline transport from the IEA data, as no information is 
provided in the German energy balances. 
C.4.4. Other flows  
In the German energy balances all other flows are covered in a single category 
labelled “Gewerbe, Handel, Dienstleistungen” (GHD). The GHD reports provide a 
more detailed investigation of direct energy use split into 37 different sub-sectors 
for the years 1994 (Geiger et al., 1999) and 2001-2011 (Schlomann et al., 2004; 
Schlomann et al., 2009; Schlomann et al., 2013) in a mostly consistent format. 
Direct sectoral energy use for the 37 sectors and years 1995 to 2000 was obtained 
using linear interpolation. The GHD reports produce results  that are not 
completely consistent with the total GHD energy use reported in the energy 
balances, although differences between the totals are small. To make the energy 
extension for Germany as consistent as possible with the German energy 
balances, we scale the sectoral energy use in the GHD reports to match the total 
GHD use in the energy balances.  
We then transform the energy use in the 37 GHD sectors for the years 1995 to 
2011 into the relevant EXIOBASE sectors. Where energy use had to be split from 
one GHD category into multiple EXIOBASE sectors we allocated the energy use 
in proportion to EXIOBASE output. The GHD category mostly covers the non-
transport public and commercial service sectors (41, 43-46, 52-68 in Table A6), as 
well as construction (42) and agriculture, forestry and fishing (1-3). However, it 




employees) in the industry sectors (e.g. artisan bakeries), as well as some energy 
use that is used in the transport sector for non-transport purposes (e.g. energy 
use in airports).  
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Appendix D: Additional information for Chapter 4 
Table A 10: Rates of change in direct and embodied energy intensity in the UK 
and Germany (DE). 
 
Annual rate of change in direct 
energy intensity (%) 
Annual rate of change in 
embodied energy intensity (%) 
Sector UK DE UK DE 
Group 1     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing -4.5 -2.5 -4.7 -3.3 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco -2.6 1.0 -2.4 -0.1 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 1.8 -1.7 0.0 -1.8 
Paper, Printing, Publishing  -1.0 -1.2 -1.8 -1.9 
Chemicals  -5.9 0.3 -4.8 -0.3 
Metals and Fabricated Metal 
Products  
-6.4 -1.8 -3.6 -2.4 
Machinery, Electrical 
Equipment, Computers  
-3.2 -3.5 -4.3 -2.5 
Transport Equipment  -4.4 -2.3 -4.6 -1.5 
Other manufacturing  1.5 0.2 0.7 0.6 
Transport -2.1 -1.9 -2.4 0.1 
Group 2     
Mineral Products  4.4 -1.3 1.6 -0.7 
Construction -2.9 0.7 -0.3 0.3 
Group 3     
Hotels and Restaurants -2.1 -1.2 -1.4 -0.9 
Public Administration -3.8 -3.5 -1.6 -2.1 
Health  -2.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.9 
Education  -4.0 -3.2 -0.7 -1.0 
Other Services  -0.9 -1.9 -0.7 -1.0 
Group 4     
Wholesale and Retail Trade  -2.0 -2.8 -2.0 -3.8 
Finance and Insurance -4.0 0.2 -4.5 6.0 
IT and Communication -6.0 -4.5 -6.5 -2.6 
Business Services  -2.9 0.5 -3.8 -0.2 






Table A 11: Average labour intensity and energy-labour ratio, both direct and 
embodied, for sectors in the UK and Germany between 1995 and 2011 (constant 
2010 EUR).   
 Labour intensity (hours/EUR) Energy-labour ratio (MJ/hour) 
 Direct Embodied Direct Embodied 
Sector UK DE UK DE UK DE UK DE 
Group 1         
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing 
0.067 0.066 0.074 0.063 52 149 49 113 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
0.040 0.033 0.078 0.055 177 176 70 85 
Textiles, Clothes, 
Leather 
0.051 0.026 0.056 0.056 102 253 81 96 
Paper, Printing, 
Publishing  
0.048 0.017 0.059 0.029 108 468 88 142 
Chemicals  0.032 0.011 0.046 0.025 266 701 141 277 
Metals and Fabricated 
Metal Products  
0.046 0.022 0.063 0.042 188 496 95 142 
Machinery, Electrical 
Equipment, Computers  
0.047 0.018 0.067 0.041 39 36 67 77 
Transport Equipment  0.057 0.016 0.081 0.040 60 94 82 101 
Other manufacturing  0.031 0.034 0.057 0.048 385 102 168 77 
Transport 0.037 0.017 0.045 0.035 369 775 302 297 
Group 2         
Mineral Products  0.015 0.018 0.032 0.033 255 596 127 243 
Construction 0.041 0.035 0.043 0.038 16 29 44 74 
Group 3         
Hotels and Restaurants 0.022 0.034 0.028 0.035 51 63 47 63 
Public Administration 0.041 0.031 0.043 0.036 30 36 39 54 
Health  0.033 0.023 0.036 0.026 43 50 49 59 
Education  0.053 0.037 0.054 0.041 14 23 31 39 
Other Services  0.039 0.025 0.043 0.030 50 65 50 71 
Group 4         
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade  
0.040 0.041 0.041 0.046 45 51 48 49 
Finance and Insurance 0.028 0.019 0.037 0.024 9 23 37 41 
IT and Communication 0.085 0.029 0.078 0.036 8 30 21 44 
Business Services  0.022 0.026 0.032 0.031 33 42 43 57 






Table A 12: Sector classification used for presenting the results 
Sector NACE codes (rev. 1.1) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 01, 02, 05 
Mineral Products  13, 14, 26 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15, 16 
Textiles, Clothes, Leather 17, 18, 19 
Paper, Printing, Publishing  21, 22 
Chemicals  24 
Metals and Fabricated Metal Products  27, 28 
Machinery, Electrical Equipment, Computers  29, 30, 31, 32, 33 
Transport Equipment  34, 35 
Other Manufacturing  20, 25, 36, 37 
Construction 45 
Wholesale and Retail Trade  50, 51, 52 
Hotels and Restaurants 55 
Transport 60, 61, 62, 63 
Finance and Insurance 65, 66, 67 
IT and Communication 64, 72 
Professional Services 71, 73, 74 
Public Administration 75 
Health  85 
Education  80 
Other Services  41, 90, 91, 92, 93 
Sectors not presented in empirical results  
Energy Producers 10, 11, 23, 40 
Real Estate Activities 70 
Private households with employed persons 95 
 
 
 
